MULTICULTURALISM IN ENGLAND
THEORIES AND PRACTICE

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Presented By: Mrs. Assia BENFODDA

Supervised By: Prof. Fewzia BEDJAOUI

Members of jury:

President: Dr. Belkacem BENSEDDIK
Supervisor: Dr. Fewzia BEDJAOUI
Examiner: Dr. Radia BENMANSOUR
Examiner: Dr. Azzedine BOUHASSOUN
Examiner: Dr. Naima BOUYACOUB
Examiner: Dr. Rahmouna ZIDANE

University of Sidi Bel Abbes
University of Sidi Bel Abbes
University of Tlemcen
University Centre of Ain Temouchent
University of Tlemcen
University of Tlemcen

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To:

All my family members for their precious support
All my family in law members for their patience
All my friends for their valuable advice
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Abstract

Multiculturalism has become the main matter of modern social and political theory, particularly in contemporary social sciences. It has also occupied a central place in public culture of western liberal democracies and in global political discourse as it is a way to respond to cultural diversity through accentuating the importance of equal treatment of different communities in public sphere and in all aspects of life. Therefore, multiculturalism approaches could be a resolution to cope with conflict and intolerance that result from differences through allowing the existence of many diverse and incompatible theoretical and moral ideals, many belief systems and fundamental values. The thesis investigates the politics and practices of multiculturalism in Britain, with a particular emphasis on England. It aims to provide some possible answers to the controversial question “to what extent is multiculturalism in England successful?” The findings demonstrate that governance framework transformed accordingly as a reaction to the politics of multiculturalism. British governments may have adopted multicultural ideals. Yet its conception and application remain problematic for local government and many state departments. Instead of improving understanding of cultural differences, multiculturalism nurtures apathy toward other people’s lives, thus strengthening parallel societies with different values. In a word, the rise of plural multiculturalism causes a more fractured Britain whose disintegration raises fears over religious aggressiveness and worries over internal terrorism. Consequently, two multicultural approaches are opposed to each other; to one side, neo-mono-cultural commitment to integration with difference. To the other side, neo-multicultural model that challenges conformist notions of diversity and difference. Certainly, matters of culture and identity are connected to economic criteria and public response to immigration and refugees. To the question: “what does it mean to be British in multicultural Britain/England?” multiculturalism remains an issue of intense debate and controversy.

Key words: immigration, integration, cultural diversity, multiculturalism
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<td>BLINK</td>
<td>Black Information Link</td>
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<tr>
<td>BME</td>
<td>Black and Minority Ethnic</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
<td>British Nationalist Party</td>
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<td>Brexit</td>
<td>British exit</td>
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<td>BSF</td>
<td>Building Schools for the Future</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Commission on Integration and Cohesion</td>
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<td>CIH</td>
<td>Chartered Institute of Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMPAS</td>
<td>Centre on Migration, Policy and Society</td>
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<td>CRE</td>
<td>Commission for Racial Equality</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>ESOL</td>
<td>English for Speakers of Other Languages</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>HESA</td>
<td>Higher Education Statistics Agency</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>ILR</td>
<td>Indefinite Leave to Remain</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>KoLL</td>
<td>Knowledge of Language and Life</td>
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<td>LEAs</td>
<td>Local Education Authorities</td>
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<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>MCB</td>
<td>Muslim Council of Britain</td>
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MHCLG: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

MPs: Member of Parliament

NASS: National Asylum Support Service

NCS: National Citizen Service

NCW: New Commonwealth

NDC: New Deal for Communities

NHF: National Housing Federation

ODPM: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister

OFST: Office for Standards in Education

OFSTED: Office for Standards in Education

ONS: Office for National Statistics

ORB: Opinion Research Business

PSAs: Public Service Agreements

RRA: Race Relations Acts

RRAA: Race Relations (Amendment) Act

RSLs: Registered Social Landlords

SET: Searchlight Educational Trust

QLFS: Quarterly Labour Force Survey

UK: United Kingdom

UKIP: UK Independence Party’s

US: United States

USA: United States of America

WRS: Work Registration Scheme
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All human beings are born into a culture and live within a particular cultural context. Hence, cultural detachment seems to be idealistic, as any advance of societal norms will unavoidably privilege one perception over all others. Even the founding of a liberal state with the intention of endorsing as much cultural freedom as possible would fail to attain true impartiality, since this political philosophy would make a set of instructions that not all cultures would admit. Culture, then, is both a condition for individual autonomy and an expected result of his existence.

In addition, culture and society are inseparable so that there is no society without culture and no culture without society. Therefore, the existence of varied cultures in one society brings diversity in human life. “Cultural pluralism”, “cultural diversity” and “multiculturalism” are the most common terms used to define societies of various cultures, religions, languages and races. Yet, “plurality” includes the coexistence of many cultures with no consideration of the way they relate to each other while diversity refers to multiplicity of distinct entities which are different from one another. Likewise, the concept of “multiculturalism” approves the idea of difference and heterogeneity that is embodied in the concept of “diversity”. In modern societies, the state is generally recognised as a majority culture where cultures that are different from this majority are mostly regarded as minorities.

Besides, “pluralism” is not a new phenomenon, but the new issue about it is the growth and expansion of “diversity” in the world. “Pluralism” is a social fact representing different beliefs, attitudes and ways of life. The pluralist world, then, tries to encourage the presence of many diverse and incompatible theoretical and moral standards, belief systems and key values to manage conflict and bigotry that come out of differences. As a result, multiculturalism arose as a reference to a wide variety of theories, attitudes, beliefs, norms, practices and policies in search of public recognition and support for non-dominant cultural groups.
Nevertheless, a multicultural approach is different from social and cultural diversity as it goes beyond the elementary civil and political liberties related to conformist liberal citizenship.

Moreover, multiculturalism becomes the foremost issue of modern social and political theories, particularly in contemporary social sciences. It also occupies a dominant place in public culture of western liberal democracies and in global political discourse. Currently, multicultural debates emphasise the nature of global justice and the search for universal standards of human rights. According to Song (2010), multiculturalism is much related to “identity politics,” “the politics of difference” and “the politics of recognition”, all of which have in common a devotion to re-evaluating discriminated identities and enhancing their representation in public sphere.

Furthermore, European countries are challenging a governance irony: how to democratically rule multi-ethnic, multi-racial, and multi-religious communities, and the identity politics resulted from these differences, without falling into anarchy or regressing into rigidity. Of those European countries in the front of multicultural governance, Britain is placed high in dealing with the contradictions of managing diversities and difference, mainly caused by Commonwealth immigration of principally male labour from the 1950s onward, followed by family reunion in the 1970s, and the 1980s current of both professionals and refugees.

Early discourses, policies, and programmes associated with multiculturalism were enclosed around the skills of immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia. In the post-World War II period, the majority of immigrants came from Commonwealth countries, most of them arrived as children of newly established migrants due to limited entry procedures. A commitment to multicultural doctrines sought to endorse tolerance and respect for shared identities in founding disciplined communities by funding community associations, places of worship and cultural activities, and through promoting a more cohesive British society.
However, peak periods of mass immigration (1958–1962, 1967–1975, 1997–2002) regularly cause public hostility. Newcomers are seen as rivals in employment, housing, and social services, menacing the existing communities and damaging social solidarity. A growing concern over the institutionalisation of tolerance toward difference presses the government to react, through providing financial supports for minority schools, adjusting diet and dress codes, considering different religious and cultural dictates. Yet, according to Grillo (2007), rather than promoting an integrated society based on communication and comprehensiveness, indifference arose instead with a consistent loss of common identity and unity.

Moreover, critics against multiculturalism are rising, especially with events since the mid-1990s, discouraging public trust in the capability and efficiency of the government’s multicultural policies to integrate immigrants and minorities. Denunciations comprise: multiculturalism leads to separation, averts immigrant integration into the leading sector, challenges Britishness/Englishness and central British/English values, and stresses group rights rather than individual rights through privileging culture over cohesion.

With hundreds of thousands of immigrants arriving yearly in the UK, Britain’s plural governance is facing another identity crisis. Pressure is increasing for a more civic-oriented integrationist model to replace multicultural governance; the greater the diversity, the greater the need to elucidate what people have in common. Without cohesion and shared values, critics argue, the belief of Britain/England for the British/English is compromised. The country is now in front of assessing the benefits and weaknesses of its long-standing multicultural policy.

As an EFL teacher interested in cultural studies, I investigate multiculturalism in Britain, with a specific emphasis on England, as it is one among other core topics discussed in British culture and civilisation classes. Through this work, I try to provide a pedagogical support for our
teachers and students. The following study is primarily based on a deductive thematic analysis of multicultural policies and practices in England.

In admitting the shift from highlighting cultural distinctiveness to emphasising Britishness/Englishness values, this thesis examines the politics and practices of multiculturalism in Britain, with a particular focus on England. It aims to provide answers to the following questions:

- What are the policies adopted to integrate immigrants?
- To what extent is multiculturalism in England successful?

The hypotheses formulated are as follows:

- British government has made an exclusive combination of legislation and policies for treating difference, regulating immigration, and nurturing inclusion.
- Many ethnic and religious minorities still feel isolated not because of their socio-economic status but due to their socio-cultural identity.

The thesis is divided into four chapters; the First Chapter, “Theories and Politics of Multiculturalism” discusses politics and theories of multiculturalism. It is an introductory chapter that tries to give some clarifications on the issue of multiculturalism and its controversial theories and politics. In general, multiculturalism refers to the coexistence of different cultures within the same group. It can also be defined as an anti-discrimination policy that ensures equal social status to members of diverse cultures; as an identity policy that promotes the expression of the peculiarities of different cultures; or as a community policy allowing the existence of specific status to members of a particular cultural community.

The Second Chapter, “Immigration, Diversity and Legislation” points out immigrants’ integration in England and the policies adopted to manage their incorporation within society. An integrated British culture arose at the end of the 19th Century. Thanks to the flourishing colonial empire and the booming Industrial Revolution, a strong sense of British identity
emerged. As stated by Colley (1992), the sturdy commitment to Protestantism was the most important reason in uniting the nation. Yet, differences in what the people qualified as “Britishness” and/or “Englishness”, a sentiment of being part of the nation, differed according to class structure, region of the country, ethnic status, etc. Newspapers, education, and spreading a shared common culture fuelled homogenisation processes. More features promoting homogenisation comprised the standardisation of the language and the unification of political and economic institutions. As settled immigrant groups began to integrate political life, new immigrants kept on arriving and settling in the country.

The Third Chapter, “Multiculturalism in Practice: Education, Employment and Housing” analyses multiculturalism in practice through education, employment and housing. The role of education in social reform is similarly important, with education in the 1960s viewed as a key means of integrating minority ethnic groups into the labour market and civil society, and as an instrument for diminishing prejudice and discrimination. Accordingly, the first attempt to multiculturalism via schools was seen with education act by the late 1980s.

Like education, employment is a serious matter in British society, involving social status, housing, health, and leisure. At the start of New Labour’s first term, the 1997 Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities revealed that at each level of educational qualification, unemployment levels for Black Caribbean and Pakistani/Bangladeshi men and women were higher than for white men and women. Similar statistics were noticed for male professional attainment and average earnings. Additionally, there was a great diversity in housing experiences and outcomes for different minority ethnic groups including class, generation, family type and gender differences.

The Fourth Chapter, “Challenges facing Multiculturalism: Local vs. Global” discusses the challenges facing British multiculturalism at both local and global level. Though diversity is vital to official collective
victimhood, pluralism is gradually weakened by its restraint within the emblematic borders of the nation-state; the limits of state multiculturalism depend on racial differences inside and outside national community. Additionally, the expulsion of individuals, considered as a threat to national security due to their actions, religious beliefs, affiliations or associations, proves the racial limits of state multiculturalism compared with Britain’s national interest. The state’s conflicted treatment of British Muslims is another proof of a progressive attempt to separate one from the other, hence revealing the most dominant contradiction in the politics of multicultural nationalism. The conclusion opens new paths of research related to the topic, notably multicultural issues and Britishness/Englishness.
# Chapter One: Theories and Politics of Multiculturalism

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Introduction

This chapter tries to give some explanations on the issue of multiculturalism and its controversial theories and politics. In general, multiculturalism refers to the coexistence of different cultures within the same group. It can also be defined as an anti-discrimination policy that ensures equal social status to members of diverse cultures; as an identity policy that promotes the expression of the peculiarities of different cultures; or as a community policy allowing the existence of specific status to members of a particular cultural community.

1.1 From Diversity to Multiculturalism

Culture means the customs and beliefs, art, way of life and social organisation of a particular country or group. It might be defined as the ideas, customs, skills, arts and tool which characterise a given group of people in a given period. It is a range of socially transmitted and intraintraditionally generated ideas about how to live, to think and to behave. Cultural models are thus inherited from the preceding generation through socialisation and they are learned intraintraditionally and through imitation, teaching and from the media.

Civilisation refers to a highly developed culture, including its social organisation, government, laws, and arts, or the culture of a social group or country at a particular time:

[C]ulture has come to serve as the basis both of imagined communities and individual identities deemed to be ‘authentic’ in contrast to repressive, alien, or otherwise ‘inauthentic’ normative codes, social institutions, and political structures. This historical unwedging of culture and society as political-economic structures has converged with, and greatly reinforced, the idealistic culturalism ... of the disciplines and thinkers primarily involved with multiculturalism. (Turner 1993, p. 424)

The sense of culture, then, is undergoing a historic transformation due to globalisation, the information revolution, consumerism, and other
such phenomena typical of this age. The conscious creation of cultural identities within multicultural politics and the political efficacy of the idea of culture itself, suggest that the concept of culture that is evolving along with multiculturalism contains new elements which are connected with the context of its emergence. Consequently, multiculturalism becomes a form of identity politics, in which culture is merged with ethnic identity.

Any society makes and constantly endorses new cultural norms and ideals. All human beings are born into a culture and lead their lives within a cultural context. Thus cultural neutrality seems to be out of reach, since any evolution of societal standards will necessarily privilege one notion over all others. Even the establishment of a liberal state with the aim of promoting as much cultural freedom as possible would fail to achieve true neutrality, as this political philosophy has to make a set of rules that not all cultures would accept. Culture then could be seen as both a precondition for individual autonomy and a logical and inevitable consequence of his existence.

Besides, culture and society are indivisible in sense that there is no society without culture and no culture without society. Hence, the presence of different cultures in society brings diversity in human life. “Cultural pluralism”, “cultural diversity”\(^1\) and “multiculturalism”\(^2\) are the most common terms used to describe societies of multiple cultures, religions, languages and races.

However, “plurality” suggests the existence of many cultures with no consideration of the way they relate to each other whereas diversity refers to multiplicity of separate entities which are different from one another. Furthermore, the concept of “multiculturalism” supports the idea of difference and heterogeneity that is represented in the concept of “diversity”. In modern societies the state is usually recognised as majority culture where the cultures that are different from this majority are mainly considered as minorities.
Moreover “pluralism” is not a new phenomenon, but the new issue about it is the development and spread of “diversity” in the world of ideas. “Pluralism” is a social fact that is represented in different beliefs, attitudes and ways of life. The pluralist world then would tolerate the existence of many varied and incompatible conceptual and moral ideals, many belief systems and decisive values to deal with conflict and intolerance that come out of differences.

The last four decades of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a bunch of intellectual and political movements led by various groups as the indigenous people, national minorities, old and new immigrants, feminist movements, etc. They represent morals, ideologies and ways of life that are different from the dominant culture of the wider society. Their demands go far beyond the call for toleration. They want the wider society to treat them equally with the rest and to respect their differences so as to enable them to realise their identities in all aspects of life.

As a consequence of these different movements, multiculturalism emerged as a reference to a broad range of theories, attitudes, beliefs, norms, practices and policies that seek to provide public recognition and support for non-dominant cultural groups. However multicultural approach is different from social and cultural diversity as it goes beyond the basic civil and political liberties associated with liberal citizenship to bring a differentiated citizenship that allows groups to express their identities and practices (Ivison 2011). According to Mahajan (2010), theorists of multiculturalism protest against any systematic discrimination, give positive value to cultural diversity. Multiculturalism then becomes a way to respond to cultural diversity as it endorses the importance of equal treatment of different communities in public sphere.

Furthermore, multiculturalism has become the main topic of modern social and political theory in particular and in contemporary social sciences in general. It has also occupied a central place in public culture of western
Chapter One: Theories and Politics of Multiculturalism

liberal democracies and in global political discourse. Now the multicultural ideas have spread to debate over the nature of global justice and the search for global norms of human rights. For Song (2010), multiculturalism is much associated with “identity politics,” “the politics of difference” and “the politics of recognition”, all of which share a devotion to reconsidering discriminated identities and changing dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalise certain groups.

Though the traditional model of citizenship as common-rights is deeply connected to ideas of national integration, many groups like blacks, women, indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious minorities, feel segregated not because of their socio-economic status but because of their socio-cultural identity. They point out that the common rights citizenship disregards the needs of other groups. However the standards governing their claims cannot be derived from one culture alone but through an equal dialogue between different cultures based on the principle of justice and toleration.

Consequently, multiculturalism approaches try to emphasise the need to have a stable identity and accentuate the importance of cultural belonging. It identifies the difference through institutional and policy reforms that take into account the claims of marginalised group. According to Modood (2007) when we speak of difference rather than culture from the sociological standpoint is to recognise the difference not only from the inside (i.e. from the side of the minority culture) but also from the outside (i.e. outside treatment towards these minorities in question). It also admits the nature of the minorities and their relationship with the rest of the societies. Multiculturalism is not, therefore only about cultural rights instead of political equality and economic opportunities. It is also the politics which sees the post-immigrant groups and creates awareness that these group differentiating cultural aspects are essential to their social construction.


1.2 Theories of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism theories involve conditions of racial and ethnic diversity as well as support for cultural differences, policies and programmes for managing this diversity such as abolishing hostility and discrimination, and a remaking of public sphere to advocate toleration and justice (Fleras 2002; Forbes 2009). For Willett (1998) theorising multiculturalism ‘has proven an enigmatic and elusive exercise, in large part because multiculturalism, by definition, encourages a range of opinions outside of mainstream discourses’. (Fleras 2009, p. 4) Theorising multiculturalism then seems to be a complicated perspective since it tries to investigate dominant systems of meaning, leading versions of knowledge and truth, and arbitrary claims to moral authority. Besides, political and philosophical debates over multiculturalism are still divided between how to balance collective rights with individual freedoms and how to establish a framework for equality between groups without sacrificing individual rights within these groups.

Furthermore, theorising multiculturalism banks on different levels of meaning, mostly, multiculturalism as “empirical fact”, multiculturalism as “ideology”, multiculturalism as “policy”, multiculturalism as “practice”, and multiculturalism as “counter-hegemony” (Fleras 2009). As an empirical fact, multiculturalism is mainly shaped by global migration that has formed new demographically diverse societies within which people must live, work, and communicate with each other by learning to accept and tolerate differences. As an ideology, multiculturalism includes a set of ideas and principles for balancing minority rights with national interests and the public good. It also involves respecting cultural differences and advocating social equality as a basis for society building and living together.

Moreover multiculturalism as a policy entails the mixing and merging (hybridising) of cultural forms, an official multiculturalism (as state policy) often endorses a mosaic of fixed identities and identifiable ethnicities
Chapter One: Theories and Politics of Multiculturalism (Huijsers 2004). Governments then have adopted multiculturalism approaches to build official frameworks for promoting the social and the cultural without compromising the national. Likewise multiculturalism as practice comprises a union of policy and philosophy that includes its function by politicians, minorities, and institutions across a range of activities.

As counter-hegemony, multiculturalism provides ideological foundation for multicultural social movements. For Shohat and Stam (1994), ‘multiculturalism as critique challenges the Eurocentrism that depends on the racialised foundational principles of a liberal constitutional order.’ (Fleras 2009, p. 5) Thus multiculturalism is often related to identity politics that are generally structured by discourses of victimisation (Hjort 1999; McDonald and Quell 2008).

1.2.1 Main Contemporary Theorists of Multiculturalism

There are three well-known theorists, Iris Marion Young (1990), Charles Taylor (1994) and Bhikhu Parekh (2000)³, who have made major contributions to what May et al. (2004) have described as the "multicultural turn" in recent social and political theory. It is claimed that these three in particular have defined in their works the key aspects that construct a multicultural society. The aim, therefore, is not to offer a descriptive explanation and overview, but to identify some points of convergence that help further understanding of the ideas of difference, diversity and recognition that constitute the politics of multiculturalism.

1.2.1.1 Iris Marion Young and Difference

In her book *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Iris Marion Young (1990) is hostile to approaches of political assimilation which compel minorities to reject their own distinctiveness in a process of cultural assimilation to the dominant standards, values and customs of that society. In Young's view such a requirement is unfair because ‘assimilation always implies coming to the game after it is already begun, after the
rules and standards have been set, and having to prove oneself accordingly’. (Young 1990, p. 165) Although Young states that there are different types of assimilation which can seek to integrate different cultural aspects, what they all share in common is the unequal burden of change that they place upon the minority.

Young's work is a response to the view that citizenship achieved through individual rights alone, based upon rejection of difference, can match principles of social justice, for example, demoting differences to the private authority in favour of equal treatment in the public sphere. By emphasising the context of groupings that are formed upon non-voluntary aspects of social identity, she accentuates the unequal impact of past dominance or present problem. She thus argues that focusing upon individuals does not take into consideration how citizenship already fails to treat people equally, or where ‘blindness to group difference disadvantages groups whose experience, culture and socialized capacities differ from those of privileged groups’ (ibid.)

Hence, the fact of not being attentive to group differences may lead to a form of repression in itself and/or can contribute to more oppression:

... by allowing norms expressing the point of view and experiences of privileged groups to appear neutral and universal. [...] Because there is no such ‘unsituated’ group-neutral point of view, the situation and experience of dominant groups tends to define the norms of any such humanity in general. Against such a supposedly neutral humanist ideal, only the oppressed groups come to be marked with particularity; they, and not the privileged groups, are marked, objectified as the others. (Young 1990, p. 165)

In holding this view, she offers an opposition to the idea of neutrality presented by Du Bois in 1903, in his description of “the operation of the veil”. Since ‘privileged groups implicitly define the standards according to which all will be measured... their privilege
engages not recognizing these standards as culturally and experientially specific’ (Young 1990, p. 165). Du Bois’ veil imagines that those who are “veiled” become visible by dominant society as opposing the `norm', while those in front of it may not see anything other than their own legal dominance. It was claimed that this presents a reversed version of Rawl’s (1971) “veil of ignorance”, which means for Young that the minority looks out from behind a socially constructed inequality, in full awareness of significant aspects of their identity. She argues that:

When participation is taken to imply assimilation, the oppressed person is caught in an irresolvable dilemma: to participate means to accept or adopt an identity one is not, to try to participate means to be reminded by oneself and others of the identity one is. (Young 1990, ibid)

The sense of looking at oneself through the eyes of another, according to Young, is a form of cultural recognition which relates one's own cultural identity to the cultural identities of other members of one's community. Consequently, the harm caused by prejudice is not only due to the unconcealed hostility from the majority, but also arise from minority invisibility in not being recognised or represented as a legitimate part of society.

This links to Young's criticism that it is an uncooperative liberal obsession to take for granted that a person can be detached from the dependent aspects of their social identity, history and culture. In other words, Young’s support for institutional integration of group identities into a democratic cultural pluralism can settle a general system of rights that is the same for all:

... a democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged. Such group representation implies institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting self-
organisation of group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of society; group analysis and group generation of proposals in institutionalized contexts where decision makers have taken group perspectives into consideration... (Young 1990, p. 184)

Young’s view is mainly based on advocating policies that can incorporate the recognition and integration of minorities in a reorganised public sphere with the aim of preventing minorities from being neglected or oppressed by majorities.

1. 2.1.2 Charles Taylor and Recognition

In his 1994 account of the Emergence of a Modern Politics of Identity, Taylor implies that the idea of `recognition' has emerged away from historically distinct or inherited hierarchies as the only basis of social status or honour, and towards a notion of dignity matching the principles of a democratic society that guarantee political equality and a full civic status to all its citizens. Dating back to 1989, in his account of the emergence of the modern self, Taylor defines two policies of “equality”. The first is based on politics of universalism, with the view of affording equal dignity to all citizens in a society; and the second represents a politics of difference where the distinctiveness of context, history and identity is prominent.

For Taylor, the concept of “recognition” has given rise to a search for “authenticity” away from the unbending universalism that supports ideas of the “Just” or the “Right”, in favour of the accomplishment and realisation of one's true self. As a result, according to Taylor (1994), people can no longer be recognised on the basis of identities shaped by their positions in social hierarchies alone but, rather, through considering how people build up their identities. The boundary between these two issues “dignity” and “difference” forms the basis of Taylor's account of the politics of recognition, expressed as a “dialogical interlocutor”.
Taylor's emphasis on the importance of “dialogical” relationships, implies the fact that we define our identity ‘always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us’ (Taylor 1994, p. 33). He suggests that our idea of ourselves, what we claim to be, and what we really think we are, can rely on how others come to view us to the extent that our sense of self is developed in a continuing dialogue. Self-consciousness exists “only by being acknowledged or recognised”, in a way that a sense of socio-cultural self-esteem evolves not only from personal identity, but also in relation to the group in which this identity is developed:

....our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm; can be a form of oppression, imprisoning some in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. (Taylor 1994, p. 25-26)

It is worth noting here how Taylor’s characterises liberalism as a “fighting creed” and what this means to the “being fought”:

Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges. ...[A]s many Muslims are well aware, Western liberalism is not so much an expression of the secular, post religious outlook that happens to be popular amongst liberal intellectuals as a more organic outgrowth of Christianity... All this is to say that liberalism is also a fighting creed. (Taylor 1994, p. 62)

What Taylor stresses here is ‘a particularism masquerading as the universal’ (Taylor 1994, p. 43). At the same time, he defines the limits of his own conception of recognition politics, concluding that the confines marking the legitimacy of recognition politics must be drawn somewhere,
and that nowhere is more suitable than on issues of Muslim claims-making. Taylor (1994) states, because in Islam ‘there is no question of separating politics and religion in the way we have come to expect in Western liberal society’ (ibid. p. 62). Nevertheless, Taylor's idea of recognition does not exclude any minority claims-making from the process of politics.

1. 2.1.3 Bhikhu Parekh and Diversity

Cultural diversity and social pluralism are of a fundamental value because they challenge people to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own cultures and ways of life. This differentiates Parekh from liberals and communitarians. The latter might admit that cultures can play an important role in making choices meaningful for their members (Kymlicka 1995), or that different cultures increase autonomy by providing further “options” in ways of living for society as a whole (Raz 1986). However, such different views imply that culture is vital for individual group members but, they could not explain why cultural diversity is necessary in itself. To this Parekh suggests the following clarification:

Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it may be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities. Different cultures thus correct and complement each other, expand each other’s horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human fulfillment. The value of other cultures is independent of whether or not they are options for us... inassimilable otherness challenges us intellectually and morally, stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our categories of thought. (Parekh 2000, p. 167)
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Thus Parekh’s position suggests that each culture has something to teach others, people should be allowed to develop moral and aesthetic awareness for humanity as a whole. This is an issue of plurality as a consequence of particularity. What is being promoted is both a deepening of cultural particularities and a broadening of these insights from different cultures. Parekh's argues that cultural diversity ‘fosters... human freedom as self-knowledge, self-transcendence and self-criticism.’ (Parekh 2000, p. 167-168)

1.3 Politics of Multiculturalism

As a result of many factors including globalisation, immigration, decline of traditional moral consensus, consolidation of human rights agendas, and liberal emphasis on individual choice (Laviec 2005), conformist governance models of assimilation, segregation, and separation are constantly disputed by diversity politics of difference that claims new policies of living together in practical and equitable ways.

According to EDG (2007), the politics of governance is at the forefront of public debate over managing diversity and difference. Consequently, governments have begun to revisit their public policies and governance rules. Relations between minorities and majorities have shifted accordingly, with rearrangement varying between countries and evolving over time (Watt 2006; Kymlicka 2007).

Besides, the management of diversity and difference under multicultural governance is increasing to the vanguard of global political programs. In the past, nation-states were ruled by a majority national group who adopted the state for self-serving purposes, in contrast to the present politics of governance that no longer tolerate mono-cultural agenda.

Thus most democratic societies are confronted by diversity politics and the politics of difference, reflecting, in part, the interaction of demographics with minority political determination and a growing human
rights agenda (Kymlicka 2007). Ethnic variety rather than mono-cultural uniformity characterises the demographics of most societies, resulting in deep social gaps because of religious prejudice, economic and cultural differences, intergroup competition, and historical hatreds (Peleg 2007).

However those programmes, skills, and vocabulary that developed to control the politics of culturally homogeneous states are of limited help or cause an unbearable obstacle in accommodating the legitimate demands of unity and diversity. According to Abbas (2005), ‘the notion of multiculturalism with its corresponding concept of accommodating those who do not share the dominant cultural ethos is not without consequences. Political and governance problems are created that have no parallel in history.’(Fleras 2009, p. 24)

Furthermore, a commitment to cultural homogeneity, which was crucial for national identity and social integration, is now harshly contested. Recent social transformations and the politicisation of difference, cultural and religious minorities are challenging conformist notions of democratic governance (Koenig 1999; Shachar 2007). Consequently, new governance alterations are growing that include minority rights and identity claims without revoking the values of social justice and national unity (Inglis 1996).

Moreover, multiculturalism as governance no longer resonates with legitimacy and authority, although migrants and minorities continue to depend on its relevance and value in preserving their interests. This conflict of interest engenders a fundamental contradiction: To one side, increasingly politicised minorities demand a redistribution of power and privilege, so that full and equal inclusion in society does not compromise their identities in the public domain (Koenig and de Guchteneire 2007).

On the one side, central authorities try to reconcile these conflicting interests without compromising a commitment to national unity or minority difference, a framework is evolving for constructing a feasible community out of ethnically diverse populations. The challenge lies in
balancing a liberal commitment to the individuality of autonomy, diversity, and equality with a society building agenda of a common language, shared culture, and national identity (Baubock 2005).

Despite the fact that diversity and difference are perceived as opposed to society building (Beissinger 2008), multicultural governance remains a practical alternative. The challenge of accommodating different political claims of individuals and groups with the claims of the nation-state as a whole is exposed to require a composite governance act between two demands – social unity on the one hand and insertion of diversity and difference on the other hand (Reitz 2009).

1.3.1 Diversity and Difference

The two concepts are not identical; if diversity is about categorisation, then difference is about contextualisation. Whereas diversity represents an experiential statement about its existence in society, difference applies its politicisation within the context of unequal power relations. If diversity describes variety, then difference capitalises on this empirical reality to challenge, resist, and change. If diversity tends toward the de-contextualised, difference consists of layered relationships of power and disparity, reflecting the placement of individuals by those with the power to identify, name, and categorise differences into flexible groupings that are both debated and growing (Dei 2000; Fleras 2008).

On the other side, the concepts of diversity and difference are interchangeably used at the governance level where references to diversity represent an executive interpretation of differences that need to be synchronised, controlled, and depoliticised (Ang and Saint Louis 2005). Therein the logic behind official multiculturalism depends on taking the difference out of diversity, in that lies the source of confusion and disagreement, especially when the politics of difference is demoted to the level of diversity for policy reasons.
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The pluralist crisis is clear then; too much of cultural differences privileges recognition at the expense of equality (Yates 2001; Hollinger 2008). Too little attention to difference can have a degrading effect on those whose differences are disadvantaged. As a result, a major governance breach is exposed; those who believe in the primary resemblance of humanity versus those who believe in its vital differences. If people are basically alike, then paying attention to differences is rather insignificant in defining who gets what. If people are essentially different, then governance must take differences seriously as basis for recognition and reward.

To sum up, each of these difference discourses can be alternatives for living together differently: an abstracted pluralism support differences in principle rather than in practice; and a radical pluralism approves the dominance of difference apart from society interests. The role of governance is to adjust as many varied interests and demands as possible by institutionalising exceptions as the rule i.e. plural multicultural model. A conservative multicultural model is to establish a common structure that applies to all members of society regardless of who they are (Hansen 2007). A third governance prototype is a liberal multicultural model that recognises the importance of treating everyone equally; it also acknowledges the prominence of difference to define who gets what when the situation arises.

1.3.2 Diversity Politics and Politics of Difference

In the community, school, media, and workplace, diversity is valued and practiced throughout the world. Ideologies endorsing diversity and difference are extensively adopted and expressed in official government policy and practice, in legislation and celebrations. Businesses regularly approve recruitment, promotion, and retention enterprises that are intended to guarantee a varied and complete labour force through exclusion of prejudiced obstacles. As Boli and Elliott (2008) indicate, academic journals look for assorted editorial boards, companies want
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varied boards of managers, broadcasters are casting about for miscellaneous teams, and organisations set up executive offices whose main responsibility is the search of rising inclusiveness.

Certainly, a diversity commitment is not without its blemishes. Such a commitment destroys integration and stability, creates conflict because of incompatible values, legitimates human rights violations, reduces individuality to collective identities, deforms the principle of diversity, and reflects a focus on the superficial instead of more pressing issues related to power and inequality (Lentin and Titley 2008). So far, a commitment to diversity is still appreciated and legitimised on moral basis; people have a right to be different yet the same.

The first decade of the twenty-first century has made it clear that the management of diversity and difference can no longer be taken for granted or left to chance. The junction of globalisation and communication/transportation technologies has seen to that, as have global migration flows and emergent human rights agendas (Fleras 2009). Diversity politics and the politics of difference are now a widespread if debated trait of the modern political landscape (Frederickson 1999).

Besides, diversity is gradually politicised because of open competition for power, resources, and recognition. This is barely astonishing since nation-state building commonly inflicts a burden on migrants and minorities who reject their assimilation into a difference-uncompassionate system (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001). Thus, countries facing multicultural politics are rethinking the governance plan with protective barriers.

With all the reactions against multiculturalism as public discourse resolutely recognised, a neo-monoculture; common identities and citizenship that compose “nationhood”, is gradually abounding (Joppke 2004). Furthermore, an open rejection of multiculturalism as governance, in exchange for integration models, without removing the pluralistic
principles and practices that are deeply ingrained in society, continues at local and regional levels rather than nationally or officially.

In addition, responses to politics of difference vary: (a) from difference as superficial and insignificant, to difference as essential and important, (b) from difference as a menace and defy, to difference as a chance and benefit, (c) from difference as a source of denial and exclusion, to difference as a source of recognition and reward, and (d) from difference as opposite to society building, to difference as fundamental.

According to Fish (1997), difference may be encouraged as a positive contribution to society. But its recognition relies on accepting a common institutional structure that frequently squeezes differences into a one-size-fits-all sameness or, instead, dismisses them as reflective of a basically universal humanity. In the same context, Johnston (1994) argues that those in positions of power can control the diversities agenda by defining what differences count, what counts as difference. However such a contested politics draws a multicultural society into a governance contradiction: how to engage difference without marginalising it, while advancing the objectives of justice and inclusiveness against national interests.

In general, the diversity of societies is unavoidable and there is no magical recipe for improving the prospects of living together with difference, even though pressure rises to remove conservative governance models in a changing and diverse world. The politics of difference, then, tries to cope with the challenge of converting the contradictory suggestions into practice i.e., multicultural governance.

1.4 Multiculturalism as Governance

As a policy, multiculturalism generally symbolises an inspiring discourse for founding idealistic principles of accommodating coexistence. However, as a governance of diversity and difference, multiculturalism
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supports the promotion of all together governance around the legality of difference as different yet equal. Besides, a policy structure sets up the full and equal contribution of minorities through elimination of discriminatory obstacles, whereas the making of cultural space validates a minority right to be treated the same as a matter, yet to be treated as different when circumstances dictate.

For Kymlicka (2008), the legitimate status of multiculturalism as governance is generally approved as much as it pushes society to engage differences without falling into anarchy. Paradoxically, all diverse societies have to face the challenges of making inclusive governance for living together. They must also deal with an inevitable multicultural dilemma: how to construct a cohesive yet affluent society without eroding the integrity of its constituent elements.

Furthermore, multicultural governance is mainly a political instrument to achieve political objectives in a suitable way (Ahmed 2000; Fleras 2009). Thus, an official multiculturalism is principally a dominant discourse in defence of leading ideology that represents a brilliant branding strategy for conflict resolution and impression management. Besides, the basic logic of official multiculturalism is deliberately practical, with national interests prevailing over secondary concerns (Bader 2007; Fleras 2009).

In other words, multiculturalism as governance promoted the delusion of change and inclusiveness by masking white supremacist order while muting the profoundly ingrained conflicts of race and power (Thobani 2007; Fleras 2009). Certainly, a state multiculturalism is not only about power and control. National interests offset social equality and cultural recognition, though, the accomplishment of these commitments may combine patterns of control. Nevertheless, as Caws (1994) asserts, an official multiculturalism has engrossed conflicting social articulations and political goals that many despair of any clarity or agreement.
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Moreover, multiculturalism forms a podium of censure and reform, of domination yet resistance, of conventionality yet difference, of control yet liberation, of exclusion yet participation, of belonging yet of exclusion. Likewise, Ellie Vasta (1996) defines multiculturalism as:

... a discourse of conciliation and liberation; of control and participation; of the legitimisation of the existing order and of innovation. Multiculturalism is part of a strategy of domination of the majority over minorities, but also calls attention, to the possibility of new forms of social and cultural relations. (Vasta 1996, p. 48)

Because agreements about an official multiculturalism seldom succeed, disagreements keep on existing. Multiculturalism is particularly resistant to definition by agreement, partially because definitions are context specific, partially because the concept is always altering, and partially because of a gap between rhetoric and reality. For Modood (2007), varied interpretations and suggestions eradicate the possibility of gathering all models of multiculturalism into one plot. That affirmation makes it important to consider different models of official multiculturalism in advancing the objectives of multicultural governances.

1.4.1 Models of Multiculturalism as Governance

An official state multiculturalism represents a late-twentieth-century experiment for altering the rules of pluralistic politics (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). As Kymlicka (2008) stated, multiculturalism is intended to adapt minority demands, contrary to former epochs that discarded ethnicity and ethnic politics as intrinsically threatening, multicultural policies occurred in response to the ethnic political mobilisation of the 1960s. Consequently, multiculturalism can be categorised into three models of governance: conservative, liberal, and plural. Each of them is different in terms of defining the challenges of living together, determining suppositions, projected solutions and expected results.
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Conservative models of multiculturalism suggest equal treatment before the law for everyone with no consideration for who they are or what they look like; no one should be excluded because of culture or colour. Yet, no one should be given special treatment because of difference. Differences are tolerable under a conservative multicultural model, but should not help in defining who gets what.

Neill and Schwedler (2007) claim that individual and group attachment to cultural differences should be limited to the private sphere, thus preserving firm neutrality in public sphere for assigning valued resources or preventing ethnic complications. A conservative model, then, consists of a belief that a governance of many cultures is possible as long as people’s differences do not get in the way of full participation and equal treatment.

Liberal models of multiculturalism are based on the principle of unity and equality within difference and diversity. With liberal multiculturalism, a society of many cultures is possible only if the dominant culture makes space for difference and minorities are treated equally in spite of their difference, but should be treated as equals, because of their difference, when the situation occurs.

In a word, a liberal multiculturalism grants the need for people to be treated uniformly and as equals. The same treatment strengthens unity; treatment as equivalent recognises the contextual importance of difference. Considering equality and inclusion implies a commitment to both similarities and differences (Modood 2008), difference should be considered within limits and without causing troubles for the institutions. Therefore, a liberal multiculturalism supports a society of many cultures provided that people are treated as equals by taking differences into account when required to guarantee equality, belonging, and participation. Differences are allowable but must respect human rights, obey laws, and be based on individual rights rather than group rights.
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Plural models of multiculturalism approve a strong devotion to cultural diversity. As all cultures are basically dissimilar, yet of equal value and importance, differences should be highly considered under this model of multiculturalism. In other words, going beyond a simple respect for difference, a plural multiculturalism grants the centrality of recognising and respecting group identities in building a sense of self-esteem within the public sphere (Modood 2008). With a plural multiculturalism, society is structured around an ideology that legitimises the existence and value of many cultural groups, each of which lives by its distinct beliefs and conventional practices (Ben-Eliezer 2008).

Contrary to conservative and liberal models of multiculturalism, a plural multicultural model suggests to recognise, institutionalise, and give power to difference. A plural multiculturalism model, then, can be defined as governance of many cultures in which differences are taken seriously into account as a foundation for living together including the establishment of equivalent institutions, competing value orientations, and separate communities.

Besides, there are other multicultural models such as “soft” multiculturalism, which supports tolerance and equality, and “hard” multiculturalism that espouses the absence of right or wrong principles: (1) no culture is superior to another and consequently cultural practices are beyond censure and (2) cultural differences should be promoted even if they infringe the law or violate individual rights (West 2005).

In addition, a critical multiculturalism challenges the values of state official multiculturalism through legitimising different ways of thinking, being, and doing (Anthias 2007; Fleras 2009). Under a critical multiculturalism, Eurocentric liberalism is critiqued and challenged by privileging group rights over individual rights, providing a voice for the oppressed, and condemning the universalism of the dominant sector as the normative standard (Goldberg 1994).
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To conclude, models of official multiculturalism renegotiate the terms of minority integration into society along conservative, liberal, or plural outlines. Admittedly, the differences involving models of multiculturalism are more analytical rather than lived, with the result that most jurisdictions represent a conflicting package of multicultural dos and don’ts. Both liberal and conservative models try to facilitate the integration of newcomers and minorities into the existing social and cultural structure whereas plural models endorse the separation of minority cultures with each preserving a degree of control over internal religious, political, and cultural affairs (McGarry and O'Leary 2007).

1.4.1.1 Assimilation as Governance

Assimilation as governance and policy model suggests that a society cannot be consistent without a common national culture and shared obligations (Parekh 2005). Inglis (1996) asserts that the dominant sector inflicts its culture, authority, values, and institutions over subdominant sectors, with a desertion of their cultural individuality under conventionality pressures. Migrants and minorities are projected to engage into a mono-cultural mainstream to ensure moral and cultural homogeny (Ben-Eliezer 2008).

Under a dominant-conformity model, some aspects of a subdominant lifestyle are accepted provided that they are limited to the personal sphere, do not challenge the existing authority, are conformed to majority principles of decency, and do not violate moral values or the law (Fleras 2009). It seems simple in theory but when applied to the human condition, assimilation represents a complex and multidimensional process.

Assimilation came out as a “progressive” social policy for its time. Compared to other models such as compulsory separation or genocide, assimilation ensured a governance framework for managing indigenous peoples in settler societies in considerate ways. However assimilation
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seldom succeeded as an open policy principle because group differences were dismissed as inferior, irrelevant, or destructive.

Although officially reproached as a model for managing diversity and difference, assimilation as governance continues to play a major role for keeping migrants and minorities in the mainstream, reasserting core ethics, and excluding those who “don’t fit”. As minorities become more and more involved in the mainstream, assimilation is setting up the rule rather than the exception.

1.4.1.2 Integration as Governance

Integration as a governance model came out to manage difference after World War II when the contradiction of fighting for liberty clashed with the realities of repression. However integration reflected a mounting disappointment with assimilation as a practical model for living together, because of international conventions that protect human rights. Nevertheless the concept remains poorly defined; terms like acculturation, accommodation, incorporation, and adaptation are arbitrarily combined with integration.

Furthermore the concept of integration opposes that of segregation. Segregation entails the compulsory social and geographical separation of people. Integration, on the contrary, is a process through which individuals interact as equals at all institutional levels throughout elimination of discriminatory barriers and those colour bars that divided (Jaret 1995; Fleras 2009). Fix et al. (2008) describe integration as ‘a process by which immigrant newcomers reach economic mobility and social inclusion in the larger society.’ (Fleras 2009, p. 45)

In addition, integration as governance comprises two variations; first, integration as cultural governance stands for a process of alteration through which the dominant and subdominant segments are brought together in one inclusive lifestyle, without either losing its individuality. It endorses a system of full and equal participation without forgoing cultural
identity as the cost of admittance. Another alternative includes a “combination” process by which the dominant and the subdominant groups combine as a new cultural blend comprising essential components of this mixture. This fusion of the “modern” with the “traditional” into a moderately harmonised body is metaphorically captured by the concept of the melting pot.

Second, integration as a social policy implies that no one should be excluded from society or treated unequally and those included in society should be integrated so that they become an essential component (Parekh 2005). Under integration, society is held in a common body of institutions and values that guarantee consistency. Therefore immigrants can manage their private lives as they please, but commit to express their loyalty to the host country; they should participate in the social, political, and economic life of the society and internalise its basic values, institutions, and practices.

Furthermore, many European countries have adopted integration over multiculturalism as a reaction to perceptions that immigrants were spoiled by rights without matching obligations. Consequently multicultural models of governance have changed from a plural approach to a more integrative model of multicultural governance (de Hart 2007). To guarantee a “civic integration” of newcomers, citizenship tests and programmes are established so as to force them to register in language and values courses on (or before) arrival.

In 2004 members of the European Council agreed on a commitment to integration whose standards are summarised as follows:

- Integration is an active process of reciprocal amendment by immigrants and host society.
- Integration involves respect for the fundamental ethics of the European Union.
- Employment is an important component of the integration process for immigrants and host society.
• Fundamental knowledge of the host country’s language, history, and institutions is crucial to integration.
• Access to education is decisive to the integration of immigrants.
• Immigrant integration needs complete and fair access to institutions and public and private commodities and services.
• Recurrent and creative communication between immigrants and member-state citizens guarantees successful integration.
• Integration is meant to assure the practice of varied cultures and religions, only if these practices respect rights and laws.
• Immigrant participation in the democratic process is vital, especially in the formulation of programmes and policies that influence their own lives.
• Integration is dependent on mainstreaming integration policies in all government and public services.
• Lucid objectives and evaluation methods should be in place to regulate immigration policies and evaluate improvement.

This commitment to integration is similar to the ideology of Canada’s Multiculturalism Act of 1988 that implies: a sense of belonging, trust in the other, recognition with society at large, acquisition of citizenship, life satisfaction, a spirit of volunteerism, and exercise of voting rights (Fleras 2009). Accordingly, both integration and multiculturalism seems eventually concerned with making inclusive governance that boosts minority participation, belonging, and equality without discarding either the legality of difference or commitment to national unity. However multiculturalism may bend more toward “difference” in balancing difference-with-unity, while integration may emphasises “unity” in a unity-within-difference equivalence.

1.4.1.3 Pluralism as Governance

Kymlicka and Bashir (2008) define pluralism as an inclusive governance model that foresees the complete integration of individuals and groups without losing their individuality within the process. For Ben-Eliezer (2008) pluralism tries to build a concoction of cultural identities
that defy the singularity of the nation-state, which historically was grounded in the accomplishment of a culturally and linguistically standardised population with a denial of difference.

In other words, pluralism is the recognition of difference as a foundation for inclusive governance within a national frame. Hence, pluralism as governance is more than a simple existence of ethnic minorities in society. For some, market forces should prevail in deciding who gets what; for others, a degree of government intervention may be necessary to protect and promote minority needs, mainly by endorsing individual rights, rectifying past injustices, decreasing social inequalities by eliminating inequitable barriers, providing positive actions through employment equity programmes, and ensuring protection of traditional language and culture.

As a reaction to these patterns, Bloemraad (2007) claimed that a commitment to pluralism offers minorities the recognition that legitimises their presence in society, while securing both full and equal participation. However this commitment may hinder socioeconomic mobility, create underclass minorities, and deepen threats to national unity and political stability.

Pluralism as governance, then, can be expressed in varied ways, including multiculturalism, biculturalism, and multi-nationalism. Pluralism becomes multiculturalism (and biculturalism and multi-nationalism) when diversity and difference are identified and included as a legal constituent of social reality, government policy, and governance patterns:

First, Lupul (2005) asserts that multiculturalism is a basis for managing political governance on grounds other than state’s nationalism. Multiculturalism, then, approves the legitimacy of ethnic diversities as different yet equal through composing institutional space for migrants and minorities without apprehension of endangering national unity (Ben-Rafael and Peres 2005; Fleras 2009).
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Second, biculturalism is similar to multiculturalism in lots of ways but gives emphasis to the association between two main groups, each of which stands in a rapport of partnership with the other. For instance, biculturalism portrays the affiliation between the indigenous Maori peoples and the non-Maori in New Zealand (Fleras and Spoonley 1999).

Last, multi-nationalism entails the existence of many nations or peoples who see themselves as political communities—both independent (sovereign) in their own right and sharing in the sovereignty of society (Asch 1997). Canada, for example, is described as a multinational coalition including indigenous peoples, the Québécois, and the English speaking sectors, counting immigrants and descendants of immigrants (Fleras 2002).

1.4.1.4 Multicultural Governance

According to critics, mono-cultural governance reflected a false view of human morals, it was spoiled by nationalism and war, and it was unnecessarily oppressive of individuality and authenticity (Sacks 2007). As a reaction to repression multicultural governance has emerged. Nevertheless the concept of governance has been neither completely theorised nor entirely applied to the challenges of living together (Bader 2007). Expectedly, the search continues for models of multicultural governance whose principles, structures, and values match the realities of the twenty-first century (Institute of Governance 2007).

Additionally, the challenge of multicultural governance is boosted by a misleadingly simple yet indefinable objective i.e., the making of a culturally diverse yet socially inclusive society without compromising national and vested interests in the process. However official authorities have replied differently to this challenge. Some support the division of minorities into separate closed societies as a basis for multicultural governance; others approve assimilation and integration as a guiding outline; and others endorse inclusiveness along pluralist and multicultural lines. For Malik (2008), some consider a person’s cultural background as
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insignificant in defining who acquires what or who is who. For others, a person’s culture reflects his or her identity and well-being so that it becomes vital to recognise it.

Generally, migrants and minorities used to accept their secondary status and social/geographical internment as a matter of course. Thanks to the spread of democratic ideals of equal status and rights that modern governance no longer dismiss diversity and difference as marginal; they are seen as legal and important components of society. Nevertheless the majority of progressive societies still face a governance contradiction in dealing with collaborative coexistence: how to manage the contrasting dynamics of liberal universalism with ethnic particularities within a structure that assures social and cultural recognition without breaking national unity. In that the challenge remains the same: to create multicultural governance that is protective of national interests yet supportive of the public good and safeguard of minority rights.

Multicultural governance, then, approves the fact that the state could not explicitly identify with any particular ethnic or religious group but remain neutral when dealing with its various communities. Under multicultural governance, difference and diversity are endorsed in ways that make it less frightening but more indispensable to society building (Kymlicka 2006). Moreover, multicultural model of governance reinforces the belief that the state belongs to all its citizens, not just a particular national group; the rights of all migrants and minorities to full and equal participation without giving up their right to ethnic identity; and acknowledgment that all citizens have the same institutional access.

Yet multicultural governance still faces many challenges: making policies and programmes including strategies and institutional measures to engage difference in advancing democracy and justice. In granting a programme that gives emphasis to a working collaboration rather than direct control, multicultural governance recognises the importance of going beyond government indifference (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007).
Furthermore, to protect its national interests, multicultural governance requires a bilateral approach that nurtures constructive relations between varied communities through tolerance and engagement, and supports central authorities’ involvement to eliminate bigotry and discrimination, build common values and create a sense of commitment and compromise among assorted components. As Nye (2007) points out, references with regard to differences combine with admitting the worth of relations, commitments, community, agreement, and shared values of engagement across diversity.

As a conclusion, multicultural governance is devoted to protect all human rights and liberties no matter their race, ethnicity, or religion, as well as minorities’ rights to their own language, culture, religion, and identity apart from practices that infringe national laws or break universal standards. For Bogaards (2006), multicultural governance admits the fact that a collaborative coexistence is possible, but only when power is reciprocal rather than dominated, decentralised rather than central, and expressive rather than mechanical.

In a world that is more and more miscellaneous, swiftly changing, and more connected than ever, a commitment to conformism causes problems. Through recognising the value and advantages of diversity and differences as resolutions, multiculturalism suggests a new way of thinking that relates unity to difference, consistency to ethnicity, and common values to cultural doctrine. However the politics of multicultural governance should accommodate tensions and nurture a sense of living-together among different communities.

1.5 Multiculturalism and Identity

There are four identity theories typically employed by contemporary social studies: personal identity, role identity, social identity, and collective identity. Personal identity is the most elementary of the four identities. It is what makes every person unique, defining them through their specific biographies (e.g., name, birthplace), unique characteristics
(e.g., intelligent, athletic), role identities (e.g., daughter, employee), and particular combination of private and public experiences. Role identity is defined as the role (or character) people play when holding specific social positions in groups. It is relational, since people interact with each other via their own role identities. (Bedjaoui 2015)

Social identity emphasises how a person’s cognition, affect, and personality traits affect immediate person-to-person social interactions and vice versa. It is the part of an individual’s self-concept formed through the knowledge of his or her membership in meaningful social groups, organisations and categories. Collective identities are especially important to social movement participants, political activists, and others banding together to fight for or against social change by working on shared goals and action plans. (Bedjaoui 2015) In short, it is a process by which a set of individuals interacts to create a shared sense of identity or group consciousness.

Multiculturalism now is very different from its early form and its effect on personal and collective identity, the governance practices and negotiation of tensions is deep. It becomes clear that most people are now exposed to diversity in all aspects of their daily lives; in their local communities, schools and workplaces, or obliquely via television, social networks and other media. The more diverse societies are and the more people are exposed to difference, the more they seem, however, to retreat into their own identity, adopt identity politics and approve nationalist ideologies. This could be, partly, because of the lack of real engagement with difference.

Robert Putnam (2000) demonstrated that social capital is contrariwise related to diversity because ‘immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and constrain social capital’. (Putnam 2007, p. 137) However, he suggested that in the medium to longer term, ‘successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities. Thus, the central challenge for modern,
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diversifying societies is to create a new, broader sense of ‘we’.’(ibid.) Indeed, this is the challenge, yet, there is still lack of “clear” vision and established policy and practice to make the larger sense of “we” into a reality.

Likewise, the world seems more disposed to ethnic and religious conflict with over 70 percent of wars having an ethnic or religious dimension (Baldwin et al. 2007). Actually, there are signs of a mounting number of divisions and more fanatic separatist movements, where people no longer feel capable of even sharing the same land or government; many nations were created in recent years as a result of the collapse of formerly constructed federations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, or divisions were turned into separation, for example in the lately divided Sudan. More separations are possibly on the cards with states like Belgium becoming almost ungovernable as a one entity and with secessionist movements, mainly in Scotland and Catalonia.

On the one hand, Sen (2006) argued that conflict and violence are constant today, no less than the past, by the delusion of a unique identity. He approves that the world is progressively separated between religions, cultures and civilisations, which disregard the importance of other ways in which people see themselves through class, gender, profession, language, literature, science, music, ethics or politics. Many thinkers, such as Younge (2010), believe that the promotion of identity is caused by the decline of democracy, and that globalisation weakens the democracy and sovereignty of the nation state and transforms individuals into a “universal tribe of consumers” who are ‘economically interdependent but isolated and impotent as citizens’ (Cantle 2012, p. 17). Younge’s argument is persuasive, particularly in the context of the making of the Euro and the globalisation of products which weaken local businesses. He concludes that the greater the loss of control and access to democracy, the more people retreat into isolated identities or tribes.

On the other hand, the sense of shared identity changed deeply in all Western societies, but it is unavoidably understood in different ways by minority and majority groups. This is mirrored in the altering nature of
personal identities in terms of faith, present locality, and ethnicity, as well as a seemingly decreasing sense of nationality. In the case of Britain, the 2011 Searchlight Educational Trust (SET) report revealed that despite the fact that many ethnic groups saw themselves in a similar way, Asian and Black groups differed meaningfully from White groups in some aspects; the three components of nationality, country of birth and residence were most significant for White groups (67 percent) compared with Asian (46 percent) and Black (21 percent). Minorities were also more likely to consider religion and ethnicity as the most central part of their identity.

Moreover, the influence of diversity on personal identities is mainly intense, with individuals generally attached to their cultural heritage, belief, language, diaspora and new national identity so as to construct hybrid or multiple identities. As Brah (2007) indicated, identity is a process and not a static category. Hence, Identity is more and more complex along with hybridity of nationality, faith and ethnicity, as a consequence of cultural diversity shared within the same society which led to the evolution of “mixed race” or multiple identities.

In spite of this wide-ranging diversity and varying patterns of identity, governmental replies remained ambiguous. Mostly, they tried to strengthen their view of national identity through some procedures such as the teaching of national history and the promotion of national citizenship and identity. By consistently maintaining the integrity of national borders and governance, and trying to reject the interdependence carried by globalisation, they toughen a fear of “others”. They, then, stay behind the existing reality of multiple identities within their communities and may find that social media can form new transnational relationships which surpass traditional power structures. Besides, there is strong evidence of deterioration in traditional democracies across Europe, with election voters and political party membership in decline.

In addition, such policies support multiculturalism, which placed identity as stagnant and limited. Nevertheless, the reality for many people today is that identity is transitory and, at least partially, chosen. For Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah (2010), the spread of mixed race,
intermarriage across national, faith and other borders is a reality for many people:

In an age of super diversity where people do not identify around single identities and feel conflicted allegiance (if any allegiance at all) to pre-defined groups, activism around particular ‘strands’ seems irrelevant to many people and may not even be that effective in addressing the true causes of inequality. Even the very categorisations that we rely on (for example, ‘black’, ‘gay’, ‘Asian’ or ‘disabled’) no longer seem to be able to tell us much about who people, what lives they lead, who they identify with, or what services they need from government and society. And the tick box approach seems to be missing out on growing numbers of people who fall outside or across standard classifications. Yet society seems to treat ethnic identities as if they are clearly bounded, static and meaningful, and public bodies insist on a tick box classification. (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010, p. 11)

Yet, past ideas of identity remain, maintained by systems of over-protective community leaders and single identity funding which have standardised and toughened in-group restrictions and stereotypes.

1.6 Multiculturalism and Globalisation

Globalisation, according to sociologists, is an on-going process that involves interconnected changes in the economic, cultural, social, and political spheres of society. As a process, it involves the ever-increasing integration of these aspects between nations, regions, communities, and even seemingly isolated places. Globalisation also represents the intensification of economic, cultural, and political practices accelerating across the globe in the early 21st century.

Most countries in the world are culturally diverse. According to world statistics, in 184 independent countries there are about 600 languages and 500 ethnic groups (Human Development Report 2016). Only a small number of countries in the world can say that their citizens share the
same language and belong to the same ethno-national group. However, this diversity may pose many important questions that can be subject to disagreement. Minorities and the majority are mainly opposed to various matters such as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, educational programmes, national symbols, choice of anthem or national holidays.

Finding moral and political answers to these questions is the major challenge that most democracies are faced with today; the attempt to make liberal-democratic institutions in Eastern Europe and the Third World are weakened by patriotic conflicts. In Western Europe frequent disagreements concerning immigrants’ rights and other cultural minorities challenge the expectations on which decades of political life is based on.

Modern societies are mostly faced by minority groups in search of recognition of their own identity; this is usually seen as the chief challenge of multiculturalism. However, the latter often covers several forms of cultural pluralism, each of which represents a test of its own. In addition, minorities are merged with political communities in different ways, from conquest and colonisation of formerly independent societies to voluntary immigration of individuals and families. These differences influence the kind of relationship that they want to found with the broader society.

Thus, cultural diversity is shaped by integrating previously autonomous and territorially concerted cultures into a larger state. These incorporated cultures (national minorities) are likely to remain as isolated communities within a predominant culture requiring independence or self-government in order to provide their own survival as singular societies. In another case, cultural diversity may be formed by individual or family immigration. These immigrants frequently constitute moveable associations called ethnic groups. Generally, these groups are ready to mix with the wider society and be accepted as full members. Though they try to look for greater recognition of their own ethnic identities, their aim is not to become autonomous nationalities, but to adjust the institutions and laws to get used to cultural differences.
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During the course of history, governments were the makers of different policies toward cultural minorities in order to achieve the ideal of a homogeneous state; some minorities were exterminated either by mass persecutions or by genocide. Others were assimilated by force, and were obliged to adopt the language, religion and traditions of the majority. Whereas others were treated as aliens and were exposed to physical segregation and economic discrimination through which all their rights were eradicated.

Nevertheless, countless efforts to defend cultural minorities and to regulate possible conflicts between minorities and the majority were made, often via bilateral agreements. After Second World War, it became clear that there was need for a different approach to minority rights. Many liberals expected the resolution of minority conflicts on the basis of "human rights" agreement. Instead of protecting themselves directly, cultural minorities were protected indirectly, by ensuring elementary civil and political rights such as freedom of speech and association, regardless of individuals’ group affiliation.

Moreover, there was a general inclination for the advance of human rights to overcome the problem of national minorities through guaranteeing basic individual rights to all human beings. Yet, the main theory was that the members of national minorities did not need rights of a special character and should not acquire special powers. The policy of human rights was considered as a substitute for minority rights, with strong insistence on the fact that minorities could not legally seek guarantees to preserve their ethnic and group rights.

So as to resolve these questions impartially, it was necessary to enhance the traditional doctrine of human rights theory of minority rights. The need for such a philosophy became clear in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where clashes over local autonomy, determination of borders and other ethnic matters caused fierce conflicts in a great part of the region. Thus, there was little prospect of founding a steady peace in these regions, or of respecting basic human rights, without resolving all
minority problems. Currently, the view that it is legitimate to ask for additional items to the conventional policy of minority rights is more and more accepted. An inclusive theory of justice in multicultural countries should comprise universal rights which belong to individuals no matter their group.

By the end of the twentieth century, huge crowds of people crossing borders made nearly every country became multi-ethnical. It was also a period of rising nationalist groups in search of confirming their identity. Therefore, the new policies of difference and diversity changed conformist governments in many countries. The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the demands of ethnic and national groups became a centre of political attention in many countries, at both domestic and international level.

Conversely, in many parts of the world, groups motivated by hatred and intolerance had no interest to behave toward others with goodwill. In these conditions, potential abuse of ethnic group rights was very large, such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, where racial segregation and religious persecution led to ethnic cleansing and genocide. As a result, a particular solution was needed for minority rights. Yet, it was also important to underline the limits of those rights; minority rights had to neither authorise any group to dominate over other groups, nor allow one group to struggle for freedom and equality.

Yet, globalisation today is seen as a process of making a single economic, political and cultural space on Earth. It suggests that global culture emerges from different tendencies of social and cultural development, global patterns of consumption and consumerism, cosmopolitan lifestyles, global sport events such as the Olympics and world championships, spread of tourism and education on global scale, and weakening in of nation states sovereignty; also, growth of global military systems, recognition of the world’s ecological crisis, world health problems like AIDS, organisations of world political systems such as the United Nations, global social movements and extending human rights. More important is the fact that globalisation enhances new consciousness of the
world as a single space. Generally, globalisation is described as a particular structuring of the world as a whole, and this means that the world is an environment that is endlessly being fabricated. Other definition implies that globalisation is a social process in which geographical restrictions on social and cultural activities stop to exist.

Today, in the analysis of modern society and its changes, two subjects are becoming more predominant: globalisation and its effects on education. As humanity is becoming a more single political, economic and cultural entity, education, then, becomes the most significant progressive resource. Problems of education are subject to analysis of many international scientific and political meetings, where the current educational systems are critically reviewed. Besides, the future of education is often directed towards global "civilisation of knowledge". A lot of scientific research at both national and international level is undertaken to adjust educational systems contents to the new social needs and changes. On these grounds, many measures are adopted to advance education from primary school to university.

1.7 Critiquing Multiculturalism

Reactions to multiculturalism as governance are diverse. Many have critiqued multiculturalism as a protective concession to calm bothersome minorities. Others link multiculturalism with liberal changes in evolving the politics of recognition. Yet others perceive it as a political product of power struggles over rival plans. On the contrary, there are those who recognise the ambiguous partiality of multiculturalism as profit, depending on context, standards, or consequences. In between are the moderates who are unsure of where to stand or what to believe.

Contrariwise, multiculturalism was intended to construct a progressive and tolerant society. Open-mindedness toward people’s cultural identity would preserve social equality and equal opportunity to create a society comfortable with difference. As Turner (2006) acknowledges, democratic governance in capitalist societies includes a conflicting relationship: the import of migrant labour to the left, and a
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state commitment to security and unity to the right. In this regard multiculturalism embodies a strategy to resolve this political paradox in a politically acceptable way (Thobani 2007).

For Bannerji (2000), the contradictions and uncertainties entailed within multicultural governance justify the criticism. Many accuse multiculturalism of being too radical or too obstinate, of encouraging too much or not enough change, of promising more than it can bring. In this respect Irshad Manji (2005) points out:

As Westerners bow before multiculturalism, we anesthetize ourselves into believing that anything goes. We see our readiness to accommodate as strength — even a form of cultural superiority... Radical Muslims, on the other hand, see our inclusive instincts as a form of corruption that makes us soft and rudderless. They believe the weak deserve to be vanquished. Paradoxically, then, the more we accommodate to placate, the more their contempt for our “weakness” grows. And the ultimate paradox may be that in order to defend our diversity, we’ll need to be less tolerant. (Fleras 2009, p. 19)

Critics have condemned multiculturalism as vain. For Thobani (1995), multiculturalism is criticised as a massive fraud spread by vested interests to warrant minority vote through ideological brainwashing. In this regard Bannerji (2000) asserts that multiculturalism, as a capitalist confusion to divide and divert the working classes, ghettoises minorities into occupational structures and residential arrangements, thus covering the predominant distribution of power and wealth behind a “camouflage of efficient clichés”.

Moreover multicultural guarantee of inclusion and justice is compromised by excessive emphasis on culture at the expense of more central categories of social classes, race, or gender. Multiculturalism, then, denotes a well-mannered and moderated way of covering unequal power relations and institutionalised racism (Lentin and Titley 2008). In other
words, an official multicultural discourse tends to enclose diversity within the existing system rather than being integral to a changing society so as to fortify its weakness in endorsing equality or intergroup relations. Bader (2007) argues that a thoughtless use of multiculturalism can cause a division of society along cultural lines; partly, an inappropriate multiculturalism emphasises the legality of those identities that might be a menace through exposing society to incursion by terrorists. Multiculturalism is taken to task for rejecting liberal ideals of state neutrality and equality before the law.

Official Multiculturalism may sound good in theory, but application may fail because of difficulties in balancing concepts with reality. For instance, though its intent may be to enable the integration of immigrants and assure their loyalty, multiculturalism may have strengthened immigrants’ attachment to their homeland via diaspora’s connections (Kurien 2006). In opposition, despite the fact that multiculturalism may promote distinctiveness, the actual participation may have the ironic effect of engaging them into the dominant culture (Pearson 2001).

**Conclusion**

The conclusion seems inevitable: multicultural governance involves much partisan politics and electoral benefit rather than policies of inclusion and anti-racist programmes. Support is repeatedly elite driven and reflects a political accord, whereas “underground” dissatisfactions and angers are hardly approved. Nevertheless, criticism should be tempered to some extent, particularly if multiculturalism is taken as a general principle with ambitious goals rather than a specific programme with spoken goals and enforceable execution. An official state Multiculturalism seems to occupy a third space in between the benefits and the costs. Both critics and supporters tend to drop toward extremist positions.

Hence, those who heavily defend multiculturalism at all costs are as ideological as those who mock it for lacking any positive value whatever. In that there are many people, with different expectations and needs, the
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The effect of official multiculturalism is neither all good nor all bad. Reasonably, it may be either good or bad depending on context, standards, and consequences. Multiculturalism might be good and bad concurrently, redeeming and disregarding, uniting and discordant, broad and limited, with profits and expenses.

However, alternative to official Multiculturalism can decrease the strength of difference by directing it into the private or personal. Far from being a danger to the social order, multiculturalism as governance establishes a discourse in resistance to dominant ideology and politics of indifference. Britain could be a “good” example that illustrates all the benefits and drawbacks of multicultural governance. This is what the next chapters explore with a particular focus on England.
Notes to Chapter One

1 Weinstock (1994) as cited in Parekh (2000): Since cultural diversity fosters such vital preconditions of human freedom as self-knowledge, self-transcendence and self-criticism, it is an objective good, a good whose value is not derived its being an essential condition of human freedom and well-being.

2 Mahajan (1999): Multiculturalism locates the incommensurable differences within the boundaries of state. Here diversity is no longer pushed outside the nation state rather diverse communities coexist within the nation state and hence, multiculturalism raises the issue of equality.

3 It would be impossible to try to offer a detailed account of each thinker's sophisticated arguments. Given the enormous influence of their work, secondary accounts are widespread and range in quality. For a general but critical reading of Taylor, see Appiah (2005) and Bauman (2000), for Young, see Faulks (2000) and for Parekh see Modood (2005). For a critique of each see Barry (2001).

4 Thus making equal recognition an essential part of democratic culture, Habermas (1994, p. 113) argues that "a correctly understood theory of [citizenship] rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the individual and the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed".
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Introduction

An integrated British culture arose at the end of the 19th Century. Thanks to the flourishing colonial empire and the booming Industrial Revolution (1760-1840), a strong sense of British identity emerged. As stated by Colley (1992), the sturdy commitment to Protestantism was the most important reason in uniting the nation. Yet, differences in what the people qualified as “Britishness” and / or “Englishness”, a sentiment of being part of the nation, differed according to class structure, region of the country, ethnic status, etc. Newspapers, education, and spreading a shared common culture fuelled homogenisation processes. More features promoting homogenisation comprised the standardisation of the language and the unification of political and economic institutions. As settled immigrant groups began to integrate political life, new immigrants kept on arriving and settling in the country.

2.1 Immigration to England (1950s-2000s)

Immigration is the movement of people into an area to settle there permanently, adding to the population. In Britain, especially in England, many immigrant groups established in particular suburban areas which became branded by the groups’ distinct ways of life. As these different lifestyles became noticeable, a sense of “otherness” grew among the population. Jews from Central and Eastern Europe, Spanish Sephardic communities, Italian migrants, Irish workers, Chinese and Indian sailors, Eastern students and businessmen, all altered, in one way or another, the English society.

In spite of some racist violence, the first few decades of the 20th Century were moderately tolerant. For Watson (2000), the dominant white English, attached to a constant English sense of identity, believed that within a few generations’ migrants would master English customs, and the public sphere would be preserved, whereas the original culture of immigrant groups could be reserved within the privacy of their homes and places of worship. The fundamental idea behind this belief was that
differences would not be publicly perceptible, and thus immigrants would become systematically integrated within English society. It was supposed that “foreign ways” would become incorporated and enrich the cultural life of the nation by means of additions in terms of cuisine or professional specialisation.

Nevertheless, before the second half of the century, the number of ethnic minority immigrants was small and immigrants were not part of a large ethnic or religious group. In the 1950s, mounting numbers of Commonwealth migrants\(^1\) came to meet the needs of the labour market, and visible communities emerged in London and other chief industrial towns. It was during this era that fin de siècle ideas about other cultures entered into people’s imagination. Those fin de siècle views were founded on images that related to stereotypical characters attributed to cultural “others”. Those thoughts exploded imagination depicting the cultural “other” as alien, and either menacing or ludicrous (Watson 2000).

Moreover the media symbolised “cultural others” on the basis of conventional stereotypical beliefs. Media descriptions involved differences in physical appearance, pagan beliefs, superstitions and further accounts of Oriental and African “other” as lacking in culture and civilisation. Through the media, mistrust was raised and scorn increased for the non-European. The hostility of this period was reflected in race riots, such as the Notting Hill Race Riot of 1958 (Ramdin 2017).

Besides, the process of decolonisation nurtured a deleterious depiction of the nationalist politicians that were left behind in the decolonised regions through the use of provocative appellations; terrorists, saboteurs, and communists, etc. According to (Watson 2000), references to acts of brutality and violence had the swelling effect of separating the European from the non-European. Other representation took either the guise of the “loyal servant” or the “Anglophile aristocrat” and, in both cases the image was one of “amusing condescension”; a tolerance for the absurd and the ostentatious.
During the 1950s, the dominant white belief raised that non-white others were accepted in their place, yet should not try to reach further than themselves, either through social mobility or intermarriage. Among other factors such as the changing economic conditions of the time, it was this new conceptualisation that led to a sense of separation, and the desire to conserve social and cultural differences. At the same time, loyalty of the “other” to social conventions and national laws were thoroughly inspected\(^2\) (Watson 2000). These widespread and detrimental representations of other cultures produced in the 1950s remained in the popular imagination and were transmitted down the generations.

Consequently, multicultural policies were adopted in the ‘70s and ‘80s, particularly under Tony Blair’s government (1997-2007), to define both the problems and promises of living in a post-colonial blend. Such policies related to questions of how the state had important influence on the political accommodation of minority cultures. These multicultural politics tried to focus on the heritage of colonialism and conquest. They provided both a platform for the state to reconsider the new composition of the nation, mainly the populations previously excluded from national memory.

In 1966, Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary at the time, promoted a policy of integration instead of assimilation. Public opinion since then supported ideas relating to integration policies, which credited other non-English cultures and religions. Such views are expressed in relation to questions regarding freedom of religious expression, multilingual education, the ingrained racism in English social and political institutions and colour-blindness.

All these questions emerged around the effort to settle a principle of difference within equality. Moreover, the debates still resound in the government chambers; intercultural marriage, black and Asian novelists, cultural fusion in music and cuisine, films and television, all show that English society is undertaking a major change in its attitude to cultural
diversity. However, many questions remain concerning who and what can be basically English and what elements of “otherness” England wants to hold.

2.2 Immigrants and Ethnic Minority Groups in England

Before 1971, the decennial census recorded only place of birth of immigrants. Census statistics displayed that, in 1951, 4.4 percent of the population of England and Wales was foreign born, increasing to 6.5 percent in 1971 and growing more gradually afterward. In 1991 the foreign born were 7.4 percent of the population of Great Britain and 45 percent of these were born in the Commonwealth countries. Some of the foreign born were of British extraction and others became British citizens. Only 3 percent of the local population counted in 1991 was citizens of foreign countries.

In addition, place of birth became a progressively poor indicator of the amount of ethnic minority population due to the rising numbers of second generation immigrants. The 1971 census indicated that ethnic minorities were 2.7 percent of British population but this estimation was considered to have an extensive margin of error. This estimate was updated to 1981 suggesting a population of over two million (4 percent). However, the suggestion to include a question on ethnic group in the 1981 census was abandoned because of race problem. Not until 1991 was a question on ethnicity involved in the census and this showed an ethnic minority population of only 3 million (5.5 percent of the total). The most important alternative source on the population size was the Labour Force Survey (LFS). It started biennially from 1973, annually from 1983, and quarterly from 1991. Estimations from the LFS demonstrated numbers of ethnic minority population which were largely consistent with census based estimates for 1971, 1981 and 1991.

Nevertheless, there were many different ways of defining ethnic minority population, mainly according to race, religion, language or culture, or country of extraction. The 1991 census divided ethnic minority populations into seven groups based on a mixture of race and region of
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Among the 5.5 percent who identified themselves as ethnic minorities, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis constituted almost a half, while those describing themselves as Black Caribbean and Black African were more than 30 percent. As shown in Table 2.1 below, approximately half of the total ethnic minority population was born in Britain though only a third of the Black Africans, Bangladeshis, Chinese and Other Asians were second generation. The proportion was mainly high for Black Other, many of who called themselves Black British.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population Share</th>
<th>Born Overseas</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Age Under 16</th>
<th>Age 60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Other</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>49.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
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<td>63.4</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
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<td>71.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>52.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>40.2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Ethnic Minorities in the 1991 Census

The table also indicates that the proportions of men and women were equal reflecting the influence of family reunion. However, the age structure was rather less similar to that of the white population. Excluding Black Caribbean and Black Other, the common aged 60 or over was less than 10 percent. This revealed that most immigrants were young on arrival and only those first immigrants could reach retirement age. Large proportions of those under sixteen constituted the vast majority of those born in Britain. This characteristic was raised by high birth rates and large family sizes for some of ethnic minority groups, principally the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. LFS data also demonstrated that a third of Pakistani and Bangladeshi families had three or more dependent children under 16.
Besides, the 1991 census exposed a noticeable concentration of ethnic minority populations in some parts of Britain. These concentrations were established early as a result of consecutive waves of immigration. Ethnic minority populations remained heavily concentrated in urban regions with 45 percent located in the Greater London area alone compared with 10 percent of the white population. Other main zones of settlement were the Midlands and the industrial/urban parts of Lancashire and Yorkshire. Even inside urban parts, minorities were concentrated in some localities, frequently the more depressed inner city areas.

Therefore in London district, in the boroughs of Brent, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Ealing and Lambeth, ethnic minorities surpassed 30 percent of the population in 1991. Many of these areas had communities dominated by one specific ethnic minority group; Bangladeshis made up 23 percent of the population of Tower Hamlets, Black Caribbeans formed 15 percent of Lambeth population whereas Indians dominated in London, especially in Brent, Newham and Ealing and in the Midlands.4

The general numbers of ethnic minority groups, their demographic structure and their concentration in some urban areas had many explanations: First, their contact with white British culture might be less than it would appear at first sight. Second and more important, as statistics from the 1970s emphasised, these ethnic minorities had to be considered as communities and not just as individuals or families. Third, the preservation of distinct cultures was both a reason and a consequence of geographical concentration.

2.3 Immigrants’ Integration in England (1950s-2000s)

For many centuries, various immigrants came into England in search of better economic opportunities or to escape from political or religious oppression such as Huguenots (French Protestants) in 17th century and Jews in 19th century. Immigrants from all over the world have lived in England for many centuries; the total numbers have generally been small,
excepting Irish immigrants, until New Commonwealth immigration instigated in the 1950s. The Irish have formed a considerable part of the population. According to some estimate, the ancestry of 10 percent of British population is Irish (Mason 1995).

Before the Second World War, an important number of Nazi refugees moved to England in 1930s. As stated by Geddes and Guiraudon (2004), the majority of post-war migration originated from Ireland and its previous colonies in South Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. During the late 1940s and 1950s a rising number of black immigrants, coming from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, started to settle. By 2001, immigrants from South Asian countries (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) comprised 3.6 percent of whole population (see Appendix I). According to 2001 survey, ethnic minority population involved 7.9 percent of the entire UK population and the majority of them (over 2 million individuals) originated from South East Asian countries.

Labour migration, however, was the chief reason of immigration to England. In that Mason (1995) pointed out that ‘in the year following the end of the Second World War, Britain suffered from a severe labour shortage; especially in unskilled jobs and in service industries such as transport ... these vacancies could only be filled by substantial immigration’. (Mason 1995, p. 24) For Weil and Crowley (1994), other reason of massive immigration to England was for filling up long term demographic necessities. Nevertheless, since the end of World War II, immigrant population of England has increased swiftly and for the first time British government had to find out the suitable policies to control the stream of migration and correspondingly integrate immigrants into the growing multicultural English society.

However, the British policies have occasionally given importance to integrationist approach; the most important decisions were taken in 1960s. Prominent Race Relation Acts (1965, 1968 and 1976) were passed to integrate immigrants and allow cultural diversity in an air of common
tolerance. These policies derived from 150 years of religious and cultural discord since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Nonetheless the major change began when a mounting number of black immigrants settled in England after Second World War. As a result, policy makers adopted the race relation approach to deal with the rising ethnic minorities. Such policies were inspired by a study of US institutions to achieve racial equality for black Americans (Rex 1998). These Race Relation Acts aimed at avoiding discrimination and promoting multiculturalism.

2.3.1 Economic Integration

To boost immigrants’ economic integration, British government endeavored to improve race equality and eradicate racial discrimination from the active labour market. Yet, unemployment discrepancies between the “white” and “ethnic minority” population have persisted, with recent research suggesting that ethnic minorities have constantly experienced unemployment rates twice that of “whites”. (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004) Therefore, immigrants were continuously at the lowest hierarchy in social and economic status, mainly, because they were less educated than native citizens and were needed to fill up unskilled manual labour deficiency in England.

The post-war immigration to England was mainly driven by economic imperatives. At the time, England suffered from a severe labour shortage, especially in unskilled jobs and in service industries and these could not be filled by English population alone. Accordingly, Caribbean and Sub-continental men were invited to fill up these voids and be mainly employed in manual low-paid work (Smith 1977).

So far, unemployment rate of “non-white” immigrants is at last twice, some times more than three times, as high as those for white people and it is highest among Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black-Africans. However, among Indian and Chinese immigrants, it is moderately low (see Appendix II). According to Labour Force Survey (1999), 85 percent of white people (aged 16-64) are economically active compared with 77
percent of immigrants and 74 percent of white women are in the active labour market compared to 56 percent of immigrant women. Correspondingly, 10 percent of working population is immigrant counting 3.6 million people (Home Office 2002).

On the other side, there is an important difference of unemployment rate among diverse immigrant groups. Chinese and Indians are in wide equivalence with whites whereas high level of unemployment is noticed among Black Africans, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. For Modood (1999), immigrants are limited to low-skilled jobs because they are returning to their pre-migration occupational levels.

2.3.2 Social Integration

Britain gave a strong importance to housing access for immigrants as Harrison and Phillips (2005) noted:

The UK has a stated multi-cultural policy, which aims to respond to cultural diversity through its housing policy whilst widening minority ethnic housing choices. Local government and social housing organisations are statutorily obliged to develop housing strategies which promote race equality and respond to the diverse social and cultural needs and preferences of migrant and minority ethnic groups. Housing providers set out a long-term vision for local minority ethnic communities, set targets for measuring performance and seek to integrate these with regional ethnic minority strategies. (Harrison and Philips 2005, p. 88)

Conversely, after the Second World War, recent immigrants had little access to proper housing. They had to live in poor private rental properties or buy cheap attached housing in deteriorating internal city (Rex and Moore 1967). But this situation has changed significantly. Immigrants now have access in wide range of housing freehold and their living condition is improved considerably (Karn and Phillips 1998).
According to 1991 survey, immigrants were well embodied in housing pattern. The Indian were in good position among immigrants in terms of public housing. They had practically the same access in housing market as British citizens did. Alternatively, ethnic minority groups remained in poor situation than white regarding housing quality; overcrowding and concentration in deprived areas with high levels of segregation. (Karn and Phillips 1998) Owner-occupiers, at the time, household accounted 66 percent compared to only 25 percent in 1945. There was a considerable difference in house-ownership amongst diverse immigrant groups. Indian were in the top position, 82 percent, whereas Pakistani 77, Chinese 62, Caribbean 48, Bangladeshi 44 and African 28 percent. Intriguingly, white were in the third position in owner-occupiers housing (see Appendix III).

Among immigrant groups there are significant differences in housing conditions and ownership. Pakistani and Bangladeshi, however, were the most disadvantaged group, 30 percent of Pakistani and 47 percent of Bangladeshi lived in an overcrowded condition whereas only 2 percent British citizens do so in 1991. The quality of housing also differed among different immigrant groups. Indian and Chinese were most likely to live in higher quality houses while Bangladeshi and Pakistanis lived in poorer condition (Karn and Phillips 1998). Besides, the earnings of Bangladeshi and Pakistanis were 43 and 32 percent correspondingly, compared to earnings of whites (Modood 1999). Therefore, immigrant groups who had low level of income tend to live in poorer housing condition.

Nevertheless, there is an evidence of some progress in terms of quality and pattern of housing, yet relative disparities are still tough. Immigrants in England remain in a worse situation than native citizens as Harrison and Phillips (2005) stated, the recognition of housing as a causal factor in “race” related urban turbulences in the UK in 2001 includes an acknowledgement that housing is integral to wider patterns of disadvantage, poverty and social division.
2.3.3 Political Integration

Mason (1995) declares, though in formal terms Britain’s minority ethnic populations are entirely integrated politically, they have access to political citizenship rights, their needs have not been completely represented in the political system. Their participation is limited mainly in seeking funds for the party, taking part in strategy meeting, holding public or party office, and campaigning for party (Goulbourne 1995).

For historical and structural reasons, immigrants in England were relatively absent in real political life. They were less inclined to participate in political sphere such as voting, standing as a candidate in local or national level. It was estimated that immigrants represented 5 percent of whole British electorate and their vote was vital in many urban districts. In general, electoral registration rate of immigrants is lower than white. But Asians have nearly the same rate as British citizens do (Bousetta 2001).

On the other hand, immigrants’ counsellors represent 2.9 percent of total councillors in England and Wales. The majority of them (82 percent) are male, and Asians are dominating in this category (Anwar 2001). Black councillors in London had 134 seats in 1986 local election and their number continued to grow during 1990 (Saggar 1992). In 1991 the number of ethnic minority MPs had increased modestly (Fitzerald 1995).

Furthermore, naturalisation, a process of acquiring nationality, grew 21 percent in 2003 than previous year in Britain which accounted 139,315 individuals. Asian and African immigrants accounted 40 and 32 percent respectively, among them 10.9 percent were Pakistani and 7 percent were Indian and Somalis. There was also a stable connection between distance of residence and naturalisation rate. Sixty one percent of total citizenship was granted to those who have been residing in England more than six years.
2.3.4 Cultural Integration

According to Labour Force Survey (1999), there was a general tendency of intermarriage among different immigrant groups in England. It was more common among men than women with the exception of Chinese and some Asian immigrants (see Appendix IV). The mixed couples were mostly in white/West Indian origins though white/Asian mixed couples are also common nowadays (Coleman 2004).

According to Office for National Statistics (2001), there were 10.3 million couples in England and Wales and only 2 percent of total marriages were inter-ethnic marriage (see Appendix V); white and mixed raced immigrants involved 26 percent of all inter-marriages and white and other was 15 percent, white and Caribbean marriages included 12 percent, the largest among immigrants groups, while white and Indian involved 11 percent only. However, intermarriage rate among Asian immigrants was quite low except for Chinese and Bangladeshis immigrants because Asian people were less likely to marry other ethnic minority people; only 6 percent Indian, 4 percent Pakistani and 3 percent Bangladeshi married outside their ethnic group.

Alternatively, English language proficiency in England differs among diverse ethnic groups (see Appendix VI). As stated in Dusmann and Fabbri’s (2003) study, Afro-Asian are well ahead from other immigrants groups, followed by Caribbean and Indian. Bangladeshis are in the bottom of this category. Unexpectedly, a significant percentage of immigrants cannot speak English at all, among them Pakistani 16.88 percent, Bangladeshi 16.76 percent, Chinese 12.64 percent, Indian 9.81 percent, and all groups 9.67 percent respectively.

2.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants

The diversity of multi-ethnic society and culture is widely acknowledged by the English media, politicians and policy makers, yet racism and xenophobia is still a problem in England. Immigrants are still
Chapter Two: Immigration, Diversity and Legislation

suffering from a high rate of racist and xenophobic instances. According to Saggar (1992), the evolution of British racial attitudes seems to owe less to the direct face-to-face interaction between white Britons and black people and more to a fundamental system of values and conventions about Britain in a period of unique economic growth.

Heath and Tilley’s (2005) survey shows that immigrants are not welcomed in England (see Appendix VII). One third of respondents claimed that the flow of migrants should be reduced since they do not fit British identity and values. Nevertheless, they were more liberal about current immigrants and most of them (61.3 percent) in favour of immigrants’ assimilation. Therefore, the level of integration of immigrants in England becomes rather complicated when considering native citizens’ attitudes towards immigrants.

Furthermore, racist incidents in England have increased fiercely (see Appendix VIII). On the word of RAXEN (2005), Britain is in the first place with the highest number of reported racist violence (53,092 incidents) in periods between 2001 and 2005 including 25,116 racially serious offences whose victims were mainly South Asians. As a result, British government has introduced new and innovative legislation and action plans to fight institutional racism and improve integration.

2.5 National Policy Approach and Its Impact on Immigration

Labour Unions had a strong position in bringing social and political rights onward so that the working class could participate in the wider society as upper social classes did. Conventionally the state did not interfere in such interest-group treaties. Instead, it tailored the welfare state system, during the 1980s Conservative government, for low-income groups, i.e. the working class. Besides, this model of welfare relied on the principle that the market is the primary controlling instrument in society. However, limited welfare support caused the tendency to choose poorly paid jobs instead of social assistance. Poor-quality public services also
activated the private sector to provide substitute services in health care, education, etc. (Schierup et al. 2006).

Thereafter, civil rights and labour-market participation of individual migrants became the most common instrument of immigrants’ integration. Parties, then, will win seats in Parliament if they have strong local support; they are in a position to win a majority of seats, and therefore build government, if this support corresponds to other electorates. Consequently, this system of welfare has favoured the representation of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) candidates (Garbaye 2005). In the electoral areas mainly populated by a majority of ethnic minorities, parties have inclined to endorse BME candidates to secure a seat in the Parliament.

On the other side, England has 36 Metropolitan districts, of which Birmingham is the largest, which are essentially unitary authorities, i.e. a metropolitan district is responsible for all local government functions within its area, including housing, education, social services and transport. This has enabled Metropolitan districts such as Birmingham relative freedom in modeling the delivery of services that affect BME communities in particular (Garbaye 2005).

However, the industrial sector reform caused a large number of jobless workers, many of whom were African-Caribbean and Pakistani. England also faced a demographic crisis during the 1970s and early 1980s which made the kind of temporary, low-paid jobs that used to be occupied by youth progressively taken over by ethnic minorities (Schierup et al. 2006).

Moreover, the British Government reacted to the financial crisis of the 1990s by carrying out a wage-cost competition strategy which involved the improvement of low-wage service sectors. This was endorsed by Major’s Conservative Government as well as by New Labour (Pontusson 1997). This approach to the political economy had important consequences for ethnic minorities and women, in particular those who
had been employed in service occupations and subcontracting firms used by the textile and clothing industry. Part-time jobs have multiplied, as they have been encouraged by the government, and employees had a weak legal position which made them potentially subject to exploitation. Hence, the wage-cost competition strategy contributed to preserve a gendered and racially hierarchic labour market.

Clark and Drinkwater (2007) have compared the data of the 1991 and 2001 censuses and prove that the employment rate of white British male in England and Wales was 77.8 percent, while male unemployment rates were in excess of 10 percent for all ethnic minorities. The census also shows that Chinese and Indians had a higher rate of employment than Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Recent research also shows that Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim men earn 13 to 21 percent less than white British Christian with similar qualifications (Government Equalities Office 2009). Generally, BME women perform better in employment than men. However the unemployment rate is higher among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women than it is for men⁶.

2.6 Immigration Policies

England has experienced large migration flows from the 1940s and onwards. This period of migration was a movement of citizens within an imperial institution, rather than third-country populations moving to a sovereign territory. The British Nationality Act of 1948 intended that persons born in colonial or Commonwealth countries were allowed to travel and enter Britain without restrictions by virtue of being subjects of the Crown. All British subjects, then, could enjoy the same social, political and legal rights as other Britons.

However, the race riots that occurred during the late 1950s generated public and parliamentarian debates expressing fears that social and racial problems would rise with the arrival of more colonial workers (Solomos 2003). This incident weakened the political agreement about the benefit of migration and thus nurtured a basis to control legislation,
applied in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, which introduced more restrictive measures for immigration control.

2.6.1 Race Relations and Immigration Regulations (1960s)

The policy logic regarding immigration and integration of migrants was that constricted control would lead to better race relations. This understanding was encouraged by both Labour and Conservative governments. Therefore, the firm 1962 Immigrants Bill was complemented by an accord concerning immigration policies to enhance cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance, as stated by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966 (Joppke 1996).

In the 1960s, welfare agencies were created to cope with the problems faced by non-white migrants and to help white communities to comprehend them. As well, two Race Relations Acts (RRAs) were passed in 1965 and 1968. These immigrant policies were characterised by two major elements: anti-discrimination policies and race relations policies at the local level (Garbaye 2005). With the RRAs, Britain formally took measures to fight racism and discrimination and to endorse social integration, accordingly admitting that political equality had not lead to broad equal treatment in the wider society (Layton-Henry 1992).

Moreover, Garbaye (2005) claims that through the RRAs, official authorities started to see immigrants not as simple beneficiaries of policies, but as actors of politics and consumers of policies. Even the classification of immigrants changed from being considered as immigrants they became racial/ethnic minorities. This relieved their participation in British politics, both as electorate and as politicians. It also preserved the category of race or ethnicity as socio-politically relevant since the imperial era. Consequently, British migrants began to mobilise, as black, to make related claims for racial equality and, in turn, closed the chances for religious groups such as Muslims to make equality claims in the name of their religion (Modood 2007).
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Following the 1964 elections, won by Labour Party, more preventive measures were introduced to immigration regulation. As said by Geddes (2003), the restrictive immigration policies were a reply to anti-immigration sentiments rather than a practical stance. A national poll of 1961 showed that 73 percent of the British population wanted tighter immigration control of, in particular, coloured colonial migrants (Small and Solomos 2006). As a response, the 1968 Second Commonwealth Immigrant Bill introduced the partiality rule, through which entrance to the UK was permitted only if the person had one parent or grandparent born, adopted or naturalised as a British citizen. However, the bill excluded the large majority of British citizens living in the Commonwealth.

Likewise, a new RRA was passed in 1976. As a result, a Commission for Racial Equality was established through which the local authorities became officially responsible for equality of opportunity and good community relations (Geddes 2003). However, politicians kept playing the race card when it was resonant among the public. For instance Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1978 said she understood the fear of Britons to be flooded by alien cultures and that it was her duty to stop these people from joining extreme right movements.

Words were translated into practice through the 1981 British Nationality Act which restrained the control on immigration and restricted the definition of British citizenship but maintained the right to vote at national elections to Commonwealth residents in Britain. Nevertheless, after the introduction of the Nationality Act, the three Conservative governments kept a passive position on immigration and immigrant policies, generally responding disapprovingly to Labour’s proposals (Layton-Henry 1992). Consequently, Labour's recruitment of politicians among ethnic minority groups and its support of black and Asian electorates created a particularly strong link between Labour and ethnic minorities7 (Garbaye 2005).
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Race relations allowed ethnic and religious minority group decrees for special requirements related to dress, diet or prayer in workplace and in schools. Yet, the formal growth of immigrants’ rights did not match the advance of a fully anti-discriminatory atmosphere. For example, the number of local councillors and MPs of ethnic minority origins remained low; the only representatives belonging to an ethnic minority were elected in areas with relatively large minority populations.

Nevertheless, recent statistics demonstrate that differences in terms of employment, labour market participation and housing follow ethnic lines; members of ethnic and religious minority groups are more likely to be outside the labour market. Those in employment can be fired and are at risk of unemployment even if they are born in Britain and have equivalent age and educational characteristics to the White British population (ONS 2006).

2.6.2 Asylum Seekers and Community Cohesion (1990s)

The term asylum seekers/refugees refers to individuals that fit into any of the three categories of asylum statuses offered by the UK government, namely; asylum seekers, refugees and persons granted Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). By asylum seeker, is meant someone who has made a formal application for asylum and is waiting for a decision on his or her claim. In the UK, a refugee refers to a person whose application for asylum has been successful, and is recognised as needing protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) category involves individuals who have been granted right of residency in the UK on a permanent basis. All these categories have some rights including residency and entitlement to social welfare, particularly access to services that could enable them to become “full and equal citizens” (Home Office 2001).

When the New Labour came to power in 1997, it was expected to react to the demands for changes in race relation policies. The 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act (RRAA) was the product of New Labours’
initiative and a partial reply to the 1999 Macpherson Report into the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. The Act involved promoting racial equality to all public authorities, including the police and confirmed a sustained support for anti-discrimination policies. But, the geopolitical changes of the 21st century opened up for a substantial shift in policies and discourses on migration and multiculturalism, changing the core of the debate.

The late 1990s witnessed augmented flows of asylum seekers (see Appendix IX) however their numbers were exaggerated by media and politicians who endorsed the idea that people seeking asylum in Britain were seeking to exploit the system as their real intention for migration was economic. This placed asylum-seekers as a social menace to Britain and created an opportunity for government and policy-makers to introduce measures to contain this threat, i.e. immigration (Buonfino 2004).

Simultaneously, welfare requirements were subject to serious restrictions. As stated by Geddes (2003), British government tried to portray asylum-seekers as alien to the British society and as a menace to its culture so as to provide the foundation for placing asylum-seekers as illegal receivers of welfare state benefits. Since the mid-1990s the rejection rate of asylum seekers in England was over 70 percent of all applications, with moderately low numbers of rejections in 1999 (52 percent) and 2002 (66 percent), due to harsh conditions in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq respectively.

Moreover, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act set up checks for asylum-seekers to replace cash paid welfare benefits and a national distribution system to counter the concentration of asylum-seekers in some areas of the country. This has in several ways deprived asylum-seekers to decide over their private economy, and has put important obstacles to their participation in the wider society. However, applications of asylum seekers increased from 41 500 in 1997, to 84 000 in 2002.
Though the numbers fell to 23,430 in 2007 (Home Office 2008), they aroused the fear that England was about to lose its identity and its wellbeing if letting too many asylum seekers to reside.

Between May and July 2001 the northern British towns of Bradford, Oldham and Burnley saw violent riots between gangs of white and British Asian adolescents. The same year, the 9/11 attacks on the United States altered the public ideas on migrants and, in particular, Muslims. The later attacks carried out in Madrid (2004) and in London (2005) aggravated the debate. In the meantime, the populist British Nationalist Party (BNP) was gaining more political terrain. These events, accordingly, revived the debates about British national identity and British core cultural values and strengthened the understanding that good race relations depended on strict immigration regulation.

Besides, British immigrant policies in the 2000s were embodied by a shift beyond multiculturalism towards forms of civic integration (Joppke 2004). The Independent Review Team, established by the government to study the consequences of the riots of 2001, reported that in some areas of the country, because of economic and urban segregation, communities were living parallel lives. It also criticised both local authorities for promoting these trends and Asian communities, in particular, to self-segregate themselves.

The report concluded that a solution to this dilemma would be to reinforce community cohesion through promoting a common sense of citizenship, approving shared values of nationhood, and developing a greater acceptance of the principal national institutions among the non-white community. These ideas, subsequently, gained a large importance in the public debate and endorsed the call for a reconsideration of British citizenship. As a result, the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act was introduced to impose on candidates to British citizenship to take a vow of loyalty to Britain as a sign of civic integration.10
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Furthermore, the 2002 white paper *Secure Borders, Safe Haven*, a chief constituent of this progress, suggested that the government should define the key objectives for the development of citizenship and nationality policy. It also argued that it is vital that to fortify both a sense of community belonging, and civic and political dimensions of British citizenship (Home Office 2002). The paper, then, associated belonging to loyalty whereas at the same time it underestimated the importance of a person’s multiple belongings and the inner tensions among them (Yuval-Davis et al. 2005).

In June 2006 the Government launched the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, a fixed-term consultative body. The Commission’s duty was to study ethnic diversity in local areas and to provide potential policy responses to interethnic conflicts. The 2007 Commission’s final report *Our Shared Future* set up a new description of integration and cohesion. It affirmed that an integrated and cohesive society is one where:

There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country; There is a strong sense of an individual’s rights and responsibilities when living in a particular place […]; There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in arbitrating between different interests. (CIC 2007, p. 42)

The report, then, corroborated that integration and cohesion can best be treated at local rather than at national level. Yet, the commission was doubtful about single-group financial support. On this subject, Kofman et al. (2009) declared that agencies and constitutional funders are now stricter in supporting organisations only if its policies and practices advance integration and cohesion.

Though the government tried to limit asylum-seeking migration, it also attempted, since the 1990s, to reinstitute a labour recruitment policy
which targeted high skilled workers, in particular, because these migrants would not burden the public services and would easily integrate. However, since 2008, a system was introduced to allow a firmer control of migration, students and workers (Home Office 2008a). These regulations had significant gendered implications, and domestic workers were not given the same status as other workers although both private and social sectors needed employees.

Additionally, the approach neglected women, who generally enter the country as wives. In this regard, Yuval-Davis et al. (2005) stated, as the woman’s right to stay is dependent on that of the husband, unequal power relations within the family are amplified. Family reunification, thus, was subject to important interventionism owing to some immigrants’ practices, such as arranged marriages and authoritarian gender relations, which might be introduced into liberal societies.

In 2004 the European Union was extended to comprise the A8 consent countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Britain was one of the countries that put no “temporary” limitations to migration flows from these countries; A8 citizens who wish to start employment in the UK can register with the Work Registration Scheme (WRS). A total of 715,000 applications to the WRS were accepted between 1 May, 2004 and 30 September, 2007. Among them, 66 percent were Polish (82 percent were aged between 18 and 34). Yet, their numbers were rather small compared to migration flows coming from the Commonwealth and from other parts of the world, as the table below shows. It is noteworthy to mention that since 2001, migration to Britain has generally decreased – with the exception of migration from the European Union (See Appendix X).
Table 2.2 Most significant national groups in the UK 1997-2007  
Source: Kofman et al. (2009)

Table 2.2 above shows the six most important non-naturalised national groups resident in Britain. In 2008, the ethnic minority population in Britain equaled 8 percent of the whole population (Eurostat 2008).

2.6.3 Citizenship Legislation

Citizenship refers to the state of having the rights of a person born in a particular country. It is also carrying out the duties and responsibilities of a member of a particular society. As a result of the 1948 British Nationality Act, anyone born within British territory could claim British nationality. Contrariwise, the 1981 British Nationality Act limited the citizenship legislation and brought preference into nationality law. The Act, then, restructured Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies into three categories: British Citizenship, British Dependent Territories Citizenship, and British Overseas Citizenship.

Citizens of the previous colonies who had either a parent or a grandparent who was born, adopted, naturalised or registered as citizen of the UK, or who permanently settled in the UK, were considered British citizens. British Dependent Territories Citizenship would be acquired by
those whose parent or grandparent were born, naturalised or registered in a current dependency or associate state. The third category involved all other cases, and was an undeclared invitation to those British subjects permanently resident abroad to take on local citizenship (Layton-Henry 1992). The Act specified that British citizens would mechanically carry a right of residence in the UK. The other categories of British nationality, however, would not hold such status.

Correspondingly, the 1981 Act changed the application of “jus soli” (right of the soil) in British nationality. It set up a mixture of “jus solis, jus sanguinis” and “jus domicili” (Odmalm 2005) through which it was required for at least one parent of a United Kingdom-born child to be a British citizen or to hold a permanent resident permit in the United Kingdom. In 2003, new British citizens were obliged to join a ceremony where they pledged their loyalty to Britain and the crown. In 2005 the government added a language obligation before being able to naturalise; one must prove her/his proficiency of English by either taking or passing an English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) course or, if the candidate’s knowledge of English is sufficient, by passing a standardised multiple-choice test called Life in the UK on basic English language, the political system and civic rights.

On the other side, British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens are allowed to vote in Westminster elections. Yet, people from other EU countries resident in the UK cannot vote at general elections. Moreover, Saggar (1998) declared that there was a high level of electorate registration among BME communities, 92 percent (compared to whites 97 percent) among them, there were lower electoral voters from younger generations and ethnic minority women.

Besides, BME communities have joined political parties since the 1970s, particularly, the Labour Party which was successful in employing and receiving support from Asian and black voters. Their representation in parliament improved progressively, but they still represent a small
minority of MPs which is not representative of Britain’s BME communities. Both major parties have race and equalities committees which try to attract BME communities’ support and to raise the number of ethnic minority candidates and elected MPs and councillors.

Other than party-based political contribution, BME organisations have played a role in British political life since the 1950s, in particular at the local level (Solomos 2003). In 1999, Local Government Act obliged local administrations to consult with representatives from communities and civil society. This had significant impact on policies of social and political integration of BME communities. The government, then, began to encourage voluntary and community activity, including BME groups. This was done through accords between the government and the voluntary sector such as “Compact”, a framework of principles and values determining relations between the voluntary and community sector and government (Craig et al. 2005).

Furthermore, the majority of BME associations are organised nationwide since the late 1990s in the Council of Ethnic Minority Voluntary Sector Organisations and its associated Ethnic Minority Foundation. In particular, British Muslims are formally organised nationally through the Union of Muslim Organisations, the Muslim Council of Britain, the Council of Mosques, and the National Association of British Muslims. The majority of these organisations deals primarily with anti-discrimination issues or is community care groups intended for specific ethnic groups with particular needs (Odmalm 2005).

These leading organisations are part of the government policy to respond actively to public consultations. There is however little consistency in policymaking dealing with BME-led organisations at the local and national levels. Recent research shows that there are still hindrances to significant participation by BME-led groups in agenda-setting and policymaking (Craig et al. 2005).
2.7 International Migration Impact

In the absence of international migration data from 1870, the labour force in 1911 would have been 16 percent larger than it really was. The overall effect of this drain of labour was to increase the wage of unskilled workers by 12.2 percent by 1911 (O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton 1994). In the case of Ireland, which was still part of the UK at that time, the dramatic currents of migrants from 1851 to 1911 had the effect of raising the wage by 30 percent (Boyer, Hatton and O’Rourke 1994).

Between 1951 and 1991 the UK population augmented by only 15 percent. Depending on the technique of calculation up to half this increase could be accounted for by immigration.\textsuperscript{11} Since a large proportion of immigrants than of the native population was of working age, their impact on the labour force was greater than their effect on population growth. As indicated in Table 2.3 below, in the 1960s and 1970s net immigration caused an increasing counterbalance to the deteriorating rate of natural increase. From 1981 net immigration comprised between a third and a half of entire population growth. For both groups the proportion of males slightly surpassed that of females and about three quarters of both immigrant flows were aged between 15 and 45. Therefore on purely demographic grounds the net consequence of migration was small.\textsuperscript{12}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Population growth (000’s)</th>
<th>Population growth (%)</th>
<th>Net migration (000’s)</th>
<th>Migration share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-66</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-71</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-56</td>
<td>-21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-76</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-55</td>
<td>-94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-81</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-120.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-86</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>+43</td>
<td>+51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-91</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>+60</td>
<td>+32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-96</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>+76</td>
<td>+38.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Population Change and Net Migration, 1961-1996

Source: Calculated from Population Trends

Moreover, the timing of migration was more important than the numbers involved. One possibility was that offsetting movements in
immigration could cause instabilities in the natural growth of the population or in the labour force. More important was the fact that migration movements were attracted to domestic business cycle. Supposedly, such relation could add an element of flexibility to the labour force and cause variations in unemployment rates. Yet, although net immigration was positively related to the business cycle, the year-to-year consequences of increases in the labour force were insignificant compared with the high rates in employment.

According to Pissarides and McMaster (1990), net international immigration aided to ease the geographical transfer of the population and the labour force in response to the changing regional demand for labour within the UK. It was generally noticed that internal migration was rather indifferent to regional unemployment and wage differences. However, the local distribution of immigrants changed very little over time and remained intense in urban centres, principally those where employment growth slowed after 1979. The chief destinations of immigrants, especially those from the New Commonwealth (NCW), was determined by the setting of earlier immigrants through chain migration effects, and not essentially by economic variances between areas.

In the early post-war years of floating labour demand, the influx of immigrants had a key impact on some sectors of the economy and that they took jobs that British-born workers avoided. From the late 1940s to the late 1960s, NCW immigrants were willingly accepted and sometimes vigorously recruited to work in low-wage and low-skill sectors and those with mainly poor or harsh working conditions. The most important examples were the Lancashire textile industry and predominantly service sectors such as London Transport and National Health Service (Baines 1998).

By the 1970s more than a quarter of all hospital employees were foreign born and the building industry was dominated by Irish immigrants. Modern evidence suggested that NCW immigrants were received with hostility by low wage native born workers in sectors such as London
Transport on the grounds that they menaced wages and working conditions and weakened trade union power (Brooks 1975). Though there was no estimate of such effects but it seemed likely that in the absence of immigrant labour supply, wages would have mounted to attract larger numbers of native-born workers.

From 1983 to 1993 the difference between high skilled and low skilled groups was close to zero. However, non-white immigrants could have smaller revenues in terms of access to jobs and level of earnings than did native-born. One explanation of these results would be that immigrants’ skills were of lower value, either because of discrimination or due to lack of flexibility.

Additionally, an estimation of the international immigration among university-based scientists and engineers over the period 1984-92 demonstrated a slight increase in immigration compared with the preceding decade. Besides, among low-skill workers conditions in the labour market had worsened since the 1970s; basic changes in the economy and technology reduced the demand for unskilled labour. Although the distribution of work permits limited the influx of unskilled workers and those without pre-arranged jobs, its results were minor. While immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s found it quite easy to move into jobs, conditions in the last two decades of the 20th century made this much tougher; employment rates were particularly low and unemployment rates mainly high for most immigrants, particularly for non-whites.

Lately, in terms of employment, unemployment, and wage outcomes, immigrants rapidly improved their labour market status; for non-white immigrants unemployment rates were halved in the first 5-10 years of the 21st century. The results for earnings also pointed in the same direction. Consequently, regardless of lack of skills that put immigrants at a main disadvantage and thus provided restricted economic profit, the labour market disparity was temporary.
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2.8 Diversity and Difference in England

Britain has a long history of migration, but it took until the mid-1980s to become a country of immigration, with a peak of 222,600 people in 2004, according to Home Office statistics, before declining to 185,000 in 2005. In 2006 the number of immigrants augmented to 591,000, followed by a minor decline to 577,000 in 2007. Conversely, the difference between those coming in and going out in 2007 rose at 237,000, an increase of 46,000 from 2006 (Guardian Weekly 2008).

Moreover, the mass immigration reveals various factors, including an increased number of work permits for the highly skilled, asylum applications, foreign students studying in Britain, migrants reuniting with families, and citizens from new EU member states. Nearly 10 percent of Britain’s population is foreign born, according to OECD data for 2005, up from 4.2 percent in 1951, with the largest numbers from India and the Republic of Ireland (Sriskandarajah et al. 2007).

Nevertheless, the previous prime-minister Tony Blair left behind a basically reformed immigration system which reinvented Britain’s approach to immigration, stressing the economic value of immigrants with a more restricting approach to asylum seekers, and a new set of settlement and integration tools (Papademetriou 2007). According to the 2007 Commission for Racial Equality, recent immigration is transforming British demographics; Britain holds a meaningfully varied population, reflecting migratory patterns of those who escaped religious and political oppression, wanted reunion with family and relatives, or desired better economic opportunities. In 2005, about 0.7 percent (430,000) of the population was illegal or undocumented immigrants, who exerted more pressure on security (Somerville 2007).

Between 2001 and 2002, a Labour Force Survey considered that those who called themselves as other than white totalled approximately 4.5 million (8 percent of the population). According to Home Office statistics (2004), this number increased to 4.9 million (8.3 percent of the
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population) by 2004; South Asians counting Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi composed 4 percent of the total population (2.3 million), Blacks including Caribbean and African were 2.1 percent of the population (1.2 million), and the combination of Chinese, mixed, and others composed 1.7 percent of the population (1 million).

As reported by Sriskandarajah and Road (2005), around 600,000 of the 1.6 million British Muslims live in and around London, another 140,000 in Birmingham, and 75,000 in Bradford. Generally, ethnic minorities are geographically concentrated in the Greater London area; they are less motivated than their white counterparts to live in Wales, Scotland, or Northeast and Southwest England.

On the other side, recent arrivals particularly those who arrive as asylum seekers frequently meet important challenges in integrating into British society, mainly in terms of English language acquisition and recognition of overseas qualifications (Sriskandarajah and Road 2005) such as Muslims who are more likely to live in the most disadvantaged districts, and thus strengthening the socioeconomic gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nearly 60 percent of Muslim families have a breadwinner with low revenue, whereas Bangladeshis were unemployed at the rate of 38 percent between 2000 and 2001, more than nine times the national average (Seidle 2007).

By the early 2000s, Muslims in Britain had three times the unemployment rate of the entire population, including 16 percent who have never worked or are among the long-term unemployed. Besides, among second-generation immigrants, Chinese and Indians frequently overtake whites in schools and labour markets; on the contrary, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and black Caribbean have higher unemployment rate and lower earnings compared to whites (Giddens 2006).

Generally, immigrant diversity has increased intensely since the 1990s. England has attracted a variety of immigrants including Afghans, Congolese, Filipinos, Poles, Slovaks, and Somalis many of whom are less
acquainted with the country, language, and cultural practices than former immigrants from colonies or the Commonwealth (Rutter et al. 2008). Yet, ethnic minority populations are likely to be younger than the age profile of the general population, are tremendously drawn to urban areas, and are more prone to economic disadvantage in terms of employment and income (Kundnani 2007).

Moreover, the increased diversity of backgrounds and experiences of England’s population uses pressure on the dominant governance standard. As noted in a 13-country survey by the Pew Centre in 2006, public attitudes toward Muslims in England are less aggressive than in many parts of Europe (Seidle 2007). Regardless of this relative goodwill, worries and tensions augment when hearing that many British Muslims value their religion as the most important reality in their lives, whereas younger Muslims insist on a stronger connection to their religion than to community or country (Mirza et al. 2007).

The impact of such assertions, however, may prove extremely threatening, particularly when the context is powered by media propaganda that nourish public prejudices about Muslims and overstate the problem of Islamophobia (Mirza et al. 2007). As stated by The Economist in 2009, through embedding a sense of victimhood, Muslim anger is unavoidable in a country where ‘...many Britons are indeed more interested in assessing Muslim’s potential for violence than in anything else about them’. (The Economist 2009, p.60) Consequently, an integrative governance model has developed, in a move to calm these potentially bothersome residents, to nurture community cohesiveness and a commitment to Britishness and Englishness as central identities.

2.9 From Combating Racism to Accommodating Diversity

Racism is the belief in the superiority of one race over another. It may also mean prejudice and discrimination directed against other people because they are of a different race or ethnicity. Modern variants of racism are often based in social perceptions of biological differences
between peoples. These views can take the form of social actions, practices or beliefs, or political systems in which different races are ranked as inherently superior or inferior to each other, based on presumed shared inheritable traits, abilities, or qualities.

According to Malik (2001), as a reaction to the challenges of migration and difference, policy makers adopted a two-sided governance strategy; restricting immigration controls became compulsory and a judicial agenda was applied to eliminate discriminatory barriers so as to ease immigrant integration into British society. The reason behind limiting immigration, through liberal race relations as governance, was interpreted by Labour MP Roy Hattersley’s statement, ‘without limitation [of immigration], integration is impossible, without integration, limitation is inexcusable.’ (Fleras 2009, p.171-172) Under the Conservative government (1979–1997), an overt commitment to the ethics of multiculturalism failed and multicultural practices were mostly limited to particular local councils.

However, the election of Labour government in 1997 readjusted the plot. Government policies recognised multiculturalism as essential to advance progressive governance, in spite of debates over whether Britain was really a multicultural society, and if multiculturalism contributed to the insertion of immigrant communities (Abbas 2007). For Bertossi (2007), multiculturalism strengthened the idea of Britain as a tolerant and varied society that united cultural difference with equal access to British citizenship rights.

Alternatively, Britain couldn’t self-define as an immigrant society; newcomers were perceived as remote nonconformities, inheritances of empire, and unfortunate consequences of imprudent government policies. Unsurprisingly, instead of blaming racism and discrimination, the coexistence problem was attributed to minority cultural differences and those self-segregating practices that excluded minority integration. As stated by Malik (2001), the multicultural discontent was deepened by the
apparent failure of ethnic leaders to encourage greater collaboration and integration.

Furthermore, divisions within minority communities were also problematic. Since the 1960s until the early 1980s, blacks were divided over strategies concerning integration and settlement; some preferred to withdraw into their institutional shells (such as mosques) away from racism and discriminatory barriers, whereas others focused on challenging political inequity through organising united masses. Accordingly, these local struggles raised awareness of a new generation of black activists whose combativeness ended in the inner-city riots of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

On the other side, concerns associated to discriminatory immigration controls, racist attacks, vulnerability to discrimination, exclusion from the conventional, and police violence served to radicalise black politics, especially of those born or raised in Britain, through suggesting the remake of British society along basically different lines. Consequently, central authorities approved the importance of depoliticising this activism; many believed that black frustration could disturb Britain’s political stability and social order. Local authorities struggled to soften the sharp edges of black politics, in the hopes of defeating its radical political element and averting one group’s violence from contaminating the others.

Deals were negotiated with black leaders who were indoctrinated to diminish community resistance in exchange for financing domestic projects and preserving their authority and/or patriarchy (Kundnani 2002). Initiatives and programmes focused on changing black (African, Caribbean, and Asian) activism into conformist institutional channels where its potential could be depoliticised. In that respect, Kundnani (2007) expressively asserted:
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...The policies that were implemented in the 1980s in the name of multiculturalism were a mode of control rather than a line of defence. Multiculturalism in this sense referred to a set of policies directed at taking African-Caribbean and Asian cultures off the street – where they had been politicized and turned into rebellions against the state – and putting them in the council chamber, in the classroom and on television, where they could be institutionalized, managed and modified. Black culture was turned from a living movement into an object of passive contemplation, something to be ‘celebrated’ rather than acted upon. The method of achieving this was the separation of different ethnic groups into distinct cultural blocs, to be managed by a new cadre of ‘ethnically defined’ community leaders, and the rethinking of race relations in terms of a view of cultural identity that was rigid, closed, and almost biological. (Fleras 2009, p. 173)

Unexpectedly, then, segregation did not rise from state refusal to cultural blend. Contrarily, it mirrored years of attentive racist manipulation and thoughtful community exclusion for political accomplishment. Nor did commitment to multiculturalism emerge as an answer to minority concerns and migrant demands. More precisely, it embodied a political act that intended to calm troublesome elements through institutionalising differences.

According to Lentin and Titley (2008), new opportunistic community leaders conspired in nurturing the “culturalisation” of race relations, with local governments financing promotion of minority cultures but commonly disregarding means for improving minority admission to the labour markets. This intergroup competition had the result of not only ghettoising communities from each other, but also boosting passivity in the face of oppression (Sykes 2008).
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The result proved all too familiar for those acquainted with the British Empire: a colonial project of division and law via an elite accord. Accordingly, parallel societies grew under the executive patronages of an internal class leadership that stood silent to maintain community order. Besides, the rise of ethnic enclaves restored the problem of racism around cultural protectionism whereas political energies were altered into endorsing cultural rights and precise ethnic programmes (Sivananadan 2006). As stated by Fitzpatrick (2005), in the competitive struggle for status and resources, minority leaders were forced into justifying their claims for funding by overstating their sufferings, grievances, and sense of victimhood.

Moreover, descriptions of racism changed with the approval of diversity as governance. Rather than defining racism as something that was done to reject equal rights, it fixated on the right to be different; instead of obliging minorities to accept British values and identity, they should have the right to protect and endorse their culture, language, and identities. Those who dared disapprove minorities or government initiatives were themselves condemned as racist by supporters of a politically correct multiculturalism.

Nevertheless, converting the discourse of equality from the social to the cultural was not without consequences. First, those stereotypical traditions that historically reinforced the debate over race relations were strengthened, e.g. blacks are essentially different. Therefore, the race relations problem had to emphasis not only on adjusting these differences, but also on lessening destructive stereotypes.

Second, the political struggles that portrayed the fight against racism were changed into battles over cultural matters. For Lentin and Titley (2008), unlike the struggles that built bridges across difference divisions, the politics of multiculturalism disenchanted intercultural interaction by proclaiming the predominance of differences in the competition for state resources over the recognition of the masses in
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challenging state supremacy. With state funding steadily knotted to cultural and religious identities, specific groups uttered their specific identities to the rejection of others. The process, however, not only strengthened old splits whilst creating new ones, but also reinforced conservative elements in every community while making the militant voices on the street less tense.

Third, minorities like Muslims may be stimulated to be different and have their cultures respected. Contrariwise, the more different is the treatment, the greater will be the disconnection from society; to feel more involved, claims will increase for more recognition and respect reinforcing the community’s awareness of its susceptibility as being the “other”. According to Alibhai-Brown (2000), a multiculturalism that associates multicultural governance with diversity funding, isolates communities, and expands parallel institutions; people are guided into sections that are detached from each other and society in general, and thus boosting the spread of remote ethnic enclaves in the name of culture.

Finally, the isolation of cultural communities into self-segregated cells not only destroys any sense of unity, it also pushes people to religion as one way of making meaning and identity. Consequently, British sense of national identity, with deep historical and cultural roots, is gradually fragmented.

2.10 Integration in the Context of British Multiculturalism

Immigrant integration generally represented the positive contribution of immigrants across a variety of domains within the receiving society: in the labour market, in the socio-cultural sphere, through civic participation and identification on both local and national level. However, the way in which the host society defined and supported immigrants’ integration varied in accordance with different circumstances.

Adrian Favell (2001) described integration as a main regulative framework within a political system; political responses intended to
manage problems posed by immigrant integration. Political reactions varied from anti-discrimination legislation, to language provision, to civic education, to employment and housing policies, or further to promote immigrant cultural needs and support ethno-cultural activities.

Besides, many definitions and approaches of multiculturalism were based on the idea of sharing a common human identity but in a culturally mediated way. Group disparities and hierarchical power relations within society started breaking down in the after-war period, first through decolonisation, then through civil rights movements, and then minority and multicultural rights struggles, along with robust individual human rights legislation.

Multiculturalism as a set of political policies focused on ethno-cultural groups, their relation with the state, and their different claims to gain recognition at economic, socio-cultural and political levels. Multicultural policies also stressed imperceptible inequalities, prejudices and marginalised groups in society, and tried to support and celebrate ethno-cultural diversity in the public sphere.

British multiculturalism policies thus acknowledged ethnic diversity and supported it, trying at the same time to eliminate the primary discriminatory barriers in society through race-relations policies; the state should not intervene in the cultural identity of its citizens. In fact, Race Relations Acts (1960s) (now Equality Act) policies were a series of anti-discrimination measures that first banned excessive forms of racial exclusion, and then by the end of the 1990s, included implicit forms of discrimination. These measures resulted in shaping a clear national approach to the issue of diversity including all areas of life; access to citizenship, education, health care and employment. However, since the early years of the 21st century, multiculturalism faced austere setbacks, and parties on both sides of the political range were calling for its end.

From the 1960s to the late 1990s, issues of integration involved two major approaches: Race Relations and multiculturalism, which were a direct reaction to the explicit racism within society because of huge influx
of immigrants, mainly from the New Commonwealth. Yet, rising criticism of multiculturalism since the late 1990s altered the political rhetoric to emphasise more on civic integration, community cohesion and common citizenship. Though Race Relations and multiculturalism supported ethnic group rights and group identity, civic integration and cohesion were meant to stress the importance of common shared values, feelings of united belonging and individual rights.

This shift from multiculturalism towards community cohesion derived from a time when national identity was facing an important impasse, highlighted by the urban race riots in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001, just ahead of the World Trade Centre attacks of September 11th in the USA. The Cantle Report of 2001 revealed that people from different groups were segregated in education, employment, communities, language, social and cultural networks, places of worship, resulting in “parallel lives.” The alternative was to endorse community cohesion, based on respect for cultural diversity and greater sense of citizenship.

Likewise, the 2002 Home Office White Paper entitled Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain positioned the integration of immigrants and its impact on citizenship and national identity on top of its strategy. The White Paper openly admitted that in some respects British citizens were in a crisis of belonging, since the state failed in its attempt to integrate its varied society. It mentioned that the turbulences in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley were a proof of this disintegration and blamed it on the absence of a sense of common values and shared civic identity.

Consequently, the government planned to address this rupture by introducing an open and productive debate about citizenship, civic identity and common values. This White Paper paved the way for the work of the Life in the UK Advisory Group, led by Bernard Crick, which created the Life in the UK handbook and citizenship testing supplies. In 2006 the dean of Communities and Local Government Secretary Ruth Kelly proclaimed the establishment of a Committee on Integration and Cohesion, through which
public discussions, case studies and research across England, was to advise the government on how to build a “cohesive society” and participate in building a national strategy about integration and cohesion.

An integrated and cohesive community meant a clearly defined and broadly shared sense of involvement of diverse individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country. It also stressed a resilient recognition of the contribution of both those who newly arrived and those who already had deep attachments to a specific place, with an emphasis on what they had in common; there were strong and positive relationships between people from wide-ranging backgrounds in workplaces, schools and other institutions within locality.

Furthermore, additional document was delivered by the Department for Communities and Local Government in 2012 under Conservative government. In the report entitled Creating the Conditions for Integration, the Communities and Local Government generally summarised the new approach to integration in England through creating appropriate conditions for everyone to contribute to national and local life. Though the Commission on Integration and Cohesion of 2007 also focused on locally-led initiatives, the 2012 new strategy sought to create conditions for integration chiefly by funding private and voluntary services.

Hence, the main task of the government was to act only “exceptionally”. The document also outlined five key aspects that could advance integration: a clear sense of shared aspirations and values; mutual commitments and obligations; helping people to realise their potential; giving chance to people from all backgrounds to take part in local and national life; and eradicating all forms of discrimination and extremism. Some of these measures were in fact rather similar to the principles outlined by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2007, principally shared futures, rights and responsibilities, while ethics of hospitality and mutual respect were replaced with more active social mobility, and similarly, equality, justice and trust between communities with a stronger sense of participation and empowerment.
Nevertheless, the main difference in policy-making lied in the intensive effort of the Conservative-led government to retire from a national strategy on integration, leaving it mostly in the hands of the voluntary and private sectors; instead of a national strategy, research and public consultations, the government created the conditions for “Big Society” in which public institutions were progressively pulled to pieces and the responsibility was placed on the voluntary and private sectors.

Although there were effective programmes like the National Citizen Service (NCS), or initiatives such as the “Big Lunch”, integrating immigrants, particularly the most vulnerable, was absent at the state level. Integration policies, thus, stretched the limits; this fact pointed to an era that was beyond immigrant integration, in which immigration was no more a new phenomenon and integration had long been rooted into the society through anti-discrimination policies, whereas it also pointed in the direction of closed borders, anti-immigration sentiment and declined will to integrate those who crossed the lines.

For Sarah Spencer (2014)\textsuperscript{15}, deputy director of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at Oxford University, in terms of integration policies, it was noted that the UK did not in fact have policies of immigrant integration. Despite the fact that she recognised the vigorous anti-discrimination legislation and the increase of English language teaching, she was clear to indicate that there was no national strategy on immigrant integration, no leadership to motivate and encourage people, through employers, trade unions and civil society, to contribute to the process of integration, which she defined as a two-way street.

Yet, one of these policies still remained in the form of civic integration testing scheme: Knowledge of Language and Life in the UK (KoLL). Though the existing citizenship policies were part of immigration policies agenda, they were obviously planned as a measure of a two-way process of integration of newcomers into British society. The 2003 report of the Advisory Group on Life in the UK, entitled The New and the Old, led
by Lord Bernard Crick, accentuated the shared responsibility and civic duty of both the new and the old immigrant generations to learn about each other’s ways. According to the same report, citizenship was meant to be an important life event, a ritual that involved the learning of the language as well as some cultural instruments to live within a new society.

At the launch of the *Life in the UK: A Journey to Citizenship* handbook and test in 2005, Tony McNulty, then immigration minister, openly declared, ‘This is not a test of someone’s ability to be British or a test of their Britishness. It is a test of their preparedness to become citizens.’ (Quoted in Kiwan 2008a, p.69) This position was strongly supported by policy-makers in the making of citizenship constituents. The declaration was a response to criticisms that the new integration policies were a test of Britishness, a “cricket-test” of sorts that Britons themselves could not pass.17

Besides, the term Britishness was a slogan at the time the first citizenship test was undertaken, adopted by politics and academia and proved in the new citizenship policies discourse. The report of *Life in the UK* Advisory Group overtly asked “Who are we British” and “What are our values?” and answered with key words like respect for equal rights, mutual tolerance, and understanding of differences. It also emphasised the fact that Britishness was not just a memorised and tested British history.

In addition, the Advisory Group strongly supported a process towards educative and integrative citizenship, in which an applicant’s improvement, especially in terms of language skills, be assessed in favour of a common test at a specific level. Consequently, the idea that newcomers should be given instruments to integrate and actively participate in the society was the fundamental philosophy of the first Life in the UK handbook, focused on the primary introduction to British civic society and its institutions, and supporting people to actively and voluntarily contribute to the society so as to build a deeper sense of national identity and belonging. The main aim of the KoLL was also to
help immigrants in their “journey” to British citizenship, through language and civics education based on active participation and community cohesion. However, with the changes in the 2013 handbook and associated test, there was a clear shift from the integrative aim of practical citizenship education towards testing of British history and culture.

**Conclusion**

As Mirza et al. (2007) noted, in replying uncritically to the aftermath of a passive pluralism, successive governments spread dissent and division. The irony of multiculturalism released a discord leading to residential discrimination, mainly, between blacks and whites. However, as Asian communities fought each other for greater distribution of council funding, ethnic responsibility lines multiplied; Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindi started to live in different spaces, attend different schools, and unite through different institutions. Rather than directly undertaking the problems of racism and exclusion of communities, both local and national authorities stimulated black and Asian communities to passively coexist by following “parallel lives” under the umbrella of multiculturalism. The third chapter exposes the different multicultural practices and strategies adopted by the British government to integrate diverse minority ethnic groups in the main important sectors, i.e. education, employment and housing.
Notes to Chapter Two

1 The 1948 Nationality Act enabled 500 to 800 million people living in the colonies and in the Commonwealth to move to Britain. This population had also an automatic right to vote, even if it was not significantly exercised until the 1970s.

2 Labour Force Survey data for 1982 indicated that females were 43 percent of African Asians, 42 percent of Pakistanis and 41 percent of Bangladeshis (Jones 1993).

3 It could also be the case that some of these immigrants returned migrated upon retirement.

4 As Peach (1998) stated, geographic concentration was much more marked among Bangladeshis and Pakistanis than among Indians or Caribbeans. Even greater concentration could be discerned when these broad categories were divided into localities of origin—often reflecting chain migration effects.

5 The national government has however the power to cap the rate of council taxes.

6 Pakistani men 16.2 percent, Pakistani women 18 percent, Bangladeshi men 20.3 percent, Bangladeshi women 23 percent.

7 In 1997, nine ethnic minority candidates were elected to Parliament. In 2001, 12 became MP and at the 2005 elections, 15 MPs belong to an ethnic minority.

8 The Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic Society has been established within Labour. The Conservative party has inaugurated an Ethnic Diversity Council. The Labour party has a long history of BME interest groups—most notably through the black sections established in between the mid-1970s and the 1980s. See Shukra (1990) and Shukra et al. (2004).

9 In an interview with The Guardian, Minister of State for Borders and Immigration Phil Woolas said that most asylum seekers were not fleeing persecution but were economic migrants (The Guardian, 18 November 2008). He has also praised the UK Border Agency for making—the United Kingdom a more hostile place for illegal immigrants. The scapegoating of asylum seekers is also prominent in British media. In an attempt to explain the—immigration crisis in Britain, Alasdair Palmer journalist for the Telegraph, claims that Britain is a preferred route for immigration because—it is easier [...] to claim benefits, get council housing and access health and education services. Palmer also says that immigrants put a disproportionate pressure on public services, in particular schools, NHS and housing. The main reason provided for this is that—[migrants] had more children. (The Telegraph, 21 March 2009)

10 The person will have to choose between one “oath of allegiance” (—I (name) swear by Almighty God that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her heirs and successors, according to law) or an “affirmation of allegiance” (—I (name) do solemnly and sincerely affirm that on becoming
a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her heirs and successors, according to law. After the oath or affirmation, she/he will make the *citizenship pledge* (I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and freedoms. I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British citizen).

11 One reason for this was that immigrants and particularly those from the NCW countries had higher birth rates (and therefore contributed more to population growth) than the indigenous population—although this difference was diminishing with the second and third generations. It was estimated that by the mid-1980s about two thirds of the growth in the ethnic minority population was due to net immigration and a third due to natural increase (Shaw 1998).

12 The latest projections made by the OPCS suggested a net immigration of 65,000 per annum over the years from 1996 to 2021 which would contribute about half the projected population increase (Shaw 1998).

13 One study of NCW immigrants in the 1960’s found that they replaced about “a third of the indigenous inhabitants lost from the conurbations”. But it concluded there was little evidence that immigrants disproportionately entered the rapidest expanding sectors (Jones and Smith 1970).

14 Muellbauer and Murphy (1988) found that immigrants settling predominantly in the southeast of England had some “displacement” effect on interregional migration from the southeast.

15 Spencer, S. 2014. *Integration* [online video]. A short 6-minute interview with Sarah Spencer, deputy Director of the Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford. <http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk>

16 The “cricket test” referred to Norman Tebitt’s remark in 1990 that a good indicator of integration was when immigrants and their children show their loyalty to the British or rather English cricket team.

17 BBC’s “own version” of the Britishness test demonstrated the fact that Brits themselves would find it difficult to pass: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>
Chapter Three: Multiculturalism in Practice
Education, Employment and Housing

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Chapter Three: Multiculturalism in Practice: Education, Employment and Housing

**Introduction**

It is difficult to overestimate the influence of education on life chances, with qualifications progressively perceived as the key to future study, employment, social position, and income. The role of education in social reform was similarly important, with education in the 1960s viewed as a key means of integrating minority ethnic groups into the labour market and civil society, and as an instrument for diminishing prejudice and discrimination. Accordingly, the first attempt to multiculturalism via schools was seen with education act by the late 1980s. According to Figueroa (2004), there were numerous different approaches towards multicultural education with different ideas of national identity; how to deal with the immigrants in terms of values and common sense of belonging. Like education, employment and housing are other serious matters in British society, involving social status, health, and leisure.

**3.1 Multicultural Education in England 1960s-1990s**

Education is a social institution through which a society’s children are taught basic academic knowledge, learning skills, and cultural norms. Multicultural Education refers to any form of education or teaching that incorporates the histories, texts, values, beliefs, and perspectives of people from different cultural backgrounds. At the classroom level, for example, teachers may modify or incorporate lessons to reflect the cultural diversity of the students in a particular class. In many cases, “culture” is defined in the broadest possible sense, encompassing race, ethnicity, nationality, language, religion, class, gender, sexual orientation, and “exceptionality” (a term applied to students with specialised needs or disabilities). (Bedjaoui and Boukhlife 2017)

In general, multicultural education is founded on the principle of educational equity for all students, regardless of culture, and it tries to eradicate barriers to educational opportunities and success for students from different cultural backgrounds. In practice, educators may modify or eliminate educational policies, programmes, materials, lessons, and
instructional practices that are either discriminatory toward or inadequately inclusive of diverse cultural perspectives. Multicultural education also assumes that the ways in which students learn and think are deeply influenced by their cultural identity and heritage, and that to teach culturally diverse students effectively requires educational approaches that value and recognise their cultural backgrounds. (Bedjaoui and Boukhlifa 2017) In this way, multicultural education aims to improve the learning and success of all students, particularly students from cultural groups that have been historically underrepresented or that suffer from lower educational achievement and attainment.

*Laissez-Faire* approach was adopted during the post-war era in Britain. It focused on the principle of colour-blind and the idea that the presence of the immigrants does not need any special measures; the common belief was to do good by doing little or that everything will sort itself out. However, since no attention was paid to racial matters, the notion of the superior culture arose and discriminatory practices emerged.

The year 1965 marked the end of the *laissez-faire* era when the *Immigration from the Commonwealth* white paper was delivered. Later, the advance of the policies on education for immigrants boomed. Yet, in 1969, the conception of assimilation of coloured residents remained and immigrants were still forced to adapt to British society standards; they were supposed to fully accept British culture without any consideration to their different identities.

Furthermore, in 1963, the “dispersal rule” was introduced by Sir Edward Boyle, after white parents of primary school children in Southall, West London complained about immigrant pupils’ presence, 60 percent mostly Indians and Pakistanis, at the school. The House of Commons, then, decided to support the Local Education Authorities to make sure none of the schools was considered as an “immigrant” one and that the percentage of the immigrant children per school would not surpass 30 percent. (Banks 2010)
Consequently, the first publication on educating immigrants in Britain *English for Immigrants* was published by the Ministry of Education. It adopted the assimilationist approach and considered English language and literature to be the core subject in educating immigrants’ children. (Banks 2010) However, the publication was not met with great interest neither from the immigrant parents nor the parents of white non-immigrant children, as the parents of immigrants wanted their children to preserve their native culture and language and the white parents were afraid that their children would not make enough progress because of the delays caused by immigrant children.

On the other side, the shift from assimilation to integration began in 1966, when the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, considered immigration not as a devastating process of assimilation but as an equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and cultural diversity. Accordingly, ethnic groups started to gain some recognition and respect, and were allowed to keep some particularity as well as adapting to the conventional British norms. The 1960s also witnessed the emergence of teachers of immigrants’ training through seminars, courses and workshops.

In 1964, Martin Luther King, Jr. visited Britain, followed by Malcolm X the year after and Stokely Carmichael in 1967. Their visits, the discontent of Afro-Caribbean immigrants with the education provided to their children and the riots of 1958, all resulted in the expansion of multicultural and later antiracist education. Yet, teachers at school still considered learning English as the chief priority, but they started to deal with some other matters ignored so far, such as underachievement of immigrant children, difficulties with finding self-identity and racial discrimination. The protection of minority cultures, however, was not considered significant and issues as prejudices and discrimination at schools were not discussed.

Up till the 1970s multicultural education became important as a result of media, conferences and publications; a 1972 Schools Council
booklet differentiated the requirements of multiracial classrooms and the needs of all children in all schools to comprehend that England had become a multiracial and multicultural country. Despite the fact that the majority of parents were pleased with the education of their children, there were claims for allowing immigrant children to have education of their native language or religion.

In 1981, the School Council Report was delivered, abandoning assimilation for cultural pluralism and replacing the term “immigrants” by “racial minority” or “minority ethnic group”. The objectives of multicultural education, then, comprised knowledge of the main cultures in Britain, approval of the principles of equal rights and justice, recognition that prejudice and discrimination are common in Britain and are destructive to the excluded groups, acknowledgment of the possibility of developing compound commitments, and the development of a positive self-image, mother-tongue skills, and English language skills.

Moreover, 1981 was a remarkable year for the expansion of multicultural education; regular BBC series on multicultural education were televised, they focused on teaching children with special needs and teaching English as a second language. The same year witnessed the publication of the Rampton report that concerned the underachievement of West Indian children, as representatives of ethnic minorities generally failing in the British education system. The main cause of their failure was stated as deliberate and unintended racism and the absence of a multicultural approach at school. The report proposed that all the Local Educational Authorities should provide a multicultural education consultant. (Banks 2010)

Besides, the famous Swann report was published in 1985, asserting that the approach towards multicultural education was not effective and was pointing only immigrant schools. Swan accentuated the importance of pluralism and education for all to understand and
accept cultural and ethnic diversity, and combat stereotypes and racial prejudices so as to advance equality and justice and eliminate all the practices that would work against any ethnic group from the education system. Hence, 80 out of 115 schools had approved antiracist and multicultural policies by the end of 1980s.

Furthermore, Mullard (1984) categorised education into four different types that were dominant in different eras: Immigrant education (1950s and 1960s), multiracial education (1960s and early 1970s), multi-ethnic education (late 1970s) and multicultural education (late 1970s and 1980s). He asserted that these four approaches were racist; the first two apparently being focused on race as a basic constituent whereas the following two focused on race as a cultural fact. According to him, immigrant education was assimilationist, multiracial education was integrationist, multi-ethnic and multicultural educations were pluralist. He approved antiracist education that developed as a result of the black experience and had as a main objective justice and the struggle against racism.

Additionally, Mullard (1984) considered antiracist education as opposed to multicultural education, in the sense that multiculturalism emphasised the assimilation of various cultures into the common one and antiracist education, conversely, regarded the white male middle-class culture as dominant and therefore racist and intolerant towards ethnic groups. Nevertheless, during the 1980s the antiracist education became opposed by academic and public statistics along with most of the media. In this regard, Figueroa (1991) advocated that each of these two approaches were important for education in Britain.

Accordingly, the late 1980s and further 1990s saw further expansion of multicultural and antiracist education. Two important institutions were founded; Teacher Training Agency and Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) together with Her Majesty Chief Inspector of Schools. Besides, the landmark of the late 1990s was the
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publication of the Macpherson Report in 1999 as a result of the movements headed by the parents of the assassinated Stephen Lawrence in 1993, who was knifed to death when waiting for the bus at the station. Although five suspects were arrested, no trial held with any of them. The murderer motif was racist and the whole case developed to be the basis of a resilient battle against the institutional racism in Britain first pointed out the Metropolitan Police Service and later spread to other institutions, including educational ones.

Macpherson (1999) disapproved the curriculum, as well, for not being able to fit the needs of multi-ethnic pupils and thus causing their exclusion from school. Also, he set seventy suggestions; including valuing cultural diversity through implementation of local strategies to stop racism. Consequently, the Race Relation Act that followed the year after the famous Macpherson Report removed the inadequacies of the previous Act passed in 1976. One of the advances in education curriculum was the introduction of citizenship education for secondary and primary schools in 2002; it aimed at teaching students about democracy, tolerance, cultural diversity and global community.

Yet, there were several continuous or frequent topics that marked long decades; visible minorities perceived as problematic, pressure on English language teaching, integration opposed to assimilation and segregation, acceptance of a common British way of life, poor educational achievement and exclusion of minorities, lack of teachers of multicultural and antiracist education, immigration controls and promotion of democratic values, and development of antiracist, egalitarian, and human rights legislation. As declared by Figueroa (2004), the roots of successful multicultural education were its wide approach in terms of social, economic and individual evolution. Hence, it was important for Britain to construct such a national identity that would completely hold its diversity and would be based on shared experiences through multicultural education and training of teachers to provide such a tolerant and democratic environment.
3.1.1 British Language Policy from the 1960s to the late 1980s

The official language policy of the 1960s was to encourage learning Standard English as a required subject to all the pupils counting natives and immigrants at all stages. However, immigrant children were incapable to understand it and failed to improve English skills to deal with the curriculum. The underachievement of immigrant pupils could be attributed to various socio-economic and psychological reasons, particularly the living conditions, discrimination and racial prejudice. According to Craft (1983), immigrant children had real academic problems since both mother tongue and English were poorly developed. Therefore, the main reason behind their under-achievement was an insufficient exposure to the English language. (Bedjaoui 2013)

Following the principle that all pupils were to be given chances to improve their language skills, intensive separate English classes were established in 1985 in conformity with a government booklet *English for immigrants* to integrate immigrants’ children. Nevertheless, the language policy of the 1960s and early 1970s caused English parents anger on the basis that immigrant pupils were disturbing the normal classes. Consequently, the problems concerning the concentration of immigrant pupils particularly in inner-city schools had forced local housing authorities to lessen the growing social welfare problem in these zones, i.e. to avoid the high proportion of immigrant pupils in schools (Cashmore 1994; Bedjaoui 2013). Likewise, immigrant parents were disappointed with government language policy and pointed out the need for pressing action to be taken to raise their children’s academic performance. They also called for the teaching of immigrants’ native languages and emphasised the importance of integrating different immigrants’ cultures in schools.

Moreover, the introduction of immigrants’ native languages was as a result of a conversion in government policy aiming at matching the linguistic, academic and social needs of immigrant pupils; the report of the National Committee of Enquiry led by Lord Bullock made some recommendations concerning the education of immigrants’ children,
particularly to keep and develop their knowledge and skills of their mother tongue (Trudgill 1984, Bedjaoui 2013), though there were no plans for action. Both recommendations demonstrated, then, an anti-racist educational policy aiming at eliminating cultural inequality and discrimination.

In the mid-1970s, the National Association for Multicultural Education and the National Association of Teachers of English stressed the need for bilingual and foreign language teaching in Great Britain. Other organisations such as the National Association of Asian Youth emphasised the importance of separating language teaching from religious instruction and of setting up a Committee for Mother Tongue. Accordingly, many researchers like Figueroa (1984), Tansley and Craft (1984) and Tomlinson (1986) suggested immigrant language teaching to facilitate mono-lingual instruction. According to Baker (1993), the acquisition of English skills and academic success could be reached through more exposure to immigrants’ native language and through a strong emphasis on improving immigrants’ native language skills. (Bedjaoui 2013)

In addition, a European instruction on Education of Migrant Workers’ children in 1977, invited all member states to teach immigrants’ culture and language within the school curriculum in accordance with national conditions and legal systems. However, the Directive was opposed to English educational principles as the Department for Education and Science could not inflict any compulsory policy on Local Education Authorities (LEAs). In 1981, the department transmitted the instruction to LEAs and teachers’ associations, but no parents or immigrant organisations were consulted.

As a result, LEAs replied differently to this need due to various criteria including the socio-linguistic perspective and cultural diversity. The socio-linguistic aspect had an important influence on the choice of immigrant language to be taught in state schools which had to improve their own educational policies to fit the needs of immigrant pupils. As
stated by the Department of Education and Science, the whole population of 12 state schools comprised immigrant children. They also formed 90 percent in 50 schools and 75 percent in 230 others. (Braid 1990; Bedjaoui 2013)

In addition to the amount of immigrant pupils in some schools, the choice of immigrants’ languages in England depended on the rising demand among immigrant parents regarding the teaching of their own languages within state schools. For Trudgill (1984), the socio-linguistic perceptions on immigrants’ language teaching governed the choice for standard language in accordance with formal schooling and religious practices; though Urdu and Hindi are the standard languages for Pakistan and India, the role of religion in script-choice is substantial. Therefore, Gujarati Muslims were taught Persian-Arabic and Koranic Arabic script, Hindi Gujaratis and Panjabis used Devanagari script to read the Vedas, and the Sikh Panjabis turned to Gurmuki script for the teaching of the Grant Sahib religious text. (Bedjaoui 2013)

Furthermore, the choice of immigrants’ languages grew progressively with the mounting demand at the primary and secondary school levels; at the primary level they were used mainly as a medium of instruction to assure continuity and intellectual development of immigrant children. Immigrants’ native language teaching was reinforced by bilingual teachers using both languages or by a partnership of bilingual and monolingual teachers working with pupils in group activities. (Tollefson 1995; Bedjaoui 2013) Yet, there was little continuity of such linguistic support further than the first years of schooling. At the secondary level, immigrants’ native languages got foreign language status in the school curriculum along with French and German in conformity with the 1988 Education Act resulting from the calls for equality with other subjects from the Coordinating Committee for Mother Tongue Teaching (1979) and the National Union of teachers (1982). (Trudgill 1984; Bedjaoui 2013)

Nevertheless, the need to advance a teaching force to fit the conditions of a multicultural society and the lack of adequate materials
were among other concerns which could be resolved through time and experience with different teaching approaches; teachers’ training institutions and the Universities Council for Education of Teachers published policies to expose some attentiveness to the multicultural issue to avoid intercultural prejudice and discrimination through the use of suitable text-books and other materials. (Thomas 1990; Bedjaoui 2013)

Many of LEA research projects, particularly The Linguistic Minorities Projects (1983), afforded new teaching materials vis-à-vis the language, history, geography, music, games and social studies of immigrants. The Schools Council, the Schools Library Services, The World Council Churches and the LEA multi-cultural resources centers also produced important curriculum stuffs to guide teachers to improve their knowledge and attitude and to keep them informed about new publications.

The year 1977 witnessed noticeable curricula progresses owing to the recognition given to immigrants’ native languages as core subjects within the National Curriculum and religious education resulting in an approved syllabus that considered the pupils’ faith. Yet, the chief challenge to teachers was to promote a multi-cultural pedagogy, especially to learn about immigrants’ cultures in order to interact with immigrant children and advance their social and cultural integration.

3.2 New Labour Education Project

Where the New Right policies denounced the liberal teaching as part of an argument to limit teacher autonomy¹, New Labour strategy was far different. As reported by Training and Development Agency for Schools (2003), New Labour policies of workforce reconstruction boosted teachers’ expertise through allowing them to focus on their core subject and through distinguishing between professional and non-professional classroom roles. At the same time the schools policy was sold as a free-market measure to take schools out of the ineffective control of local authorities and introduce them into business enthusiasm of the private sector.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the academy policy was to transfer schools from local authority control to a direct relationship with the Education Department. In a context of a huge surge in school funding, counting Building Schools for the Future (BSF), this was a quite rational strategy on the part of administration to guarantee that the upsurges in funding were under departmental control; placing massively bigger funds in the hands of schools and LEAs with a weak performance was a poor deal for the Education Department and the Prime Minister’s Office. Moreover, academies were a means to ensure that the extra investment made by government would not be lost through the hands of useless or stubborn local authorities with no progress, which lacked a strong democratic order to control such large sums of public resource.

On the other side, New Labour’s policy was evidently different from that of the Conservatives, who provided generally low levels of funding to education. The improved funds were expressing a different approach to public services as compared to previous governments. One Labour MP interviewed by Fitz and Hafid in 2007, defined the difference between the two parties approaches:

I think perhaps the philosophical difference might be that we would regard the market as a good servant and a very poor master in the delivery of public services in terms of putting additional public sector taxpayers’ money into providing those services. (Fitz and Hafid 2007, p. 284-5)

The Labour MP, then, explicitly recognised that these services would be financed by public money and that the money available to public services would rise. He implicitly drew a link between augmented investment in public services and control over them so as to safeguard value for money.

Furthermore, the funding strategy had two main fundamentals: first, extra capitals provided to public services had to be made accountable via
Public Service Agreements (PSAs), a view attributed to the Brown/Treasury axis. Second, there had to be more diversity, choice and user autonomy in public services, a view attributed to Blair\(^2\). These principles were described without reference to the New Right or Thatcherism\(^3\). However, one of New Labour objectives was to join the two basics; for instance, Blair’s commitment to new school models was continuously raised within solid accountability mechanisms that strengthened the Treasury PSA agenda. Similarly, the new model schools that were introduced in the name of more user choice and diversity depended on centrally controlled funds that increased checks available to those organisations related to getting the best value for augmented public expenses.

Additionally, the main motivation of the New Labour’s education strategy was the improvement of executive and administrative productivity. This also played a role in inspiring the Conservative reforms along with ideological conviction. Yet, in both the Conservative and New Labour cases, the drive behind education reform should not be diminished to a commitment to neoliberal ideology. The steadiness of the policy tools used by Labour and Conservative governments reflected the tenacity of a governing project founded on centralisation and managerial efficiency which was mainly distinct from ideological conflicts over the appropriate role of state versus market.

### 3.3 Education and Language Fluency Attainment

Education, professional skills and language fluency are important for adaptation to a new society environment and for success in the labour market. Lack of these qualifications can be a source of detriment. Many of the first post-war immigrants had little education and poor language skills. But these obstructions deteriorated over time because growing proportions of ethnic minorities had been educated in Britain. Table 3.1 below, extracted from the 1997 PSI study, demonstrated that language...
fluency among ethnic minorities differed from 91 percent for African and Asian men to only 40 percent for Bangladeshi women. Although rates of language fluency were quite lower for those not born in Britain, they increased significantly with time, notably for those groups with basically low levels of language fluency. The PSI data also suggested that language acquisition is less apparent in high ethnic minority density areas, especially where they composed more than ten percent of the population. (Modood and Berthoud 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Highest Qualification below &quot;O&quot; level</th>
<th>Highest Qualification degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>men</td>
<td>women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-Asian</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.1:** Fluency in English and Education Qualifications

**Source:** Berthoud and Modood 1997

As indicated in the table, among men, larger proportions of Caribbeans and Pakistanis and much larger proportion of Bangladeshis had no qualifications or qualifications below ‘O’ level, as compared with whites. Among women, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were prominent. Indians, African-Asians, and Chinese had much larger proportions with degree level qualifications than whites. Although among young males aged between 16 and 24, ethnic minorities as a whole had 32 percent with no or sub-‘O’ level qualifications compared with 22 percent for whites, the proportions are equal for females.

More noteworthy were the high participation rates in post 16 education among ethnic minorities, especially among Indians and African
Asians and to a lesser extent among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. As stated by Modood and Berthoud, “No ethnic group had a lower participation rate in post-16 education than white people and some had a much higher rate”. (Modood and Berthoud 1997)

Furthermore, in Table 3.2 below, whites, blacks and mixed/other ethnic groups immigrants had participation rates 15-20 percent higher than the native born ones, while Pakistani and Indian native born males were more likely to engage in full-time education. On the contrary, Irish immigrants had a lower participation rate in full-time education than any other group.

Although among ethnic minority adults there were significant numbers with low language proficiency and little education, the survey showed a very strong educational drive, as reflected by the behaviour of the younger generation, among Indian and, to a lesser extent, Pakistani men. While black native born young men were less engaged in full-time education than their foreign born counterparts.
Table 3.2: Labour Force Status of Working Age Males

Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys of the United Kingdom

Moreover, education attainment levels of immigrant pupils had long been lower than those of their white counterparts, while their rates of exclusion from school had been higher. In the 1970s and 1980s, these characteristics of immigrant educational experience were supposed to be the result of the pupils themselves possessing a negative self-image strengthened by a culturally unrelated curriculum and poor linguistic skills (Swann Report 1985). By the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, statistics displayed significant difference in minorities educational attainment. As Table 3.3 below demonstrated, there was a higher-attaining group including Indians and whites, and a lower-attaining bunch consisting of blacks, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Five or more higher grade passes</th>
<th>Improvement (+/-)</th>
<th>Attainment inequality relative to white performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>26% 42% 44%</td>
<td>+2 +18</td>
<td>Gap narrowed in latest figures (from 21 to 16 points) but grew overall (from 9 to 16 points).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>17% 21% 28%</td>
<td>+7 +11</td>
<td>Gap narrowed in latest figures (from 20 to 16 points) but grew overall (from 6 to 16 points).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>23% 44% 49%</td>
<td>+5 +26</td>
<td>Inequality eliminated by 1995 and white level exceeded by 3 points in latest figures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>20% 22% 28%</td>
<td>+6 +8</td>
<td>Gap narrowed in latest figures (from 19 to 12 points) and fell narrowly overall (from 13 to 12 points).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>13% 23% 32%</td>
<td>+9 +19</td>
<td>Gap narrowed in latest figures (from 21 to 16 points) but grew overall (from 9 to 16 points).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The empirical research pointed to a variety of clarifications for these detrimental results including socio-economic difficulty, racist teacher attitudes and expectations, a culturally prejudiced and dividing National Curriculum, poor family school links and parental support, and large concentrations of minority ethnic pupils in unpopular and poorly resourced schools. (Abbas 2002)

3.4 Minority Ethnic Participation in Higher Education

Over 182,000 minority ethnic (UK-domiciled) students (16.4 percent of the total number of students) were admitted to full- and part-time undergraduate programmes in English universities including the Open University between 2001 and 2002. Also, there were some 14,000 minority ethnic students taking level 4+/ higher education courses in further education colleges representing 11.9 percent of the total with known ethnicity.

Because of the uncertainty in combining data from further education...
colleges and higher education institutions, carefulness was taken in collecting undergraduate population number. Taking this into account, the estimate of the minority ethnic undergraduate student population (UK-domiciled studying in institutions in England) was almost 196,000 (16 percent of the total) between 2001 and 2002. This was approximately twice the minority ethnic proportion in the total population of England (over nine percent). Nevertheless, students came from other parts of the UK to attend university in England, and the minority ethnic distribution differed geographically. If the analysis was expanded to all undergraduate study in the UK, minority ethnic students would account for 14 percent of the total student population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>No. of students</th>
<th>% of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1,030,385</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All minority ethnic</td>
<td>196,083</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Black Caribbean</td>
<td>18,821</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Black African</td>
<td>30,971</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Black Other</td>
<td>7,874</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Indian</td>
<td>50,406</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pakistani</td>
<td>26,631</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bangladeshi</td>
<td>8,081</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chinese</td>
<td>11,775</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Asian Other</td>
<td>16,322</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mixed ethnic</td>
<td>8,848</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
<td>16,354</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (known ethnicity)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,226,468</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.4:** Minority Ethnic Groups in Undergraduate Study in England, 2001/02

**Source:** HESA, 2001/02 and ILR, 2001/02

As Table 3.4 above demonstrated, the largest group in undergraduate study was Indian (4.1 percent, making up just over one-quarter of all minority ethnic undergraduate students at English
universities in 2001/02), followed by Black African (2.5 percent) and Pakistani (2.2 percent). The smallest were the Chinese and Bangladeshi representing one per cent or fewer.

Besides, comparing student and general population numbers to display higher education participation of minority ethnic groups produced some distortions, since it used student counts rather than entrants. In addition, there were differences by age and gender which could be concealed by the global figures, particularly the younger age of minority ethnic population representing a higher proportion (12 percent) of the 18-29 age group and also gender differences in the proportions of males and females in each age group. Table 3.5 below confirmed the higher than average higher education participation by minority ethnic groups in aggregate. It also stressed the extent of difference between ethnic/gender groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Minority ethnic</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Asian or Asian British</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Black or Black British</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chinese or Other Ethnic</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mixed Ethnic</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All (with known ethnicity)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: HEIPRs for English Domiciled First-Time Entrants to Higher Education Courses by Broad Ethnic/Gender Group, 2001/02

Source: HEFCE and DFES

As shown in the table above, the highest participation rates were among the female Black or Black British group and male Asian or Asian British group (over 60 percent). These compared with an average for all
minority ethnic groups of 56 percent, an average overall number of 40 percent, and an average White group number of 38 percent.

3.5 Employment and Poverty

Like education, employment is a serious matter in British society, involving social status, housing, health, and leisure. At the start of New Labour’s first term, the 1997 Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities revealed that at each level of educational qualification, unemployment levels for Black Caribbean and Pakistani/Bangladeshi men and women were higher than for white men and women. Similar statistics were noticed for male professional attainment and average earnings. (Modood et al. 1997)

Moreover, Berthoud Analysis of the Family Resources Survey in 1998, comprised models of Chinese and Africans. It found higher average earnings for working Chinese, but also a larger proportion of poor Chinese (28 percent) compared with poor white families (16 percent). The African sample was found to prove worse than Caribbeans and was considerably poorer than white families. Results of other ethnic groups were generally similar to those of the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities. Curiously, there were very high levels of unemployment among Pakistani and Bangladeshi families, and there were much lower levels of average earnings even in work. Likewise, statistics for minority ethnic women were similar, though the differences were smaller. Exceptions involved higher average weekly earnings among minority ethnic compared with white women, although this equivalence did not extend to women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin.

Besides, men of Indian and Chinese origin performed better than other minority ethnic groups in terms of unemployment, earnings and occupational achievement (Cabinet Office 2001); the average Indian man was 1.64 times unemployed compared with the average white man, with black men 2.51 times and Pakistani/Bangladeshi men 2.85 times. Indian
men earned average weekly wages £23 lower than their white counterparts, growing to £81 for Caribbean men, £132 for African men and £129 for Pakistani and Bangladeshi men. Correspondingly, the average Indian man was 0.61 times as likely to be in a professional or managerial position as the average white man, and the statistics were even lower for Pakistani and Bangladeshi men (0.56) and black men (0.36). The current was generally similar for women, though only the foreign-born faced an ethnic earnings disadvantage (Cabinet Office 2001).

3.5.1 Labour Market Status

As displayed in table 3.6 below, among 25-34 year olds, 90-95 percent of men were active in most groups. The lower rates for foreign born blacks and mixed/other reflected the higher proportion of these groups still involved in full-time education and post-graduate studies. The inferior activity rates reported for Indian native born, Irish and Pakistani foreign born (35+ year olds) showed that these groups increased probabilities of being long-term sick or unable to work.

Additionally, self-employment rates demonstrated that there was a greater tendency to work for oneself among Indians and Pakistanis compared with the native born white population. Qualitative evidence indicated that this was a positive choice amongst Indians while, for Pakistanis, it was related to poor employment expectations (Metcalf, Modood and Virdee 1996). Amusingly white foreign born 35+ men and Irish immigrants were more likely to be self-employed than native whites. Obviously, among blacks, self-employment was not considered as an escape itinerary from discrimination.
Moreover, the youth unemployment problem was clearly evident, with young men rates being up to twice as large as that for over 25 year old. There were also noticeable differences between ethnic groups that dominate the native born/foreign born comparisons, of which only the 16-24 year old black and 25-34 year old Pakistani dissimilarities were significant. Irish-born males were less likely than other foreign-born whites to be unemployed when young, but were more likely when over the age of 25. In general, all ethnic minority groups in all categories were more likely to be unemployed than whites. Black and Pakistani males had

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>16-24 years old</th>
<th>25-34 years old</th>
<th>35+ years old</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>native born</td>
<td>foreign born</td>
<td>native born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed/Other</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.6:** Labour Force Status of Working Age Males

**Source:** Quarterly Labour Force Surveys of the United Kingdom (1992-94)
the greatest trouble in attaining employment whereas Indian labour force participants seemed to be able to access jobs nearly as easily as native born whites.

3.5.2 Employment Adjustment

According to Wheatley Price (2001a), immigrant white men were less likely to be employed (76.1 percent) than their native born counterparts (80.1 percent). Among non-whites, there was slight difference in the employment rate (68.8 percent for native born males, 66.9 percent for immigrant men). Over half of all foreign born whites arrived in the UK before 1965, with the proportion arriving over the next two decades unceasingly dropping from 12.6 percent between 1965 and 1969 to 5 percent in the early 1980s. 16.5 percent of them arrived in the last decade and Ireland was the largest source country, accounting for 30 percent of the total white immigrants. Many of the non-Irish white immigrants had British nationality and immigrated to the UK while they were still children. Immigrants without British or Irish nationality generally originated in the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, or in the rest of Europe.

On the other hand, only 7.8 percent of non-white immigrants were present in the UK before 1960. During the 1960s about 40 percent arrived in the country, with a further 17 percent arrived in the early 1970s. The proportion of non-white immigrants who arrived during the next ten years was quite smaller until 1985-1994, when about 16.5 percent arrived. However, the Indian subcontinent accounted for almost 50 percent of the non-white foreign born immigrants (India 24 percent, Pakistan 15 percent) with 11.3 percent born in Kenya and Uganda, many of whom were of South Asian origin. The Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East were also major source regions.

As indicated in table 3.7 below, a native born white male with average characteristics had an expected employment rate of 83.3 percent compared with 80.2 percent for the average foreign born white male, 71.7
percent for a native born non-white and 69.4 percent for an average non-white immigrant. Besides, 3.1 percent of white natives, an average of 3.56 percent of non-white natives, 2.79 percent of an average white immigrant and only 0.11 percent of a non-white immigrant had low employment rate due to decreasing number of years of education. These results provided evidence to suggest that educational attainment of these groups was either of such poor quality that it counted for nothing in terms of employment in England, or it was not convenient for British standards.

Additionally, less than five years experience in the labour market increased the chance of employment by 2 percent for native born whites, while non-white natives lost 5.34 percent. Compared to, white immigrants gained only a 1.92 percent advantage, for five less labour market years abroad, whereas non-white immigrants increased their possibility of employment by 3.37 percent. Hence, white immigrant men had minor disadvantages for possible work experience gained abroad than non-white men.

For immigrants who immigrated between 1990 and 1994, the extent of the initial employment disadvantage was evident; only 63.1 percent of white immigrants, with average characteristics were likely to be employed, whereas the employment rate for non-white immigrants was only 35.5 percent. Clearly, the white immigrants came with more intended jobs, were better informed about the prospects available in the English labour market before they arrived, or were more productive in their first job activity. The employment rate grew to 80 percent, for white immigrants, and stayed there after few years in the English labour market. There were also some recurring factors influencing employment rates (e.g. 1980-84 and 1985-89) which could be caused by return migration, particularly of Irish immigrants.
Moreover, the primary integration in employment was rapid for the average non-white immigrant. Over the first five years, employment rates jumped by approximately 24 percent. The constant adjustment of non-white immigrants, over the first 20-25 years in the UK to an employment rate of 75 percent, showed that they were less prepared for the English labour market, than whites. They took much longer to adapt, signifying that this process could be delayed by their foreign qualifications, lack of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Native Born White</th>
<th>Non-White</th>
<th>Foreign Born White</th>
<th>Non-White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person with average characteristics</td>
<td>83.34</td>
<td>71.71</td>
<td>80.22</td>
<td>69.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 less years of education</td>
<td>80.22</td>
<td>68.15</td>
<td>77.43</td>
<td>69.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 more years of education</td>
<td>86.05</td>
<td>73.01</td>
<td>82.74</td>
<td>69.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 less years of experience</td>
<td>85.99</td>
<td>66.37</td>
<td>82.14</td>
<td>72.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 more years of experience</td>
<td>78.95</td>
<td>73.48</td>
<td>76.39</td>
<td>63.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not married or living together</td>
<td>66.27</td>
<td>50.63</td>
<td>61.32</td>
<td>34.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married or living together</td>
<td>66.31</td>
<td>54.32</td>
<td>83.88</td>
<td>71.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No dependent children aged &lt; 16</td>
<td>84.73</td>
<td>77.75</td>
<td>81.09</td>
<td>71.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One dependent child aged &lt; 16</td>
<td>83.83</td>
<td>74.41</td>
<td>81.99</td>
<td>68.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two dependent children aged &lt; 16</td>
<td>81.93</td>
<td>63.09</td>
<td>78.30</td>
<td>73.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three dependent children aged &lt; 16</td>
<td>67.28</td>
<td>38.06</td>
<td>72.58</td>
<td>59.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in the Midlands</td>
<td>83.87</td>
<td>76.52</td>
<td>77.44</td>
<td>68.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in the North</td>
<td>79.36</td>
<td>73.12</td>
<td>78.81</td>
<td>67.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in the South</td>
<td>86.16</td>
<td>78.70</td>
<td>82.72</td>
<td>78.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Greater London</td>
<td>82.08</td>
<td>66.12</td>
<td>79.08</td>
<td>67.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated Pre-1955</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>80.15</td>
<td>72.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1955-1959</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>84.61</td>
<td>77.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1960-1964</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>84.42</td>
<td>78.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1965-1969</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>83.32</td>
<td>79.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1970-1974</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>79.33</td>
<td>74.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1975-1979</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>79.47</td>
<td>72.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1980-1984</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>64.53</td>
<td>69.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1985-1989</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>80.07</td>
<td>59.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated 1990-1994</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>63.14</td>
<td>55.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the USA</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>91.09</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Canada, NZ or Australia</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>87.19</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in SW Europe</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>85.81</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Italy</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>82.81</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Germany</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>80.44</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in NW Europe</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>85.84</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in SE Europe</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>75.13</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>71.94</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in USA/CAN/NZ/AUS/EUR</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>73.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the Middle East or N Africa</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>72.30</td>
<td>61.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Kenya</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>81.37</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Uganda</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>73.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Central &amp; E Africa</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>54.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in W Africa</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>58.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in W, Central &amp; E Africa</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>91.12</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in S Africa</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>83.35</td>
<td>68.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Jamaica</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>72.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the rest of the Caribbean</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>68.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the Caribbean</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>59.39</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Bangladesh</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>53.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>76.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Pakistan</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>62.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Bangladesh, SL or Pakistan</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>71.56</td>
<td>73.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in India</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>78.18</td>
<td>73.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in HK, Malaya or Singapore</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>72.92</td>
<td>77.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the rest of the world</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>80.54</td>
<td>73.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.7:** Predicted Percentage Rates of Employment in England 1993-4

**Source:** Wheatley Price (1998)
Chapter Three: Multiculturalism in Practice: Education, Employment and Housing

English language fluency or prejudiced attitudes. Though immigrants were more likely to be employed than non-white natives after 15 years in England, some of these disadvantages continued as their employment rates remained below compared with those of white natives.

As a result, it was evident from the analyses that place of birth was important in defining the employment prospects of immigrants; for white immigrants, having been born in the United States or West, Central and East Africa increased the employment rate by over 10 percent above the average. Those coming from Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South West and North West Europe also had at least a 5 percent employment advantage. White immigrants from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore experienced a lower employment rate by nearly 8 percent.

Among non-white immigrants, those born in Kenya performed the best (12 percent) with Sri Lankans (6.6 percent) and those from Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore (7.8 percent) also did well above average. Yet, immigrants from Pakistan, the Middle East and North Africa had approximately 8 percent employment rate disadvantage, with those born in West Africa (11 percent), Central and East Africa (15 percent) and Bangladesh (16 percent) being least likely to find employment in the English labour market.

3.5.3 Unemployment Occurrence

Table 3.8 below displayed the results of International Labour Organization (ILO) analysis on unemployment (Wheatley Price 2001b). According to the study, a native born white male, with average characteristics, had a projected ILO unemployment rate of 7.87 percent compared with 8.79 percent for an average foreign born white male, 20.8 percent for a native born non-white and 16.5 percent for an average non-white immigrant.

Furthermore, the ILO unemployment rate of white natives decreased by 2.57 percent because of increasing number of years of education by
two and that of non-white natives by 1.33 percent. For the average white immigrant, two more years of education diminished the predicted ILO unemployment rate by 2.26 percent and that of non-white immigrants by 1.27 percent. Obviously, non-whites faced more difficulties converting their education into professions.

In addition, changing the years of labour market experience made slight difference to ILO unemployment rates of the white groups. Young non-white native born were more likely to be unemployed (by 1.74 percent) with less than five years experience in the labour market. There was a significant growth in the possibility of being unemployed for single, over cohabiting, men and for fathers of several dependent children. White immigrant men had ILO unemployment rate of 19.8 percent compared with the average white native born worker and non-white immigrants faced a higher rate at 41 percent. Yet, this rate decreased over the first 5-10 years as local labour market knowledge and skills were acquired, but it never converged to that of white natives. Besides, ILO unemployment rates differed steadily across the English regions; for all groups, living in the South was linked to the lowest unemployment rates, whereas living in London considerably increased the probability of unemployment for each group.

Curiously, the country of birth of immigrants played an important role in determining their unemployment rates. For white immigrants, having been born in West, Central and East Africa, the USA or Canada, New Zealand and Australia resulted in the lowest unemployment rates (under 5 percent). Whites born in the Rest of the world, Italy, North West and South West Europe were also less likely to be unemployed than the average white immigrant male. Those born in Germany, South East Europe, India, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, experienced ILO unemployment rates at 12.2 percent. Non-white immigrants were more likely to be out of work than an average white immigrant.

Immigrants from Kenya had the lowest rates, with immigrants from the Western industrialised countries of North America, Europe and
Australasia, Uganda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, India. However, immigrants from Jamaica and the Caribbean were nearly 3 percent percentage points more likely to be unemployed than an average non-white foreign born male, while those from Pakistan, the Middle East and North Africa and West Africa had ILO unemployment rates of approximately 25 percent. Non-whites from Bangladesh (26.9 percent) and Central and East Africa (32.2 percent) had the highest ILO unemployment rates of all male immigrants, mainly due to poor quality of schooling and labour market skills, great difficulties transferring the human capital acquired before migration, or had little knowledge of the English language.
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Table 3.8: Predicted Percentage Rates of Unemployment (ILO Definition) in England 1993-4

**Source:** Wheatley Price (1998)

Generally, the results presented above demonstrated that there were large differences in the employment and unemployment experience of 25-64 year old males in the English labour market, in relation to ethnic and immigrant status. For whites, convergence with the experience of similar white natives’ occurred fast over the first five years in the English
labour market and was completed within 15 years of immigration. Nevertheless, non-white immigrants never reached the levels of labour market status enjoyed by whites.

3.5.4 Employee Characteristics

Table 3.9 below provided a summary of the average characteristics for 25-64 year old, white and non-white, male employees in England in 1993-4. Among the white immigrant groups, those with British nationality arrived at a young age, while those with other nationalities came quite late in life compared to Irish and non-white immigrants. Most of the white British immigrants were children of provisional emigrants from the UK, who went abroad in the Armed Services or in public service occupations. A huge number returned to undertake education in the UK either alone, in boarding schools, or with their parents. This explained why most of them had received their education in the UK and had very little foreign potential experience.

On the other hand, white immigrants of British and other nationalities had more acquired skills, but Irish men received less years of education than white native born workers. Non-white native and foreign born men also acquired considerably more years of education than native born whites. In general, all immigrants had lesser years of possible labour market experience than white natives, with the exception of the Irish who had noticeably more. Most of their experience was undertaken in the UK, with other white immigrants who had more experience in their country of origin than Irish or non-white immigrants. Native-born non-white male employees had substantially less experience than all other groups because of their younger age.
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Additionally, the ethnic composition of native born and foreign born non-white employees was very different. Blacks accounted for almost 50 percent of the native born employees, but only 22 percent of the foreign born total, whereas Indians were the largest immigrant group (40 percent) but represented only 22 percent of native born employees. The

### Table 3.9: Average Characteristics of White and Non-White Male Employees Aged 25-64 in England, 1993-4

**Source:** Quarterly Labour Force Surveys of the United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Native Born</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Non-White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACQUIRED SKILLS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed/ Other</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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black group also comprised those originating in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere and the Indian group consisted of those born in India and those born in East Africa.

Irish immigrants were more likely to be employed in the construction and transport sectors, but were under-represented in the financial sector, than other groups. Non-white native and other foreign born white males were the most likely to be employed in the financial services while non-white immigrants and white native born workers were mostly employed in the manufacturing occupations. Non-whites were mainly engaged in the non-financial service sector. British white foreign born male employees were markedly over-represented in the public sector and in managerial and professional professions.

Other white immigrants were employed in the higher occupational levels whereas non-white immigrant employees were the least likely to achieve a managerial position. Non-white native born males did not face the same complications as their occupational distribution was very similar to that of native born whites. Among white immigrants the Irish had the least favourable occupational distribution and definitely received the lowest weekly wage. Other white and British white foreign born males earned more than other employees with the former group also having the longest working week. Non-white men earned considerably less than white natives and worked shorter hours.

3.5.5 Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Earnings

In 1980, Chiswick’s study was the first to investigate the earnings experience of immigrants in Great Britain. He discovered that there was slight difference in the earnings of white native born and white foreign born workers, but those non-white immigrants earned significantly less. Interestingly, he demonstrated that the non-white immigrants received an inferior return to schooling, than that received by white immigrants or white natives. He also found that years of experience in the UK were no more productive than those accomplished before migration.
In 1997, Bell showed initial relative wage levels of black immigrants to be lower than equivalent natives. The difference was larger the more work experience had been obtained in the origin country. Among white immigrants, Bell found an initial earnings advantage over similar natives, which declined with time spent in the UK. Besides, Gazioglu, in 1996, confirmed the importance of English language proficiency for the earnings of Bangladeshi and Turkish male immigrants in London.

Furthermore, Shields and Wheatley Price (1998) examined the earnings of 16 and 64 year old full-time male employees in the English labour market, using data collected for the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) of the United Kingdom between December 1992 and November 1994. They separated native-born and foreign-born non-whites and isolated British, Irish, and other nationalities in their sample of white immigrants. They focused on education and potential experience acquired in the UK and that undertaken abroad.

Each immigrant group received smaller rewards from education acquired abroad, suggesting that the schooling received in the home country was of poorer quality than in the UK, or it did not transfer well (Chiswick 1980). Among the white native population, Shields and Wheatley Price (1998) reported that an extra year of schooling provided a 5 percent rise in wages. For the immigrant groups the return was lower by nearly 1 percent. Other white immigrants were the exception, receiving higher returns of 10.5 percent, perhaps because of their higher qualifications.

For Shields and Wheatley Price (1998) the returns to potential labour market experience in the England were 3.8 percent for native-born whites, because immigrant workers spent longer periods in unemployment, were limited in their choice of job, were deprived of access to on-the-job training or had reduced promotional chances within professions. Non-white native born employees got higher returns to years of UK education and greater rewards to potential UK experience than either white natives or non-white immigrants.
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Regarding the years of potential experience abroad, other white received higher rewards than they did for potential UK experience. This suggested that they migrated to the UK on the basis of employer-desirable labour market skills attained in their home country. Likewise, British and non-white immigrants received important, but lower, returns to potential foreign experience than to potential UK experience. However, these groups could face complications transferring their labour market skills developed abroad to the UK.

Moreover, Table 3.10 below revealed the expected hourly wage rates, resulting from the separate consequence of each characteristic, calculated for the native and foreign born male employees. The statistics demonstrated that two more years of education carried a considerable wage for all groups, except for the non-white immigrants. Five extra years of experience attained abroad was valued more highly for Irish and other white immigrants whereas it carried a negative premium for non-white foreign born employees who also received little reward to experience acquired in the UK.
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Table 3.10: Predicted Hourly Wage Rates for White and Non-White Male Employees in England, 1993-4

Source: Shields and Wheatley Price (1998)

Marital status and geographical location influenced earnings for all groups; being married and living in London increased hourly wages for all white groups, non-white natives earned the most living in the South, while their foreign born counterparts obtained the greatest rewards in the North. The highest wage rates were in the financial sector for whites, except for the Irish who like the native born non-whites, were paid more in construction and transport industries. Non-white male immigrants earned better wage in public sector employment while Pakistanis received the lowest wages among non-whites, regardless of being native or foreign born.
3.6 Housing Attainments, Diversity and Limitations

After fifty years of settlement, there was great diversity in housing experiences and outcomes for different minority ethnic groups including class, generation, family type and gender differences. There were also diverse opportunities in different areas e.g., the housing choices minority ethnic people living in the northern towns of Burnley and Oldham were constrained by the local tensions following the racial turbulences of 2001 and British National Party (BNP) activity there. Housing opportunities were influenced by the conditions in local housing markets. Buying a decent inexpensive home could be easier for those living in the less agitated housing markets of the north and having a job and not being disadvantaged by health, age or family type.

The first experiences of minority ethnic groups in the housing market exposed that newly arriving immigrants had little choice but to inhabit the bottom end of the market, ending up in poor private rental possessions or, in the case of Asians, buying cheap, deteriorating inner city terraced housing abandoned by white households moving to the suburbs. Separate ethnic groups grew in the inner cities, as a result of various factors, mainly: the newcomers’ poverty and unawareness of the housing market, the standards of job opportunities open to them, the desire for gathering for social and cultural reasons, and the discrimination faced by black minority ethnic groups and some white immigrants especially during the early post-war years.
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Table 3.11: Housing Tenure by Ethnic Group, 2001

Source: Census 2001, Office for National Statistics

Over time, important changes occurred in minority ethnic groups’ position and experience in the housing market; they could have access to a wider variety of housing tenures, property types, neighbourhoods, and better living conditions. Table 3.11 above indicated that Black-Caribbeans and Bangladeshis, particularly those living in London, were well represented in social housing, a sector in which minority ethnic groups were once very disadvantaged by formal and informal instructions and official discrimination. Interestingly, in the private housing market, admission to finance and information improved significantly in general terms since the early days of extensive institutional exclusion, landlord hostility and seller discrimination. The dropping of barriers and the huge disposable income of some households resulted in growing numbers of minority ethnic households.
Figure 3.1: Percentage of ‘disadvantaged’ groups without employment and in poor housing, 1996

Source: ODPM, English House Condition Survey, 1996

Figure 3.1 above displayed the barriers to good housing faced by different minority ethnic groups. The changes observed over the post-war years reflected the effect of “race” relations legislation, “race equality” initiatives, changing housing demands from a socially, culturally, demographically and economically growing population, generational differences in housing ambitions and strategies, and the role of minority ethnic inspiration and empowerment in bringing progression. Such advances brought better social and spatial mobility for the minority ethnic inhabitants.

Yet, the 2001 Census showed that there were still chief disparities between white British and minority ethnic groups in terms of access to good quality housing in all tenures, levels of overpopulation, and representation within deprived neighbourhoods. Besides, the 2001 English House Condition Survey discovered that minority ethnic households were approximately three times (27 percent) as likely to live in unfortunate
neighbourhoods as whites (10 percent). According to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister\(^5\) (ODPM) statistics, minority ethnic groups represented 26 percent of those accepted as homeless by local authorities between January and March 2004, but only 8 percent of the overall population. Considering racist harassment in shaping housing choices, it was clear that minority ethnic disadvantage in housing persisted.

![Figure 3.2: Households in Unfit Dwellings, 2000](image)

**Source:** ONS, Social Trends

Among minority ethnic groups identifiable in national statistics, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis lived in the most disadvantaged housing conditions in the worst localities. Both groups were characterised by high levels of overpopulation; 21 percent and 39 percent correspondingly had unfit living conditions compared with only 4 percent of white British. Many lived in houses without central heating; 18 percent of Pakistani compared with 8 percent of white British households. According to the Office for National Statistics (2000), almost a quarter of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households were living in inadequate housing compared with only 6 percent of white households (see figure 3.2)
above). On the contrary, Indians were generally managing better, with growing numbers getting access to good quality and semi-detached housing in the suburbs. Nevertheless, there were still high numbers living in poor conditions in the inner city; 17 percent of Indian households lived in housing with unfit living space.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was evidence of broadening choices for some groups, particularly those of Indian origin and those in middle class professions. This not only brought access to improved housing, but to better living settings, schools and other neighbourhood facilities like health and leisure, and provided better opportunities for social mobility across the generations. Yet, there were still numerous challenges to meeting the housing needs and ambitions of minority ethnic population and many limitations to achieving more equality of opportunity and outcome.

3.6.1 Home Ownership

There were extremely variable levels of home ownership among diverse minority ethnic groups. Owner-occupation was highest for the Indians (79 percent), Pakistanis (70 percent), white British households (71 percent) and Chinese (58 percent), but fell to 48 percent for the Black-Caribbean and 38 percent for the Bangladeshi groups. After decades of static home ownership rates among Indians and Pakistanis, the levels decreased since more of the younger generation opted for renting due to financial motives. Bangladeshi ownership also declined along with other Asian groups, and Chinese ownership levels lowered a little. After a growth in home ownership in the 1980s, Black-Caribbean levels of ownership stayed the same over the last decade.

In consideration of variations within minority ethnic groups in terms of gender, class, household type and regional location, the disparities in ownership levels became less honest; gender had a noticeable effect on tenure, as women were far less likely to own a
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house. These gender differences certainly reflected the difficulties faced by women in raising finance to buy a property. The high representation of female and single parent, within Black-Caribbean group, where ownership was least affordable, explained the high level of social renting among this group.

Furthermore, among South Asians in particular, low-income home ownership was common since their earliest days of settlement in the UK. The link between home ownership and employment category was always stronger for white British, Chinese and African/Caribbean households, with more working class households finding their way into housing in the social or private rented sector. However, housing choices followed by younger Asians were much more related to their socio-economic status than for preceding generations. Many found it difficult to get home ownership in the way that their parents or grandparents did in the 1960s and 1970s. Unaltered inner city housing could be bought inexpensively for cash during the early post-war years, as whites left the inner terraces for the fast emerging suburbs.

After decades, even quite cheap housing in the northern cities could not be affordable for many, chiefly due to the high levels of minority ethnic unemployment in these zones. Some Asian parents bought properties for their children, possibly in advance of their marriage. The properties bought were likely to be situated close to the family home, therefore maintaining ethnic gathering, frequently within the inner city.

Consequently, traditional patterns of minority ethnic ownership changed as more UK-born minority ethnic households entered the housing market. Growing numbers of young middle class people from all minority ethnic groups, particularly those of Indian origin, followed suburban standards of good housing, spacious and low crime neighbourhoods, and access to good
education. However, some overpopulation was still apparent among Indian suburban home owners owing to their family size. White British, Chinese and Indians were more likely to live in good areas with semi-detached/detached housing with central heating, whereas the least likely were Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The quality and status of the housing owned by women was worse than that of men, and this difference held across classes and ethnic groups.

In spite of some advances in the quality of houses owned by minority ethnic groups over time, inequality in housing criteria for minority ethnic and white owners was still important. The 1996 English House Condition Survey noted that countless minority ethnic people owned poor housing compared with whites, mainly because of inner city living conditions, where neighbourhoods were frequently characterised by high levels of social problems. (Harrison et al. 2005) Most minority ethnic inhabitants distasted the physical deterioration of many inner zones and worried about rising crime, vandalism, drug abuse and anti-social conduct.

However, they appreciated the sense of community, social support and cultural facilities of these areas and many had no desire to change. This was mostly true of elders, but some studies of the Asian population living in Leeds and Bradford noticed some younger middle class households buying into the minority ethnic regions of the inner city to be part of the daily life of the community there. (Phillips et al. 2003)

A number of minority ethnic owners certainly were stuck on poorer housing and areas due to their poverty and fears about leaving, particularly fears of cultural segregation and harassment. Besides, fear of racist harassment continued to limit minority ethnic people’s choice of neighbourhood; many moved to better housing in the suburbs only to return to the relative safety of the inner city community after being abused. Fear of victimisation also
constrained flexibility and socialisation, particularly for women.

Moreover, minority ethnic standards of home ownership were also shaped by the discriminatory activity of housing market organisations, like estate agents and lending institutions including the steering of buyers to specific neighbourhoods on the basis of their race and ethnicity. Minority ethnic purchasers were most likely to be directed to buy in multi-ethnic areas of the inner city. There were numerous researched during the 1970s and 1980s, which pointed to discriminatory conduct and concluded that better inspection of buying and selling practices had to be undertaken, particularly in terms of mortgage lending to minority ethnic groups.

Though the tough practice of red-lining, where inner city areas were labelled as unsafe for mortgage lending, was abandoned by many lenders in the 1980s, minority ethnic home owners however were offered mortgages on less favourable terms than whites. (Sarre et al. 1989) Nevertheless, the chief institutions, the building societies and banks, resisted record-keeping, therefore making it hard for the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) to undertake or defend formal soundings.

One of the few studies that examined the activity of estate agents in the twenty-first century was undertaken by Phillips et al. in 2003. The research, demonstrated that although there had been much enhancement over decades, disparities in the treatment of ethnic groups still existed. Greater competition between lenders and agencies resulted in a less exclusionary attitude to borrowers, purchasers, localities and property characteristics.

Yet, estate agents could still control the housing opportunities of minority ethnic and white buyers through a process of steering. Although agents were conscious of the law and thus unlikely to involve in explicit discrimination, many still used stereotypes about where people might like to live and held a racial opinion of the
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housing market. Consequently, patterns of ethnic segregation remained as clients were directed to specific areas based on their race or ethnicity.

In addition, only one third of purchasers (47 out of 138) had registered with an agent. Most of them were satisfied with the outcome, but there were still insights of unequal treatment and a doubt of vendor discrimination among some. Conservative lending institutions were more commonly used by South Asian households, while some still turn to community resources. Three-quarters of purchasers in Leeds and Bradford had taken out a mortgage and was generally satisfied with the service received.

On the other side, regardless of poverty and discrimination, the strategies adopted by households to provide themselves with housing in the private sector, were remarkable. Even if they were facing significant restrictions, minority ethnic people showed noticeable ingenuity and creativity in chase of their housing choices. Home ownership provided a way to the suburbs for the more prosperous minority groups.

3.6.2 Social Rented Housing

The social rented sector played an important role in the housing of particular minority ethnic households. Bangladeshi and Black-Caribbean households (48 percent and 40 percent respectively) were housed by local authorities or housing associations, according to the 2001 Census, and were particularly well represented in this sector compared with white British households (17 percent). Housing associations, mainly the Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) Associations, also facilitated affordable housing.

Housing associations, Registered Social landlords (RSLs), housed a high number of Black-Caribbean and Bangladeshi renters; 15 percent of Black-Caribbean households and 15 percent of those of Bangladeshi origin lived in this sector, compared with 5 percent of white households. Interestingly, 60 percent of RSL rentals were held
by women, often single parents, searching for particular housing and support (Housing Corporation 2003). Besides, South Asian and Chinese populations generally found social renting less attractive than low cost home ownership; only 8 percent of Indian and 12 percent of Chinese households lived in this housing sector. However, researches noticed that social housing became a progressively important housing alternative for young, newly forming Asian households. (Phillips and Harrison 2000)

Furthermore, the social housing experience was extremely changeable for the minority ethnic population over the post-war years. Many studies pointed to the different treatment of minority ethnic when compared with white housing candidates, resulting in a limited variety of housing choices for the former. (Karn and Phillips 1998) This led to an over-representation of African/Caribbean and Asian occupants in poorer quality housing in unpopular and deteriorating neighbourhoods. Though many discriminatory policies and practices were abandoned, minority ethnic people still lacked confidence in this sector serving their requirements.

The Race and Housing Inquiry: Challenge Report in 2001 exposed that minority ethnic communities believed it was difficult to access RSL housing and that minority ethnic renters were more likely to be disappointed with their RSL as a landlord than were white renters. Additionally, ethnic groups who experienced past discrimination remained in the poorest areas by a sense of community and security. The chance to change within the social rented sector and therefore leaving the worst areas also diminished for all renters over time. The segregation of minority ethnic inhabitants in this sector, accompanied by other socially excluded white groups, aggravated by the down-grading of social rented housing over decades.

Besides, the pressure exerted on local authority capitals led to
a decline in maintenance standards and a decrease in resources for improving poor quality estates, like those of high density where many African/Caribbean and Bangladeshi occupants were concentrated. All along with the New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme of social support, selective housing demolition and re-building, and stock transfers was on-going in Stepney, Tower Hamlets. This brought considerable housing and welfare improvements to the Bengali community, who used to live in poor conditions. Another programme of community and housing regeneration also accompanied stock transfer in Poplar, where about 50 percent of inhabitants were from a minority ethnic background. Yet, a fear of a new affordable housing for white occupants, who wished to live close to London, sustained.

Moreover, asylum seekers and refugees, coming from different backgrounds and with diverse needs of the established minority ethnic communities, supplementary challenges emerged for the sector. However, these newcomers frequently needed more support due to the trauma they experienced, public hostility towards them, and because they had no time to advance community support networks apparent in other established groups.

The Housing Corporation report concluded that the social rented sector’s achievement regarding housing refugees was generally mediocre, and that there were some cases of official racism. Practices varied across the country in terms of treatment of refugees under the homelessness legislation; asylum seekers and refugees needs were considered as part of broader race equality policies. In 1993, a Joseph Rowntree Foundation study warned of the possible dangers of allotting homeless refugees and asylum seekers to large social housing estates with needy populations without cautious plans for supporting the newcomers. (Harrison et al. 2005)
In 2003, the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) report recognised the same pressing need for well supported housing services, not only to meet the asylum seekers and refugees needs, but also to enable community cohesion; these vulnerable people were placed in zones of difficult-to-let social housing with little support for both the newcomers and the existing occupants. As a result, tensions exploded in disadvantaged areas such as Hull and Plymouth, as well as public outbursts against the founding of induction centres in places like Sittingbourne, Kent.

Indeed, the results of asylum seekers and refugees housing were diverse; there were cases of good practice, which provided support for the newcomers and helped their integration into local communities. Leicester City Council, for example, made an explicit commitment to supporting asylum seekers and refugees as part of its minority ethnic housing strategy, and planned positive action strategies to enhance integration.

In addition, RSLs revealed that substantial efforts responding to minority ethnic households’ needs were undertaken, yet with restrictions in benefits. Well informed experts had often involved themselves in improving practices, regardless of limitations. (Harrison et al. 2005) Nonetheless, many reports pointed to continuing problems in delivery and directing of accommodation, and indicated that matters such as housing providers’ employment needed on-going attention. In general, there was still an outstanding deficiency of good quality social rented hires in appropriate areas, and this seemed likely to affect augmented numbers of BME and some white households.

3.6.3 Private Rented Sector

During the 1970s, minority ethnic groups were heavily reliant on private rented housing; 30 percent of Black-Caribbean and 35 percent of Indian households rented privately in 1971. By 2001,
most of them moved out of private renting; only 7 percent of Black-Caribbeans and 10 percent of Indians remained in this sector compared with 8 percent of white British. Yet, private renting was still vital for Black-Africans (18 percent), who were concentrated in the London housing market, and for the Chinese (18 percent). In some areas, such as London and Dover, the private rented sector housed great numbers of refugees and asylum seekers.

On the other side, the quality of private rented housing which was inexpensive for people on modest incomes, or covered by housing benefit limits, was still very poor. The 2001 English House Condition Survey demonstrated that almost half (49 percent) of private occupants lived in inappropriate settings. The conditions improved, to a certain extent, over one decade, but this group of renters was still considerably in a worse situation than those in better parts of the social rented sector where 27 percent of RSL occupants lived in unfit housing. (Harrison et al. 2005)

Regardless of the poor quality of much private rental housing, rents were high due to the lack of rented housing in most markets. Many property-owners were reluctant to accept potential renters dependent on income support. There was also little security of tenancy; guaranteed short-hold tenures for six months became the standard for new private hires. Nevertheless, several local authorities and voluntary organisations set up systems to help vulnerable renters access private rental housing through rent deposit and bond schemes, with the purpose of diminishing the worst effects of competing for a place to rent in the private market.

The initiatives comprised working with and providing support for property-owners, who were doubtful of some categories of renters, such as ex-offenders, refugees and homeless people, bond and rent-in-advance schemes, housing benefit advice, and home grants arrangements to improve the property and furnishings. The participants included churches, councils and housing associations;
Croydon Churches Housing Association paid the property-owner the deposit and one month’s rental in advance. The property-owner, then, banked this loan for a year and retained it as a gift for the occupants if they renewed the occupancy for additional twelve months, therefore encouraging stability of tenancy. (Harrison et al. 2005) The utmost restraint was the limited funds of voluntary sector organisations, which could provide support only in the early years of housing. Their main intention was to secure a hires contract for the occupants.

Besides, the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) used the private rental sector for the housing of asylum seekers. The housing conditions were poor and there were incidents of mistreatment and harassment by property-owners. In 2003, an independent inquiry for the Home Office exposed that the private property company Landmark Liverpool and NASS neglected the housing needs and rights of nearly 2,000 asylum seekers, who had been housed in two tower blocks in Liverpool. Problems also arose when NASS paid above market tariffs for housing within the private rental sector. This led to rent inflation in local private rental markets, resulting in public misapprehension of the level of government financial support for these vulnerable groups and increasing pressure on cheap accommodation in this sector, particularly in London.

3.6.4 Black and Minority Ethnic Housing Associations

In the 1980s, Housing Corporation funds for social rented housing investment facilitated the emergence of black-run housing associations in England. Though their growth was not easy, the black and minority ethnic voluntary housing movement enhancement had an imposing impact on the policy scene. Yet, by the mid-1990s, the Housing Corporation’s black and minority ethnic housing associations approach became unsuitable for Conservative
ministers, fitting poorly with their aim of boosting competition rather than advancing community-based bodies.

In 1997, Labour’s arrival in office resulted in restoring political support and elaborating a new Housing Corporation policy statement that advocated minority ethnic housing needs and issues. However, BME associations still faced many challenges as a result of a changing investment environment and problems such as national rent reform, in addition to their constant need to adapt services to meet varying demands, especially of BME households belonging to smaller or emergent groups.

Besides, many smaller associations remained community-based, and faced an environment where development funding was focused on larger groups. Yet, these smaller associations offered specific skills in neighbourhood renewal, services for new client groups, refugees and asylum seekers, and provided contracted services in promoting larger associations to operate in terms of cultural sensitivity, discussion, transfers, support, and so forth.

**Conclusion**

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was evidence of broadening choices for some groups, particularly those of Indian origin and those in middle class professions. This not only brought access to improved housing, but to better living settings, schools and other neighbourhood facilities like employment, health and leisure, and provided better opportunities for social mobility across the generations. Yet, there were still numerous challenges to meeting multicultural education, employment and housing needs and ambitions of minority ethnic population and many limitations to achieving more equality of opportunity and outcome. The last chapter defines these main challenges facing multicultural Britain at both domestic and international level.
Notes to Chapter Three

1 This theme still features strongly in Conservative rhetoric, see for example Gove, M. 2009. Speech to conference. Conservative Party Conference. Manchester.


3 As Driver and Martell (2006) note: Left social theorists with some influence in intellectual wing of New Labour such as Beck, Giddens and Etzioni were developing criticisms of outmoded bureaucratic forms distinctively separate from the New Right. It could plausibly be argued that NL public service reforms drew on their notions of greater participation, accountability, informed choice, user autonomy and especially the erosion of expert and professional privilege rather than New Right discourse.

4 Percentage rates of the whole working age (16-64 years old) population were reported, except for the self-employment and ILO unemployment rates which were a percentage of the Labour force (or economically active population). They were derived using the whole sample of each Quarterly Labour Force Survey from 1992 to 1994. The 1991 Census weights were used to provide population estimates provided each reported cell contained a statistically reliable sample size (over 10000 equivalent persons), otherwise the cell was left blank. Full-time education rates were only reported for 16-24 year olds and self-employment rates were only provided for 25 + year old men as the other categories contained too few cases.

5 The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) is the UK Government department for housing, communities and local government in England. It was established in May 2006 and is the successor to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, established in 2001.
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Chapter Four: Challenges Facing Multiculturalism: Local vs. Global

Introduction

Britain’s former colonies were viewed as a logical source to maintain a post – World War II economic prosperity. However, the post-war influx of immigrants from India, Pakistan, and the Caribbean caused pressure on policy makers; to one side, the arrival of new labour would boost the economy; to the other side, worries increased over its effect on national identity. Moreover, the traditional concepts of Britishness and Englishness were related to the concept of race with the implicit notion of white superiority. But this racial view of British and English self-identities was inevitably eroded by extensive migration. Besides, the assimilationist model (1950s-1970s) tried to minimise the flexibility of ethnic identities, especially in contexts where minorities were marginalised and confronted hostility. In spite of nativists’ efforts to turn back the clock; it was progressively obvious that black immigrants became part of a growing national identity. As stated by Parekh (2005), with immigration, Britain’s national identity was increasingly “deracialised”; thus, no one “had to be” white or Christian to be British.

4.1 Multicultural Nationalism and the War on Terror

Nationalism is an ideology and movement that promotes the interests of a particular nation especially with the aim of gaining and maintaining the nation's sovereignty over its homeland. Nationalism holds that each nation should govern itself, free from outside interference, that a nation is a natural and ideal basis for a polity, and that the nation is the only rightful source of political power. It further aims to build and maintain a single national identity based on shared social characteristics such as culture, language, religion, politics, and belief in a shared singular history and to endorse national unity. Multicultural nationalism, according to Brown (2000), is ‘a vision of community which respects and promotes the cultural economy and status equality of its component ethnic group’. (Brown 2000, p. 128-129) This means it goes beyond the simple civic tolerance towards the different communities within the society, rather it
respects them and is interested in such diversity.

War on Terror (also known as the Global War on Terrorism) is an international military campaign launched by the US government after the September 11 attacks. The targets of the campaign are mainly Sunni Islamist fundamentalist armed groups located through the Muslim world, with the most prominent groups being Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and the various franchise groups of the two organisations. (Selmi 2019)

The growth of military violence in that instant outcome of the attacks on America in September 2001 gave excuse to racial politics in agreement with the idea of a religiously transformed war between good and evil. In spite of its tragedy, the War on Terror was a conflict without definite objectives or enemies shaping new forms of politics of race. (Selmi 2019) Although Britain’s racial politics developed for hundreds of years in relation to its own imperial history, they were obviously shaped in new ways by America’s commanding practices. Consequently, the state faced new amounting challenges concerning its capacity to hold together an ethics of multicultural pluralism regardless of the demands of war.

Besides, racial politics of the British state, as a reaction to the London bombings of 7 July 2005, reflected the way in which the Islamic faith was understood in the context of Britain’s participation in chief military conflicts, and more particularly how British Muslims were subjects to state inspection as a result of this. In spite of recognition by public opinion that the London bombings were a direct reply to the British state’s contribution to the War on Terror, official political discourses tried to transform terrorist violence encouraged by political intention into a random attack on an innocent multicultural society.

Though diversity was vital to official collective victimhood, pluralism was gradually weakened by its limits within the emblematic borders of the nation-state; the limits of state multiculturalism
depended on racial differences inside and outside national community. Additionally, the expulsion of individuals, considered as a threat to national security due to their actions, religious beliefs, affiliations or associations, proved the racial limits of state multiculturalism compared with Britain’s national interest. The state’s conflicted treatment of British Muslims was another proof of a progressive attempt to separate one from the other, hence revealing the most dominant contradiction in the politics of multicultural nationalism.

On the other hand, by relating the London bombings to North American attacks of 2001, it became easy to neglect the social and historical specificity of either event, and to assume that both attacks were carried out by the same agents with shared motivations and objectives. This association marked the fact that North American attacks provided an opportunity for the president Bush to declare America’s “War on Terror”, and London bombings were a consequence to this declaration (on 8 July 2005, for example, the Daily Star editorial was rapid to point out that ‘this was our 9/11’).

Furthermore, on the day of the London bombings in 2005 Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London, made a declaration that was understood by many to be an articulate expression of a dominant attitude of shock and indignation:

This was not a terrorist attack against the mighty and the powerful. It was aimed not at Presidents or Prime Ministers. It was aimed at ordinary, working-class Londoners, black and white, Muslim and Christian, Hindu and Jew, young and old. It was an indiscriminate attempt to slaughter, irrespective of any considerations for age, for class, for religion, or whatever. (Pitcher 2009, p. 138)

Livingstone’s words were resounded across the political range, and state and media representatives replied with exceptional concord. The bombings on 7 July 2005 were an attack on a capital city characterised by its cultural, religious and racial diversity; according
to Livingstone, they represented an aggression on an openly multicultural society, an important property that made the city of London “the greatest in the world”. (ibid. p. 139)

Besides, describing London as the capital of a multicultural nation was a statement of fact, since among the victims of the bombings were people from various cultural and religious groups including Muslims, in addition to individuals, whether British citizens or foreign nationals, who lived and worked in London from over twenty nations. Livingstone’s statement was a responsible reaction to the bombings. Undoubtedly, his words helped to prevent anti-Muslim repercussion and considerable growth in hate crimes against minorities. In other ways, his response was politically wise, as consequent police inquiries would necessitate the preservation of good relations with the British Muslim community.

Moreover, the multicultural nature of a nation under terrorist attack was again emphasised on 11 July 2005, in the Prime Minister’s first speech to the House of Commons after the London bombings. Speaking on the name of the British people, Tony Blair claimed that ‘we are united in our determination that our country will not be defeated by such terror but will defeat it and emerge from this horror with our values, our way of life, our tolerance and respect for others, undiminished’. (ibid.)

In addition, Blair related his evocation of a solid community under attack to London’s blitz during the Second World War:

Yesterday we celebrated the heroism of world war two including the civilian heroes of London’s blitz. Today what a different city London is – a city of many cultures, faiths and races, hardly recognisable from the London of 1945. So different and yet, in the face of this attack, there is something wonderfully familiar in the confident spirit which moves through the city, enabling it to take the blow but still not flinch from re-asserting its will to triumph over adversity.
Britain may be different today but the coming together is the same. (ibid.)

The Second World War tragedies could rebuild modern nationalist imagination; it was not surprising that Blair chose to raise the idea of the blitz to support the image of a strong national character. Blair’s statement also served to remind British people that his words of national unity were equally spoken in the context of a main military engagement of the British state.

On the other side, Britain’s participation in the Iraq war was a main cause of the London terrorist attacks; The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Foreign Office representatives accentuated the fact that domestic terrorism was a possible product of the state’s military project (Bright 2005). In July 2005, opinion surveys suggested that nearly two-thirds of the British public and practically four-fifths of British Muslims believed that Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq was a leading factor of the London bombings (Dodd 2005). The video message made by one of the 7 July suicide bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, and first recorded on Al Jazeera channel, made this point in clear terms:

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world, and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Unless we feel security, you will be our targets. Unless you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight (BBC News 2005a).

In the face of this evidence, Blair’s insistence that the attacks on London were simply the result of an evil ideology that did not relate to the actions of the British state seemed like wishful thinking (Hencke 2005); in his determined insistence, he tried to avert the challenge posed by such terrorism, taming its morality as a test for British
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society, rather than to the actions of a state engaged in a war and invasion. The Prime Minister exploited the image of a pluralist national society battle against fanatic evil ideology, by describing the bombings as a “murderous carnage of the innocent”. (Blair 2005a) The responsibility of the British state, then, was denied, and criticism for its actions was deflected onto the bombers as agents of Britain’s national agony.

Nevertheless, while the Iraqi death toll as a result of the war was in July 2005 in the hundreds of thousands\(^1\), the 52 deaths that resulted from the London bombings were given a special status in Blair’s total refusal to make a connection between the two. The “blitz spirit” of a nation under siege was a better description of the dilemma of the Iraqi rather than the British people, yet by deflecting criticism of the British state actions onto the suffering of its citizens, public attention was turned inwards rather than outwards, to Londoners, not Baghdadis.

Indeed, those who died on 7 July 2005 were innocent citizens, but they were also, in contrast to Blair’s insistence, not the bombers’ real target. As damage continued in violence directed against the actions of the British state, Londoners were just accessories in a huge event acted for the consumption of world’s media. Thus, Blair’s rejection of the political nature of the attacks was only to be expected; the general climate was suitable for attracting common condemnation of the British National Party who tried to exploit the bombings on the streets of East London.\(^2\) However, the way in which Tony Blair used the language of cultural diversity as a means of efficiently closing debate on why London had become the target of a main terrorist attack, gave people a vision of an innocent multicultural nation victim of an apparently random act of violence.

Regardless of Blair’s denial of explicitly admitting the link between the London bombings and the war in Iraq, his statement on brave multicultural solidarity took on a rather more aggressive tone.
In this regard, he argued that ‘when they try to intimidate us, we will not be intimidated, when they seek to change our country, our way of life by these methods, we will not be changed. When they try to divide our people or weaken our resolve, we will not be divided and our resolve will hold firm’. (ibid.)

The Prime Minister’s speech had double meanings; on the one hand, the statement was seemingly another celebration of the “blitz spirit”: innocent people exposed to a random evil with divisive motive. On the other hand, Blair’s speech demonstrated his position regarding the challenge that the bombings posed to Britain’s participation in the War on Terror. In fact, the genius of Blair’s discourse was that he succeeded to combine both visions; the contested question of British foreign policy was transformed into one of support for an innocent nation under attack.

In general, Blair’s rejection of the terrorists’ intention “to divide our people” reflected a responsible commitment to multicultural pluralism and a total refusal to accuse British Muslims; the Prime Minister’s nationalist “we” was not an impartial description of a multicultural society, but part of an attempt to consolidate support for an unpopular war.

**4.1.1 Islamic Transnationalism**

Transnationalism involves a weakening of the control a nation-state has over its borders, inhabitants, and territory. Increased immigration to developed countries in response to global economic growth has resulted in multicultural societies where immigrants are more likely to maintain contact with their culture of origin and less likely to assimilate. Therefore, loyalty to the state may compete equally with allegiance to a culture or religion. With increased global mobility and access to prompt worldwide communication technology, boundaries dissolve and the territorial controls imposed by the traditional nation-state become less relevant.

Blair’s multicultural reply to the London bombings played key role
in the politics of race and racism in the context of the supposed War on Terror; because a plural nation united against terrorism was essentially conflict free; there was no space for voices of opposition in Blair’s multicultural society. When asked to comment on Mohammad Sidique Khan’s videotaped declaration, Blair’s argued that ‘it’s absurd of anyone growing up in our country to say they are a victim or have a grievance on these issues’. (BBC News 2005b)

Blair’s attempt to cease criticism of his responsibility of Britain’s actions in Iraq was turned into a racial understanding of the duties related to membership of the British nation. As an important moment of crisis in multicultural nationalism, the way the British state dealt with the London bombings revealed how some expressions of race, culture and religion continued to be thought to break the tolerable limits of national belonging.

Besides, when Khan spoke of ‘protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters’, (BBC News 2005a) he expressed a sense in which Islam was considered as a form of universal human solidarity. The concept of the Muslim “Ummah” defined this wide idea of unity that cut across the borders of the nation-state. Such universalism characterises the main world religions, but what set Islam apart, in this context, was the extent to which it was drawn into the physical and ideological conflicts of the War on Terror, and therefore into tension with the British state.

Fundamentally, the basic transnational community structure represented by the “Ummah” exposed the inconsistent form of state multicultural discourse. Though Britain’s multicultural diversity became the standard metaphor by which a nation under attack came to be described as a result of the London bombings, its acknowledged pluralism broke brusquely at the physical and emblematic boundaries of the nation-state.

In contrast to this vision, the extensive concept of “Ummah” pushed beyond such limits, stressed on a common humanity shared by
Muslims across the globe. For Blair, Muslims at home and abroad were different categories of person. Hence, the suicide bombers’ interpretation of the Muslim “Ummah” became a symbol of global disparity that Blair’s limited notion of cultural pluralism had to banish from the British nation territory.

Moreover, trans-national conception of human solidarity divulged the limits of plural conceptions of multicultural difference enclosed in a nationalist agenda. This was not to suggest that the idea of the “Ummah” did not have its own limitations; as Bobby Sayyid pointed out in 1997, ‘the “Ummah” is no less an “imagined community” than the nation… a pre-constituted Muslim subjectivity or solidarity that can be said to exist in any empirical sense.’ (Pitcher 2009, p. 145)

Thus, the concept of the “Ummah” that motivated the bombers could be seen as the consequence of the British state practices, an idea of religious solidarity that was given life by the state’s denial to completely consider its possibility. Tony Blair’s descriptions of multicultural Britain turned inwards; they portrayed a single nation as if it were the world. The London bombings, in however, made it clear that this was a myth.

Despite these differences, there was an interesting harmony in the respective speeches of Blair and the bombers, as both depended on a strong conception of the British people as a collective political entity to legitimate their respective positions. While Blair insisted that the bombs were an attack on the British people, the targeting of civilians was justified by the idea that the voters of democratic states could be considered responsible for the actions of their government on the basis that the latter actions were an expression of popular will. Evidently, there was a gap between rhetoric and reality shared by both antagonists. This gap was rejected by both Blair and the bombers, for it called into question the legitimacy of the former to speak and act on behalf of, and the latter to attack, the British people.
4.1.2 Racism and War

Racism refers to the belief that some races are better than others, or the unfair treatment of someone because of his or her race. Although the history of European colonialism was a main element of contemporary race studies in the West, they were neglected during the wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries for two major reasons; firstly, because modern European histories of race had a tendency to make a chronological and spatial move from slavery and colonialism to postwar immigration, and therefore focused their attention on the internal dynamics of race and racism. Secondly, because narratives of the Second World War tend to center the Nazi Holocaust as the crucial moment in modern history of race, and by doing so questions of race and war vanished with the defeat of German fascism and a postwar agreement on the illegitimacy of racial genocide.

Furthermore, there was little to differentiate between the construction of an enemy on the basis of generally racial characteristics and their negative description on other grounds, i.e. xenophobia. While the terms of such descriptions varied according to context, the elementary prerequisite of wartime propaganda consistently included, according to Eric Hobsbawm’s in 1990, the construction of ‘the solidarity of an imaginary “us” against a symbolic “them”’. (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 163) It was, consequently, Islam which served as the essential outside of the War on Terror. (Staten 1985)

In spite of the war leaders of both Britain and the US efforts to accentuate the idea that the War on Terror was not against a religion, but rather ‘a fringe movement that perverted the peaceful teachings of Islam’ (Bush 2001; Pitcher 2009, p. 147), the multicultural rhetoric of Bush and Blair was weakened by policies and practices that had obviously targeted followers of the Islamic faith. Besides, in Afghanistan and Iraq, war was against principally Muslim countries accused of supporting terrorism.
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Since Islam was regarded as a means for the spreading of a terrorist ideology, it was Muslims who, in the War on Terror’s “struggle of good versus evil” (Bush 2001), suffered the consequences of anti-terrorism measures; in March 2005, Counter-Terrorism Minister Hazel Blears openly informed Muslims that ‘some of our counter-terrorism powers will be excessively experienced by the Muslim community’ (Demetriou 2005; Pitcher 2009, p. 148). The 2005–6 statistics also demonstrated that Asians were stopped and searched with twice the frequency of white people (Ministry of Justice 2007).

Moreover, doubt rose as a standard of law implementation marked by racial conventions; the belief that race provided legitimate grounds for suspicion was not the unwritten code of corrupt police officers, but established official sanction by the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police, who in August 2005 claimed that in conducting stop and searches the police ‘should not waste time searching old white ladies’. (BLINK 2005; Pitcher 2009, p. 148)

If race was considered as a reference for intelligence-based anti-terrorist police, with the targeting of some people and not others, then the domestic politics of the War on Terror reinforced the distinct racial approaches of national belonging. The war, then, illustrated the constant racial hierarchies within the structure of multicultural British state.

Besides, the claim to moral superiority of a nation at war was based on its values of tolerance and pluralism constructed against the intolerant singularity of terrorist fundamentalism. British Muslims had accordingly been made representative of values defining the enemy. The motivation behind the immediate description of guilt and innocence was underlined most clearly in the legislative suggestions worked out in the months following the London bombings.

A 2004 draft paper from the Home and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices on relations with the Muslim community,
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revealed that these departments recognised the importance of ‘gaining the active cooperation of Muslims, immigrant and British’ (Turnbull 2004; ibid. p. 149) in the accomplishment of the War on Terror, and by doing so, engaging in “hearts and minds activity” (Ehrman 2004). Following the London bombings, the Islamic Issues advisor of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Mockbul Ali, supported by higher officials, continued to warn against the exclusion of radical clerics such as the Sunni preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi, declaring that:

We certainly do not agree with Qaradawi’s views on Israel or Iraq, but we have to recognize that they are not unusual or even exceptional amongst Muslims. In fact it is correct to say that these views are shared by a majority of Muslims in the Middle East and the UK. Refusing entry on these grounds would open a Pandora’s Box in relation to entry clearance for others in the Muslim world. (Ali 2005, p. 3)

Obviously, the FCO admitted that to focus on Islam in response to the London attacks would be a disadvantageous measure, particularly in this case, as Qaradawi had himself vocally condemned the bombings. Yet, the Prime Minister stood firm to his statement in the aftermath of the bombings that “the rules of the game” had changed (Blair 2005b). Subsequently, a new anti-terror legislation was drafted and turned Qaradawi’s opinions on Israel or Iraq into an offence on the grounds of the encouragement of terrorism under section one of the 2006 Terrorism Act, therefore providing a legal basis for his deportation; Qaradawi has since been deprived of a visa to enter the UK (Dodd 2008).

On the other side, the collaboration of elected moderate Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was protected⁹, and initiatives calling for their frequent condemnation of extremism, together with a set of self-policing measures, agreed by the MCB and its associates in exchange for an official discourse that
recognised the legitimacy of ‘the decent law-abiding Muslim community of Great Britain’. (Blair 2005b; Pitcher 2009, p. 151)

Discussions took place between British Muslim leaders and their associates of the principal political parties to set up a media unit to refute negative press stories about Muslims (Dodd 2005). Nevertheless, the decisions of the unwritten contract between the state and British Muslims meant that it remained the “decent law-abiding Muslim community” who assumed the responsibility for having somehow allowed the execution of the 2005 assaults. As Shahid Malik, newly elected Labour MP for Dewsbury, and himself a Muslim, pointed out a couple of weeks after the London Bombings, ‘the choices are stark and clear – we either confront the enemy within or are seen to condone [the London bombings]. [...] the battle for the hearts and souls of British Muslims, here in Dewsbury and across the country, has truly begun.’ (Shahid 2005; ibid.)

In Malik’s arguments a planned request to hearts and minds, since emphasis was placed on Islam as essentially divided between support for fundamentalist terrorists and devoted support for a nation under attack. This clear message to British Muslims reflected the US President words addressed to the international community in 2001, ‘you are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror’. (Bush 2001)

4.1.2.1 Natives and Newcomers

The position of the British state towards Muslims in the context of the War on Terror was in itself divided. The margin between acceptable and unacceptable conducts of being a Muslim in Britain were drawn on the basis of the changing requirements of the War on Terror and British Muslims were interchangeably celebrated or condemned on these grounds. The policy suggestions worked out as a reaction to the London bombings echoed the nationalist classification; individuals and groups targeted were judged in relation to whether their actions and beliefs were considered to be of the “foreign” or
In a press conference held in August 2005, Tony Blair proclaimed some new legislative measures. In this regard, he argued:

[I]f people want to come here as refugees fleeing persecution, or as people seeking a different or better way of life, they come here and they play by our rules and our way of life. If they don’t then they are going to have to go because they are threatening people in our country and that’s not right either. (Blair 2005c)

Blair’s proposals involved deportation or exclusion of foreign nationals on the grounds of their raising hatred, supporting or justifying terrorist violence, or being related to a variety of websites, bookshops, networks or organisations on a banned list drawn up by the Home Office. In a game with converted rules, the physical expulsion of individuals promoted the interests of national security. In a word, the hypothesis was that terrorism was a foreign unit. Regardless of evidence to the contrary, in that both the 7 July bombers and the committers of the abortive 21 July attacks were themselves British citizens, terrorism was understood to originate from beyond the territorial boundaries of the British nation.

Moreover, Blair’s proposals also applied to individuals with foreign origins and sought to mechanically refuse asylum to ‘anyone who participated in terrorism, or had anything to do with it anywhere’. (Pitcher 2009, p. 152) His suggestions implied speeding up repatriation proceedings for terrorist suspects wanted elsewhere, and collecting ‘an international database of those individuals whose activities or views posed a threat to Britain’s security’. (ibid.) Additionally, an earlier legislation allowed the revocation of citizenship in the case of those with dual citizenship, and suggested that citizenship could be stripped from ‘naturalised citizens engaged in extremism’. (ibid.) This measure, however, illustrated the idea that foreignness was an indispensable attribute of terrorism, and tried to
adjust an immigrant’s citizenship status in accordance with this.

Nevertheless, all these suggestions represented a new different approach to formal citizenship, where immigrants, however long their residency in Britain, would be responsible for having their citizenship cancelled whenever they ‘acted in a way that was contrary to the interests of this country’. (ibid.) While those who were born in Britain would stay, whatever criminal acts they might commit, British citizens. In short, the citizenship status of immigrants remained conditional on their “good” conduct.

On the other side, individuals’ exclusion, deportation, or imprisonment was not based on proof that would permit any ordinary legal proceedings to be brought against them. The emphasis was on the possibility that they might commit a crime, or that their presence in Britain was not favourable to national interest. Legal norms, then, became secondary to a government of preventive security as a main active principle of anti-terrorism in the context of the War on Terror. In addition, an important distinction was made between the inside and the outside of the national sphere; those outsiders who were identified as a menace were subsequently stripped of their basic human rights.

Another proposal, first proposed by the Association of Chief Police Officers, tried to prolong the period an individual might be held without charge from two weeks to ninety days equivalent to the time usually served under a six month prison sentence. Yet, the twenty-eight days represented the restoration of imprisonment laws which unavoidably contributed to feelings of estrangement, intimidation and anger within targeted communities and groups.

Ironically, the values used to defend the War on Terror such as the protection of human rights, freedom, cultural pluralism and democracy, were the same ethics broken in the name of national security. As Agamben (1998) claimed that ‘The so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form
of rights belonging to the citizens of a state.’ (Agamben 1998, p. 126)

The refugee and the terrorist suspect, then, ‘put the fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis’ (ibid. p. 131) a critical situation that was resolved by exclusion them from the physical and symbolic borders of the nation-state. The political power was therefore set up on the expulsion of terrorist subjects from national territory. Besides, the delay of basic human rights became standardised, as a characteristic of the War on Terror, in secret military prisons across the world like Guantánamo Bay in Cuba and Abu Ghraib in Iraq.

Furthermore, Blair’s descriptions of a non-specific terrorist danger were aimed specially at some Muslim groups, mainly the two radical Islamic organisations in Britain, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun, both of whom had denounced the London bombings and had no recognised terrorist links. Another proposal implied closing down Mosques suspected extremism, and drawing up a list of non-British clerics judged unsuitable to preach, who would then be excluded from the country.

In addition, worries over the content of citizenship in multicultural Britain exposed how Blair’s objective of preventing further terrorist violence combined with a completely separate yet old concern over integration. The idea that violence against the state might be executed by British citizens was excluded, though the bombers were formally British; Blair tried to prove that Britishness and terrorism were incompatible, that it was only an outsider who can plant a bomb. Cultural, religious or racial difference, thus, were integrally grounds for doubt, and the old question of national loyalty was resurfaced in a new form.

Of Blair’s twelve distinct suggestions, over half were specifically related to the exclusion, deportation, or control of individuals, whether British citizens, immigrants or visitors, on the basis that their place of origin made them subject to greater suspicion than others. Four proposals involved controlling the affiliations and practices of Muslims,
with particular stress placed on the menace posed by Muslim clerics and organisations from abroad. Other proposals generally included eroding civil rights and removing existing legal impairments to the detainment and prosecution of terrorist suspects. Although only few of these suggestions were passed as laws, they gave a clear idea of the government’s position.

As Giorgio Agamben (2005) argued, the “state of exception” that portrayed such actions was rather a constitutive element of legislative practice; an undeclared lasting state of emergency allowed the state to use its sovereign power outside of the ordinary juridical order. The state of exception described a fundamental relation between the British state and racial groups; race, hence, remained a tool for categorising and acting upon ‘entire categories of citizens who for some reason could not be integrated into the political system’. (Agamben 2005, p. 2)

4.1.2.1.1 Asylum Seekers Dilemma

The state’s treatment of Muslims at home and abroad had broader social consequences, and the nationalist segregations applied to Muslims in the War on Terror had perhaps encouraged racist and Islamophobic practices in institutions and across civil society. Racist attacks against an individual’s physical appearance had their official equivalent in the Anti-Terrorism Minister’s approved criteria for stop and search; attacks on Mosques and other places of worship had their parallel in police investigation and raids; social prejudices that questioned the loyalty of Muslims to British culture and traditions reflected state discourses that mistrusted British Muslims’ commitment to the national community. In this regard, Phillip Cole in 2000 stated:

As the boundaries between citizens/subjects and citizens/outsiders coincide, the way the external boundary is policed will have an impact on the way the internal boundary is policed. In effect, any group which shares characteristics with
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those identified as outsiders will themselves be in a vulnerable position. Their membership will be constantly questioned; they will be subjected to forms of surveillance from which other members are free, and their access to the public sphere of citizenship will become hazardous. If the external boundary of the community is policed by the criteria based on “race”, however indirectly, then those members who share the criteria will be subjected to racism, from other groups and individuals who refuse to identify with them, and from institutions. (Cole 2000, p. 10-1)

The wider social results of anti-Islamic policies nourished old discourses of race and racism; as the two of the commiters of the unsuccessful London bombings on 21 July were, as children, refugees from Eritrea and Somalia, conservative tabloid headlines unanimously merged their immigrant status with their criminal activities. The front pages of the Sun and the Daily Mail described the bombers actions as an ungrateful gift to a nation that had housed and schooled them; the Daily Express title was more concise “Bombers are all sponging asylum seekers”. However, such positions were not different from the government’s projected policy reaction: Britain’s native generosity was abused, and collected terrorist violence in recompense.

Furthermore, the racial logic of the War on Terror was not the main factor of this negative association between criminal behaviour and immigration/asylum, which evidently had a long and complex history of their own. According to Stoler (1995), the idea of race provided an extremely flexible consolidating concept into which it was possible to introduce any number of potential antagonists, and thus resulting in a clear social classification.

In addition, the state’s response to the bombings, through insisting on the inherently foreign nature of terrorism, confirmed the connection between asylum seekers and the latter, and thus it became legitimate to make an enemy of the former. A witness report of the
assassination of the innocent Brazilian electrician, Jean Charles de Menezes, by anti-terrorist police at Stockwell underground station, on 22 July 2005 described ‘An Asian guy […] no more than five yards away from where I was sitting as I saw it with my own eyes […] He looked like a Pakistani’. (The Guardian 2005; Pitcher 2009, p. 157) Jean Charles de Menezes mirrored a racial identity at the moment he was shot; it was the actions of the state personified in the form of the armed police that made his “fabricated” identity.\textsuperscript{13}

In general, it was in the accomplishment of the War on Terror, in the actions of the military in Afghanistan and Iraq, legislative changes in Britain and police practices, that terrorism was identified, regardless of strong evidence to the contrary, as a force basically outlandish to British society, nurtured by a correspondingly foreign product of fundamentalist Islam. A radical denial of the possibility that terrorism might be a national product and the wrong belief that the state foreign policy decisions had no effect on the nation’s social and political life, all resulted in negative attitudes towards British Muslims.

Indeed, the “with-us-or-against-us” rhetoric of the War on Terror created a space for British Muslims in discourses of the nation, but this was a space that became progressively difficult for them to occupy. Although Muslim community reflected British tolerance and diversity, this remained conditional on its support for the War on Terror and commitment to common political, social and moral values. These conditions involved replacing transnational solidarity, which was an emblem of religious belief, with an enclosed loyalty to the nation-state.

\textbf{4.2 Politics of Difference and Britishness/Englishness}

Britishness is the state or quality of being British or of embodying British characteristics. It comprises the claimed qualities that distinguish the British people and form the basis of their unity and identity, and the expressions of British culture such as habits, behaviours, or symbols that have a common, familiar or iconic quality readily identifiable with
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the United Kingdom. Although Englishness and Britishness are used synonymously in some contexts, the two terms are not identical and the relation of each to the other is complex. Englishness is often a response to different national identities within Britain such as Scottishness, Irishness, Welshness and Cornishness.

A growing demography resulted in the emergence of multiculturalism in Britain. (see Appendices VXI, XVII, XVIII, VIX) According to Sen (2006), the incapability of official authorities to advance a sense of belonging and national identity caused the rise of a new multicultural model best described as plural mono-culturalism; a governance framework made of remote ethno-cultural and religious communities with little in common. Thus, minorities had an inclusive right to found their own communities, express their own identities and values, discover their own histories and languages, and follow their own lifestyles. As the 2001 Cantle Report concluded:

...Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, place of worship, language, and social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on a basis of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges. (Muir 2007, p. 9)

However, the result proved discordant: a residential, educational, and workplace separation that echoed, strengthened, and promoted parallel lives implied in a plural mono-culturalism.

By the turn of the 21st century, an adoption of a passive plural mono-culturalism was no longer maintainable. Instead a new neo-monocultural model of governance arose, founded on the principles of unity and integration with main objectives based on community, Britishness/Englishness, and common values. This incline toward integration and community union models of governance changed the politics of managing diversity and difference in primarily different ways.
Indeed, an overt commitment to integration became more “assimilationist” with civic Britishness/Englishness replacing multiculturalism as the main political discourse. As stated by the Home Office in 2004:

To be British seems to us to mean that we respect the laws, the elected Parliamentary and democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual tolerance, respect for equal rights and mutual concern; and that we give our allegiance to the state (as commonly symbolised in the Crown) in return for its protection. To be British is to respect those overarching specific institutions, values, beliefs, and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and cultures, together in peace and in a legal order. (Fleras 2009, p. 182)

Consequently, the 2008 Commission on Integration and Cohesion adopted the principles of a mutual adjustment and cohesive community outline including: a common sense of an ambitious future, shared duties related to responsibilities and rights of citizenship, civility and mutual respect, and social justice to advance bilateral trust in local institutions.

Moreover, the Commission promoted interaction between different racial and ethnic groups at local levels through adapting different people to each other in a shared space. The new definition of integrated and cohesive community, then, enhanced key beliefs including: everyone should possess similar life chances, people should be conscious of their duties and rights, and people should trust each other and local institutions to act properly.

A neo-mono-culturalism model approved integration as a two-sided process of change with responsibilities on both immigrants and society to increase community unity and decrease inequity. It also advocated a belief in a multicultural Britain as long as people’s differences would not prevent accomplishment of community, cohesion, and shared values. Additionally, the government official document *Improving Opportunity,*
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*Strengthening Society* released in 2005, emphasised the principle that you can be different, but you are different in a British society with a consistent set of duties, commitments, and prospects:

For those settling in Britain, the Government has clear expectation that they will integrate into our society and economy because all the evidence indicates that this benefits them and the country as a whole...we consider that it is important for all citizens to have a sense of inclusive British identity. This does not mean that people have to choose between Britishness and other cultural identities, nor should they sacrifice their particular lifestyles, customs, and beliefs. They should be proud of both.

(ibid. p. 183)

Hence, institutions from housing and health care, to public broadcasting, policing, and education became more multicultural and inclusive. For Hansen (2007), a commitment to multicultural values persisted, comprising: Britain is a society of diverse cultures, no one should have to leave their culture to become British, all migrants and minorities should reach full socioeconomic integration, no ethnic penalty applies, and attachment to culture should not conflict with commitment to liberal democratic standards.

**4.3 Cultural Pluralism, National Identity and Citizenship**

The 2016 British exit (Brexit) referendum was mainly about cultural pluralism, nationalism and citizenship. These various characteristics of modern Britain interacted with each other in ways that related directly to the vote. Fundamental tensions between them were aggravated by the weight of immigration in the referendum campaign, the democratic deficit within the European Union (EU) and the longer-term corrosion of the welfare state.

First, cultural pluralism was a major cause of Brexit; postwar non-white immigration shaped a modern multiculturalism that some perceived as a menace to social unity and security. From the mid-1960s until the
early 2000s, most government multicultural policies relied on integration rather than assimilation, which led to a high degree of internal cultural pluralism. However, the political agreement in favour of this approach was weakened by race riots in 2001, the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 and the wider effects of the “war on terror”.

Consequently, a hostile attitude against multiculturalism emerged, and British Muslims became objects of public and governmental doubt. Important figures claimed that British multiculturalism authorised minorities to set up their individual commitments above their civic devotions, thus causing the collapse of social cohesion. Worries about multiculturalism, security and immigration were often melded in public discourse, such as The UK Independence Party’s (UKIP) flagrant “Breaking Point” campaign poster. This opposition to multiculturalism, then, boosted Brexit vote.

Second, multiple forms of nationalism influenced attitudes to multiculturalism in the referendum. The effort to shape a multicultural British national identity faced strong resistance from those who perceived their Britishness/Englishness as under threat. There were also tensions between British multiculturalists who preferred cultural pluralism and those who supported a more assimilative form of liberalism. (Ashcroft and Bevir 2016) Multicultural, mono-cultural and even mono-ethnic understandings of being British were in competition. Therefore, the controversial nature of nationalism convoluted debates over multiculturalism.

Besides, other difficulties reflected differences between national identity in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. A sense of Englishness connected more strongly with “euro-scepticism”, than Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish identities did, perhaps because national identity was endangered by immigration. (see Appendices XV, XVI) Over 60 percent of Scots voted “Remain”; (The Sunday Times 2016) some surveys displayed leaving the EU would lead to an important rise in support for Scottish independence. Diverse understandings of different
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national identities encouraged, hence, Brexit referendum.

Finally, citizenship was also another vital issue for many voters. The majority of those who voted were citizens of both Britain and the European Union, and the Brexit referendum was somewhat directed by these different citizenships; many “Remain” voters identified as European. Nevertheless, citizenship was not just representative, it had both economic and political facets driven by valued legal rights. Support for the EU was higher among some demographics, particularly younger voters, university graduates and higher earners, who were more likely to advantage the freedom of movement guaranteed by their EU citizenship. (Ashcroft and Bevir 2016)

Contrariwise, many who wanted to restrict immigration believed it had conflicting economic outcomes for those who struggled to compete with highly movable labour within the EU. Thus, anxieties founded on the view that the welfare state was menaced by immigration, increased. However, economic and social rights granted during the postwar extension of British citizenship progressively deteriorated by austerity.

Additionally, many who voted “Leave” worried about the future of British political sovereignty and the decline of democratic receptiveness within EU organisations. Undoubtedly, an important number of British people believed that the economic and political rights they took for granted, as part of their British citizenship, were weakened by their status as EU citizens. (ibid.) Therefore, altered evaluations of plural forms of citizenship were a central part of Brexit vote.

In general, cultural pluralism and discordance over the consequences of multiculturalism, disengagement between different forms of national and supranational identities and different evaluations of the economic and political value of multiple citizenships, all were vital to Brexit referendum.
4.4 Contesting Multiculturalism

Governance framework transformed accordingly as a reaction to the politics of multiculturalism. British governments may have adopted multicultural ideals, yet its conception and application remained problematic for local government and many state departments. For Hewitt (2005), Conservative governments toughly obstructed the implementation of antiracism procedures and multicultural education, though rejecting any structural or institutional source of racial discrimination or need for special measures.

However, multicultural discourses and programmes advanced through local councils and municipal authorities who created strategies to deal with diversity and minorities’ integration as well as the establishment of consultation committees and race relations units, and the distribution of funds to minority organisations; for instance, the multicultural agenda of Ken Livingstone, the mayor of London, comprised antiracism enterprises in addition to endorsing cross-cultural understanding through promotion of ethnic projects such as the Notting Hill carnival and Chinese New Year. (Butt 2008)

Additionally, multiculturalism was communicated via debates over education, especially through programmes that reflected diversity and difference. According to Vasta (2007), the implementation of multicultural initiatives into schools guaranteed a culturally appropriate curriculum for minority children. Local governments also introduced labour market training programmes for ethnic minorities.

Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, multicultural governance became progressively weak. As stated by Kenan Malik (2001), British identity stopped rotating around racial lines, but gradually recognised itself as tolerant of different identities. People retreated into their communities or religion as an assertion of identity; when renouncing openness for confidentiality, negotiation for reticence, and integration for separation,
minorities lost the opportunity to get involved in mutual political action. (see Appendix XVII)

Rather than improving understanding of cultural differences, multiculturalism nurtured apathy toward other people’s lives, thus strengthening parallel societies with different values. In a word, the rise of plural multiculturalism caused a more fractured Britain whose disintegration raised fears over religious aggressiveness and worries over internal terrorism (Malik 2001). For example, regardless of the important efforts made to integrate and protect Muslims, an opposite result triumphed. Young Muslims still experience vulnerability, isolation, and racism along with hostility and detachment. (see Appendix XVIII)

On the other side, the summer of 2001 saw a boom of riots in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford that confirmed how the agitated relation between industrial decline, institutional discrimination in employment and the isolation of communities could lead to a disaster. In 2004, a survey for the Commission for Racial Equality stated that less than 10 per cent of whites had friends from different racial groups. (Fleras 2009) According to Kundnani (2007), this segregation was blamed on cultural differences, with particular focus on Britain’s Muslim community for rejecting to move beyond a “parallel lives“ attitude.

Besides, some politicians evaluated multiculturalism as a menace to unity, identity, and security, as well as a failure to advance Western values in conciliating a growing Islamist extremism. As claimed by Home Secretary David Blunkett in 2002, ‘migrants and minorities need to become more British.’ (Fleras 2009, p. 178) Consequently, a new integrationist governance model was established on the belief that security and unity must represent the assurance and trust related to a robust sense of belonging and identity, common purpose, and equal opportunities. Moreover, the 7/7 terrorist attacks were congruently contributory in reconsidering the governance policy. According to Mirza et al. (2007), the disturbing fact about the London bombings was that British
government had no trust in its own people. The attacks, then, revealed the defects of British cultural governance; it also boosted demands for stimulating integration into British society.

For Kundnani (2007), multiculturalism caused the spread of isolated Muslim ghettos that privileged religious-cultural priorities over civic obligations related to loyalty, tolerance, rule of law, and respect for democracy. Consequently, the rise of a strong Muslim identity stressed diversity over common national identity and encouraged the emergence of Islamist groups. As stated by Mirza et al. (2007):

For over twenty years, successive governments have uncritically... pushed an agenda which has effectively undermined the possibility of shared communal experience. Stressing difference has pushed some people apart to the degree that they feel no empathy for the suffering of others who are “not their own.” In the name of multiculturalism, immigrants have been taught that belonging to Britain is something to be ashamed of, and that, as “outsiders,” they have a special, superior status as a result of being untainted. Instead of helping immigrants to learn English and acculturate to the mainstream, the multicultural approach has aimed to preserve distinct ethnic identities and groups. (Fleras 2009, p. 179)

Multiculturalism claimed that every institution had to recognise, respect, and respond to ethnic and religious differences even if their practices compromised common values and beliefs. Critics like Munira Mirza et al. (2007) exposed the dangers of institutionalising difference over unity and connection as basics for multicultural governance.

Furthermore, multiculturalism led to impractical prospects through reinforcing a belief that Britain would admit and adapt to whatever traditions and cultures recognised by different ethnic minority groups; as culture expresses a person in terms of who he or she is, it was important to defend, preserve, and endorse both culture and minorities. Supporters
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of the new Labour government believed they were encouraging integration without assimilation via defending the rights of minorities to keep their culture while promoting their participation as citizens.

The state maintained immigrant integration, yet it remained limited due to human rights standards; the government admitted the need to incorporate migrants and minorities and isolate any values and beliefs that were explicitly British except in a universalistic sense of a commitment to the rule of law and democracy (Joppke 2008). However, without a clear sense of Britishness/Englishness in proposing an integrationist agenda, a reconsidering of multicultural governance could no longer be ignored.

Besides, Tony Blair’s speech in 2006 about immigrant’s duty to adopt Britain’s core values did not openly reject multiculturalism but it suggested the readjusting of its role in Britain’s future:

... [W]hen it comes to our essential values – belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage – then that is where we come together, it is what we hold in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves British....The whole point is that multicultural Britain was never supposed to be a celebration of division; but of diversity. The purpose was to allow people to live harmoniously together, despite their difference; not to make their difference an encouragement to discord. The values that nurtured it were those of solidarity, of coming together, of peaceful co-existence. The right to be in a multicultural society was always, always implicitly balanced by a duty to integrate, to be part of Britain...So it is not that we need to dispense with multicultural Britain. On the contrary, we should continue celebrating it. (Meer and Modood 2008, p. 12)

The shift toward civic integration demonstrated a new re-evaluation of multiculturalism through breaking many of the taboos that had shaped Britain’s ethics. Yet, an alteration of leadership did not do
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much to enhance minorities’ integration. Like his predecessor, Gordon Brown in February of 2008 supported a commitment to British values and the combination of rights with responsibilities:

While we have always been a country of different national, and thus of plural identities - ...Muslim, Pakistani, or Afro-Caribbean, Cornish, British, and English – there is always a risk, that when people are insecure, they retreat into more exclusive identities rooted in 19th century conceptions of blood, race, and territory – when instead, we the British people should be able to gain great strength from celebrating a British identity which is bigger than the sum of its parts, and a union that is strong because of the values we share and because of the way these values are expressed through our history and our institutions. (Schain 2008, p. 152)

Immigrants and minorities, then, had to be convinced to join citizenship classes, to acquire English competence, and to declare their loyalty to common British values.

4.5 Pluralist Governance and Democratic Revival

Democracy is a form of government in which the people have the authority to choose their governing legislation. Who people are and how authority is shared among them are core issues for democratic development and constitution. Some foundations of these issues are freedom of assembly and speech, inclusiveness and equality, membership, consent, voting, right to life and minority rights. Generally, there are two types of democracy: direct and representative. In a direct democracy, the people directly deliberate and decide on legislature. In a representative democracy the people elect representatives to deliberate and decide on legislature, such as in parliamentary or presidential democracy. In liberal democracy the powers of the majority are exercised within the framework of a representative democracy, but the constitution limits the majority and protects the minority, usually through the
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enjoyment by all of certain individual rights, e.g. freedom of speech, or freedom of association.

Cultural pluralism, national identity and citizenship all caused new modern challenges in Britain. However, these forms of pluralism and the different political reactions to them could not be neglected; a response to these complicated matters focused much on restructuring governance so as to revive political, economic and cultural practices. Such reforms would reconstitute common understanding of pluralism and diminish the possibility of post-Brexit falling into narrow forms of populism and nationalism.

Moreover, decentralised governance would allow those who identified mainly with local levels to express their identity and feel a sense of political ownership. It would also empower those who had multicultural identities to participate at various social levels. However, debates over political decentralisation still persisted and continued to feed disparities between various national identities; English votes for English laws was subject to many objections as English decentralisation posed supplementary constitutional and democratic problems. (Blick 2016)

Furthermore, raising taxes including income tax would be decentralised to a more local level. Also, primary control of education would be local, counting decisions about curricula and testing. Plural political structures would leave spaces for national, cultural and religious groups to participate in self-government. Brexit, then, could be an opportunity for undertaking new forms of democracy at the local level; deliberative polls, participatory planning and the extension of consultative initiatives, all would enhance cross-cultural dialogue. (Ashcroft and Bevir 2016)

Organisations such as London Citizens provided spaces for productive discussion at the local level to address deep cultural and religious differences. Other bodies including Community Interest Companies funded and controlled local energy production and transport, emphasising common properties such as open universities, share-shops and municipal gardens and farms, and supporting employee ownership of
private businesses. (Bretherton 2015)

On the other side, cultural renewal was an essential part of rebuilding New Britain; major structural changes of political, economic and social practices would be unproductive without an associated change in public culture. Britain, today, is at a crossroads facing a clear choice between retiring and reaffirming its commitment to solidarity, openness and cooperation at home and abroad; aspects of EU law protecting workers’ rights would help maintain solidarity. (Ashcroft and Bevir 2016) Similarly, negotiating access to the European Economic Area (EEA) would protect a multicultural position.

Recent surveys demonstrated extensive support for securing the right of non-British EU citizens to stay in the UK. (ibid.) Britain could also give more attention to assisting the victims of conflict, natural disasters and human rights violations e.g. through accepting a greater number of Syrian refugees. In addition, Brexit does not prevent the introduction of more immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers to British citizenship.

4.6 Neo-Multicultural Governance

The move toward integrative ethics of community, unity, and cohesion as a main governance discourse and the mounting worries over the relevance of this governance model in light of evolving realities and contested demands pushed Britain’s diversity to become more differenced and politicised. (Meer and Modood 2008) Since the 1990s, migrants grew into a more heterogeneous entity in terms of skills, constraints, economic relations, and an extensive set of social-cultural backgrounds.

However, the causes that promoted this great diversity comprised disparities in countries of origin, including EU migrants, legal status associated with migration patterns, migrants’ human capital, locality of destination, transnational relations without homeland communities, and host country response from local authorities, service providers, and residents. (Fleras 2009)
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The dynamic interaction of diversity and mobility was not without consequence; the rise of immigrants who were geographically detached, of several origins and plurality of affiliations, transnationally connected, socioeconomically differentiated, and legally stratified, posed tough challenges not only for naturalisation into citizenship, but for helping immigrants also to found roots inside local communities, encouraging active participation, and reaching unity and integration. (Rutter et al. 2008)

Undoubtedly, as stated by Waters (2007), policy makers, local authorities, and social service providers could hold the effects of diversity and mobility in readjusting multiculturalism with outlines of new inclusive governance at both national and local levels. New and creative approaches could understand and respond to complicated interactions through which ethnicity crosses race, class, gender, age, and location to build extending standards of identity, membership, and belonging.

In reconsidering governance for the 21st century, then, two multicultural models are at play; to the left is a neo-mono-cultural commitment to integration with difference in which multiculturalism is set by giving priority to unity over difference and social cohesion over ethnic particularity. To the right is a neo-multicultural model that rejects conformist ideas of identity and belonging in favour of multicultural diversity.

Conclusion

According to Sen (2006), the incapability of official authorities to advance a sense of belonging and national identity caused the rise of a new multicultural model best described as plural mono-culturalism; a governance framework made of remote ethno-cultural and religious communities with little in common. Thus, minorities had an inclusive right to found their own communities, express their own identities and values, discover their own histories and languages, and follow their own lifestyles. Yet, by the turn of the 21st century, an adoption of a passive plural mono-
culturalism was no longer maintainable. Instead a new neo-mono-cultural model of governance arose, founded on the principles of unity and integration with main objectives based on community, Britishness/Englishness, and common values. This incline toward integration and community union models of governance changed the politics of managing diversity and difference in primarily different ways. An overt commitment to integration became “assimilationist” with civic Britishness/Englishness replacing multiculturalism as the main political discourse.
Notes to Chapter Four

1 In 2004, the most thorough study of Iraqi deaths as a result of the war put the probable death toll at around 100,000 (Roberts et al. 2004). This study was updated in 2006, and estimated deaths as of July that year had risen to around 655,000 (Burnham et al. 2006). A subsequent survey, conducted in 2007, has estimated that over one million Iraqi citizens have died as a result of the conflict (ORB 2008).

2 The BNP had put out a leaflet in the Beacontree ward of Barking with a photograph of the Tavistock bus explosion and a call to end immigration and ‘say “No” to Labour’s multicultural experiment’ (BNP 2005) in its campaigning for election held on 14 July.

3 The experience of Muslims in Britain (the majority was South Asian of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin or descent) was inextricably linked to their experience as an existing racial minority (see Modood et al. 2002). Though Islam was in no way the exclusive means by which British South Asians identified themselves, it remained the case that, given the tenor of the War on Terror, it had nevertheless become the primary means by which they (whether secular, Muslim, or followers of other religions) were identified by others in discourses of race. Though the frequency with which non-Asians were identified and prosecuted in the War on Terror might be thought to go some way towards breaking an imputed identity in popular and media discourse between “Muslim” and “South Asian”, this racial categorisation had proven to be stubbornly persistent.

4 See Werbner (2002) about the development of “diasporic consciousness” among Muslims as part of transnational moral community.

5 Such thinking was in a sense a prerequisite of the War on Terror. In the same way that the colonial expansion of the British Empire recognised ‘the sovereignty of peoples on the condition that they assumed civilised forms of social life’ (see the discussion of John Stuart Mill in Goldberg (1993, p. 35)), the allegation that a contemporary state harbours, encouraged terrorism (and thus did not display the requisite levels of “civilised” behaviour) became a reason for its invasion.

6 As Milan Rai (2006) argued, this conception of Islamic solidarity contrasted markedly with the parochialism of the Sufi Sunni tradition in which three of the four London bombers were brought up. In Rai’s
analysis, an appeal to the transnational fellowship of the “Ummah” was the mark of a younger generation radicalised by British foreign policy.

7 In reality, Islam was only a substitute target of the War on Terror: neither Britain nor the US was illogical or foolhardy enough to wage a war against a religion. Yet to admit the real doctrine on which these wars were fought would be to lay bare the geopolitical manoeuvrings of imperial adventure, and thus break the legitimacy provided by the threat of “Islamic terrorism”. (Pitcher 2009) As long as the War on Terror could be presented as a defensive rather than aggressive policy then the destabilisation and destruction of nations and the killing of hundreds of thousands of people could continue to be justified in the name of domestic security. The spectre of Islam became the only means to defend the otherwise indefensible, and could on no account be given up as the principal “enemy” in the War on Terror.

8 It was not coincidental that in recent years there was some limited legal protection against religious discrimination, with the launch in 2003 of employment equality regulations, and the Race and Religious Hatred Act which came into force in 2007.

9 The MCB had been courted continuously by the Labour Government since its establishment in 1998, despite the vocal opposition of many of its member groups to the invasion of Iraq (Birt 2005). Such a relationship was commensurate with a greater emphasis under New Labour on the role of religion in civil life. Significant public funds had been committed to closer working with faith communities (Tempest 2007), subject to tests measuring the degree to which religious groups were engaged in ‘promoting community cohesion and integration’ (Blair in Mulholland 2006). For a clear-sighted discussion of the increasing role played by the Islamic right in British politics and its displacement of forms of secular Asian anti-racism, see Bhatt (2006).

10 The prospect of deporting foreign nationals to their potential torture was, despite opposition from human rights groups, a popular measure in the climate of the War on Terror, and some sixty-two percent of the public polled in August 2005 agreed with the deportation ‘of foreign nationals who spread radical Islamist views, even if they were returned to countries which use torture’ (Branigan 2005).

11 While in the event Hizb ut-Tahrir escaped a ban, two successor organisations to Al-Muhajiroun were proscribed under the 2006 Terrorism Act for glorifying terrorism.

12 It is worth recalling that the most recent significant terrorist attacks on the British mainland prior to July 2005 were the London nail-
bombings committed in 1999 by David Copeland, who killed three and injured over 110 people in attacks against Britain’s African-Caribbean, Bangladeshi, and lesbian and gay communities in Brixton, Brick Lane, and Soho. Copeland, as a BNP activist and local organiser of the National Socialist Movement (Sykes 2005), would for one be the first to stress his credentials as a genuine Brit. When thinking about the comparisons that were and were not made in the discourse of the War on Terror, it is worth going back a little further and considering the IRA’s bombing campaign on the British mainland which came to an end only in the mid-1990s. It might be argued that the state’s refusal to make any connection here (an association that, on anecdotal evidence, was frequently made by Londoners in the aftermath of the 2005 bombings) is to do with the state’s strategic differences in dealing with the two conflicts. To make this connection would draw to light the more conciliatory approach that has characterised the peace process since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, a considerable contrast to the aggressive methods of the War on Terror.

Another example that confirmed racism in relation to de Menezes was the photographic collage that was produced by the defence at the 2007 Metropolitan Police trial in an attempt to demonstrate the facial similarities between de Menezes and the terrorist suspect Hussain Osman, and thus to illustrate the legitimate confusion of the officers who pursued and shot de Menezes. Besides their short hair and relative youth, and despite the supposed treating of the photographs, it was difficult to identify any real physical likeness between the two men. (Pitcher 2009)
General Conclusion

Contemporary England is facing a governance crisis. To the left, an evident alteration toward community cohesion is seen as an ideal governance discourse. To the right, concerns are rising over the relevance of this governance model considering the changing realities and contested demands. According to Vertovec (2006), Britain’s diversity is becoming progressively differenced and politicised, thus difference and diversity are not what they used to be. Since the 1990s, immigrants are more varied in terms of skills, prospects, constraints, economic relations, and social contexts, therefore exerting pressure for an “anti-essentialist” multiculturalism to take the place of British plural monoculturalism model. Aspects that are endorsing this super diversity comprise differences in: countries of origin including EU migrants, migration channels, legal status related to immigration standards, immigrants’ human resources, locality of destination, and host country answer from local authorities and service providers.

Together with larger residential mobility, these patterns created what Jill Rutter and colleagues (2008) call “super mobility.” However, the active interaction of super diversity with super mobility is not without consequence. The rise of lately arrived immigrants who are geographically detached, of multiple origins and plurality of affiliations, transnationally connected, socioeconomically different, and legally stratified, poses difficult challenges not only for citizenship, but for helping them also to establish roots within local communities, encouraging their active participation, and attaining cohesion and integration.

To confirm the first hypothesis set in the introduction, British government has adopted various multicultural strategies that acknowledged ethnic diversity and supported it, trying at the same time to eliminate the primary discriminatory barriers in society through race-relations policies; the state would not intervene in the cultural identity of its citizens. In fact, the 1960s Race Relations (now Equality Act) policies
were a series of anti-discrimination measures that first banned excessive forms of racial exclusion, and then by the end of the 1990s, involved implicit forms of discrimination. These measures resulted in shaping a clear national approach to the issue of diversity in all areas of life; access to citizenship, education, health care and employment. However, since the early years of the 21st century, multiculturalism faced serious obstacles, and parties on both sides of the political range were calling for its end.

From the 1960s to the late 1990s, issues of integration involved two major approaches: Race Relations and multiculturalism, which were a direct reaction to the explicit racism within society because of huge influx of immigrants, mainly from the New Commonwealth. Yet, rising criticism of multiculturalism since the late 1990s altered the political rhetoric to emphasise more on civic integration, community cohesion and common citizenship. Though Race Relations and multiculturalism supported ethnic group rights and group identity, civic integration and cohesion were meant to stress the importance of common shared values, feelings of united belonging and individual rights.

Nevertheless, the main difference in policy-making lied in the intensive efforts of the Conservative-led government to retire from a national strategy on integration, leaving it mostly in the hands of the voluntary and private sectors. Instead of a national strategy, research and public consultations, the government created the conditions for “Big Society” in which public institutions were progressively pulled to pieces and the responsibility was placed on the voluntary and private sectors. This fact pointed to an era that was beyond immigrant integration, in which immigration was no more a new phenomenon and integration had long been rooted into the society through anti-discrimination policies, whereas it also pointed in the direction of closed borders, anti-immigration sentiment and declined will to integrate those who crossed the lines.

As Mirza et al. (2007) noted, in replying uncritically to the aftermath of a passive pluralism, successive governments spread dissent and division. The irony of multiculturalism released a discord leading to
residential discrimination, mainly, between blacks and whites. However, as Asian communities fought each other for greater distribution of council funding, ethnic responsibility lines multiplied; Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus started to live in different spaces, attend different schools, and unite through different institutions. Rather than directly undertaking the problems of racism and exclusion of communities, both local and national authorities stimulated black and Asian communities to passively coexist by following “parallel lives” under the umbrella of multiculturalism.

As for the second hypothesis, governance framework transformed accordingly as a reaction to the politics of multiculturalism. British governments may have adopted multicultural ideals, yet its conception and application remained problematic for local government and many state departments. Multicultural discourses and programmes advanced through local councils and municipal authorities who created strategies to deal with diversity and minorities’ integration as well as the establishment of consultation committees and race relations units, and the distribution of funds to minority organisations.

However, instead of improving understanding of cultural differences, multiculturalism nurtured apathy toward other people’s lives, thus strengthening parallel societies with different values. In a word, the rise of plural multiculturalism caused a more fractured Britain whose disintegration raised fears over religious aggressiveness and worries over internal terrorism. Many politicians evaluated multiculturalism as a menace to unity, identity, and security, as well as a failure to advance Western values in conciliating a growing Islamist extremism.

Besides, multiculturalism led to impractical prospects through reinforcing a belief that Britain would admit and adapt to whatever traditions and cultures recognised by different ethnic minority groups; as a culture expresses a person in terms of who he or she is, it was important to defend, preserve, and endorse both culture and minorities. Supporters of the new Labour government believed they were
encouraging integration without assimilation via defending the rights of minorities to keep their culture while promoting their participation as citizens.

The state maintained immigrant integration, yet it remained limited due to human rights standards; the government admitted the need to incorporate immigrants and minorities and isolate any values and beliefs that were explicitly British, except in a universalistic sense of a commitment to the rule of law and democracy. However, without a clear sense of Britishness/Englishness in proposing an integrationist agenda, a reconsidering of multicultural governance could no longer be ignored.

The shift toward civic integration demonstrated a new re-evaluation of multiculturalism through breaking many of the taboos that had shaped Britain’s ethics. Yet, an alteration of leadership did not do much to enhance minorities’ integration. Like his predecessor, Gordon Brown in February of 2008 supported a commitment to British values and the combination of rights with responsibilities. Immigrants and minorities, then, had to be convinced to join citizenship classes, to acquire English language competence, and to declare their loyalty to common British values.

Furthermore, the growth of military violence in the instant outcome of the attacks on America in September 2001 gave justification to racial politics in agreement with the idea of a religiously transformed war between good and evil. In spite of its tragedy, the War on Terror was a conflict without definite objectives or enemies shaping new forms of politics of race. Although Britain’s racial politics developed for hundreds of years in relation to its own imperial history, they were obviously shaped in new ways by America’s commanding practices. Consequently, the state faced new amounting challenges concerning its capacity to hold together an ethics of multicultural pluralism regardless of the demands of war.

As Giorgio Agamben (2005) argued, the “state of exception” that
portrayed government actions was rather a constitutive element of legislative practice; an undeclared lasting state of emergency allowed the state to use its sovereign power outside of the ordinary juridical order. The state of exception described a fundamental relation between the British state and racial groups, hence, remained a tool for categorising and acting upon entire categories of citizens who for some reason could not be integrated into the political system.

Consequently, cultural pluralism, national identity and citizenship all caused new modern challenges in Britain. However, these forms of pluralism and the different political reactions to them could not be neglected; a response to these complicated matters focused much on restructuring governance so as to revive political, economic and cultural practices. Such reforms would reconstitute common understanding of pluralism and diminish the possibility of post-Brexit falling into narrow forms of populism and nationalism.

According to Sen (2006), the incapability of official authorities to advance a sense of belonging and national identity caused the rise of a new multicultural model best described as plural mono-culturalism; a governance framework made of remote ethno-cultural and religious communities with little in common. Thus, minorities had an inclusive right to found their own communities, express their own identities and values, discover their own histories and languages, and follow their own lifestyles.

Yet, by the turn of the 21st century, an adoption of a passive plural mono-culturalism was no longer maintainable. Instead a new neo-mono-cultural model of governance arose, founded on the principles of unity and integration with main objectives based on community, Britishness/Englishness, and common values. This incline toward integration and community union models of governance changed the politics of managing diversity and difference in primarily different ways. An overt commitment to integration became “assimilationist” with civic Britishness/Englishness replacing multiculturalism as the main political discourse.
Generally, in need of rethinking governance, a commitment to cohesion and integration under a neo-mono-culturalism may prove unreliable with the politics of super diversity/mobility. Obviously, then, policy makers, local authorities, and social service providers should learn to consider the deep effects of super diversity/mobility in readjusting multiculturalism with patterns of a new inclusive governance at both national and local levels. As stated by Waters (2007), minority realities no longer turn around the modernist notion of a fixed mosaic, but about the postmodernist metaphor of a mixture, with its dynamics of variability, hybridity, and diversity. Fresh and innovative ways are necessary to understand and respond to complex interactions in which ethnicity interrelates to race, class, gender, age, sexuality, and location, so as to create shared patterns of identity, membership, and belonging.

Furthermore, in rethinking governance for the 21st century, two multicultural approaches are opposed to each other; to one side, neo-mono-cultural commitment to integration with difference. To the other side, neo-multicultural model that defies conformist notions of diversity and difference. With neo-mono-cultural governance, crisis in multiculturalism is resolved through stressing unity over difference, social cohesion over ethnic particularity, and common liberal/national values over default relativism. For neo-multiculturalism, a mosaic metaphor of identity and belonging is excluded in favour of a mixture model of multicultural diversity, with its anti-essentialist implication of internally diverse and highly contested communities.

This doctoral thesis could not investigate all the issues connected to the thematic developed. Certainly, questions remain unanswered and much is to be done. Culture as identity cannot be static but fluid and inevitably subject to change across time. It seems that today, “refugees”, who are not migrants for mainly economic reasons, would develop more easily a sense of belonging in the UK. Yet, there is no need to feel British to some extent.
Indeed, matters of culture and identity are connected to economic criteria and public feeling/anxiety/response to immigration and refugees. To the question: “what does it mean to be British in multicultural Britain/England?” multiculturalism remains an issue of intense debate and controversy.
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## Appendix I: Population by Ethnic Group, Great Britain, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>283,063</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>247,664</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Asian or Asian British</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,331,423</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>565,876</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>485,277</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Black</td>
<td>97,585</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Black or Black British</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other ethnic groups</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>All minority ethnic population</td>
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</tr>
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<td>All ethnic groups</td>
<td>58,789,794</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

**Source:** Office for National Statistics Census 2001
Appendix II: Unemployment Rates by Ethnic Group, Great Britain, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Unemployed (000s)</th>
<th>Unemployment rates</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Persons (%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>White</td>
<td>2,246.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Minorities</td>
<td>238.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Black-Caribbean</td>
<td>53.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-African</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-Other</td>
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<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
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</tr>
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<td>40.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese and others</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Asian</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other-Other</td>
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<td>17.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entire population</td>
<td>2,484.5</td>
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**Source:** Owen 1993
Appendix III: Tenure by Ethnic Group of Head of Household, Great Britain, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Owner-Occupiers %</th>
<th>Local authority tenants %</th>
<th>Housing association tenants %</th>
<th>Private landlord tenants %</th>
<th>Total (100%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>73,346</td>
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<tr>
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<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
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<td>82</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>77</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30,668</td>
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<tr>
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<td>62</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Other</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>77,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21,897,322</td>
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Source: Owen 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous nationality</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2,075</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,575</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder of Europe</td>
<td>5,575</td>
<td>9,370</td>
<td>9,405</td>
<td>17,755</td>
<td>17,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>5,415</td>
<td>6,965</td>
<td>7,245</td>
<td>8,035</td>
<td>10,195</td>
</tr>
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<td>Africa</td>
<td>12,865</td>
<td>21,925</td>
<td>29,790</td>
<td>37,560</td>
<td>39,815</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian sub-continent</td>
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<td>22,145</td>
<td>23,745</td>
<td>26,685</td>
<td>29,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
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<td>6,620</td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td>9,440</td>
<td>6,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder of Asia</td>
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<td>9,150</td>
<td>8,630</td>
<td>15,355</td>
<td>13,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
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<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(3)</td>
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<td>2,290</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>1,985</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>All grants</td>
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<td>82,210</td>
<td>90,295</td>
<td>120,125</td>
<td>124,315</td>
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</table>

**Source:** Office for National Statistics 2004
Appendix V: Percentage of Married People in Inter-Ethnic Marriages, by Ethnic Group and Sex, England and Wales, 2001

Source: Office for National Statistics Census 2001
Appendix VI: Language Proficiency Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaking, FWLS*</th>
<th>All groups</th>
<th>Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Afro-Asian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>37.81</td>
<td>54.55</td>
<td>50.44</td>
<td>64.77</td>
<td>38.16</td>
<td>25.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite well</td>
<td>23.12</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>26.05</td>
<td>18.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not well</td>
<td>20.12</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>18.14</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>21.32</td>
<td>22.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>14.32</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reading, FWLS</th>
<th>All groups</th>
<th>Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Afro-Asian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>34.64</td>
<td>40.91</td>
<td>48.67</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>33.16</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not well</td>
<td>15.86</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardly</td>
<td>13.19</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>14.47</td>
<td>17.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>15.19</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>23.44</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Writing, FWLS</th>
<th>All groups</th>
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<th>Indian</th>
<th>Afro-Asian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>32.39</td>
<td>40.91</td>
<td>45.13</td>
<td>56.82</td>
<td>29.47</td>
<td>23.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite well</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>21.68</td>
<td>23.86</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td></td>
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<td>22.73</td>
<td>15.49</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>18.16</td>
<td>16.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly</td>
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<td>11.06</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>15.15</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3.41</td>
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<td>28.84</td>
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<table>
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<th>All groups</th>
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<th>Af-Asian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fluent</td>
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<td>86.95</td>
<td>39.98</td>
<td>65.63</td>
<td>25.56</td>
<td>25.97</td>
<td>56.59</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fairly</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>9.62</td>
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<td>25.56</td>
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</tr>
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<td>–</td>
<td>25.84</td>
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<td>32.00</td>
<td>34.25</td>
<td>18.13</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.81</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>16.88</td>
<td>16.76</td>
<td>12.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Dusmann and Fabbri 2003

* Family and Working Lives Survey (self-assessed)

** Fourth National Survey on Ethnic Minorities (interviewer assessed)
### Appendix VII: Conceptions of National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree that number of immigrants should be reduced (%)</th>
<th>Agree that stronger measures should be taken to exclude illegal immigrants (%)</th>
<th>Number Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic and Civic</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic only</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** British Social Attitudes Survey 2003  
(Cited in Heath and Tilley 2005)
Appendix VIII: Racist Incidents

Source: Home office Racist Incidents Reports and CPS Reports 1997-2002 (Cited in RAXEN Focal Point for the UK 2004)
## Appendix IX: Asylum Application in the UK (1990-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nr. Of Asylum Application</th>
<th>Refused Asylum (% of Applications)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>26.205</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>46.015</td>
<td>22.315 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>80.315</td>
<td>62.720 (74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>84.130</td>
<td>54.305 (63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33.960</td>
<td>44.070 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>23.610</td>
<td>17.050 (78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>23.430</td>
<td>16.755 (73%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Home Office 2008a
Appendix X: Long Term International Migration to the UK (1991-2008) by Citizenship

Source: ONS 2008
Appendix XI: Religion: England and Wales, 2001 and 2011, All Usual Residents

The order of the main religion groups by size did not change between 2001 and 2011. Those affiliated with the Christian religion remained the largest group; 59 percent (33.2 million) of usual residents in England and Wales. This is a decrease of 13 percentage points since 2001 when 72 percent (37.3 million) of usual residents stated their religion as Christian. It is the only group to have experienced a decrease in numbers between 2001 and 2011 despite population growth. The second largest response category in 2011 was no religion. This increased 10 percentage points from 15 percent (7.7 million) of usual residents in 2001, to 25 percent (14.1 million) in 2011. The next most stated religion in England and Wales was Muslim with five percent (2.7 million) of usual residents stating their religion as Muslim in the 2011 Census; an increase of two percentage points since 2001 when three percent (1.5 million) of usual residents stated that they were Muslim.

Source: Office for National Statistics 2011
Most usual residents of England and Wales belonged to the White ethnic group (86 per cent, 48.2 million) in 2011, a decrease of five percentage points since 2001 (91 per cent, 47.5 million). The majority of these belonged to the White British group (80 per cent of the total population, 45.1 million).

**Source:** Office for National Statistics 2011
Appendix XIII: Most Reported Countries of Birth of Non-UK Born Usual Residents

The three most reported countries of birth in 2011 (India, Poland and Pakistan) each had greater numbers of usual residents than the most reported country of birth in 2001 (Ireland). In addition the 10 most reported countries of birth in 2011 all had greater numbers of usual residents than the country of equivalent rank in 2001. The estimate of usual residents in England and Wales who were born in Poland rose by six percentage points from one percent (58,000) in 2001 to eight percent (579,000) in 2011.

Source: Office for National Statistics 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>694</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 India</td>
<td>456</td>
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<td>10 Poland</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>3 Pakistan</td>
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<td>7 Pakistan</td>
<td>482</td>
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<td>3 Bangladesh</td>
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<td>7 United States of America</td>
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<td>3 Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Italy</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Jamaica</td>
<td>160</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2011, all usual residents in 91 percent (21.3 million) of households spoke English as a main language. In a further four percent (868,000) of households at least one adult spoke English as a main language and in one percent (182,000) of households no adults but at least one child spoke English as a main language. In the remaining four percent (1.0 million) of households there were no residents who had English as a main language. London had the highest percentage; 26 percent (848,000) of households contained a usual resident whose main language was not English. The North East had the lowest percentage; three percent (36,000) of households containing a usual resident whose main language was not English.

**Source:** Office for National Statistics 2011
Appendix XV: How British Identify Themselves

One in six (15%) white Britons identify with their local area or community, potentially a sign of how many have withdrawn from a wider sense of belonging to focusing in on the immediate world around them. In the wake of the Referendum result, it might not be surprising that “Remainers” are more likely to say this than Leave voters (17% vs. 11% respectively). The political fallout since June seems to have had a similar impact on minorities, with their ethnicity now being the single thing ethnic minorities are likely to identify with most (36%), followed by being British (30%) in second place. Asians in particular are much less likely to primarily identify with being British than before the Referendum (31% now vs. 43% before).

The first generation of a family to be born in the UK is the most likely to identify with either their ethnicity (43%) or religion (21%). It’s only then in later generations that identification with Britain improves. This shows that the problem of positively identifying with one’s country of birth is partly generational. The difficulties for those born in Britain to parents with a noticeably different cultural background to the society they grow up in evidently takes its toll; making integration easier for this group in particular will be challenging. On the other hand, large proportions of minorities in all generations still do not identify with being British, suggesting this is only one of the numerous barriers to successful integration into British society.

Appendix XVII: Is Britain a More or Less Racist Country to Live in Than 20 Years Ago?

Only a third (38%) of British minorities believe that the UK is a less racist country than it was before. Even more strikingly, half (52%) of ethnic minorities think that Britain has become less tolerant since voting to leave the European Union, rising to 62% of second generation British minorities. Muslims in particular feel this acutely – 59% think the UK has become less tolerant.

Unsurprisingly, Londoners have a much more positive opinion about the state of integration in Britain. Almost three in five (57%) ethnic minorities in the capital believe the UK is successfully integrated. However, minorities in the Midlands and Northern England are much more divided. For UK adults generally, the key divide is age. Older Britons, particularly those aged 55 and over, quite strongly believe that the UK is not successfully integrated, while younger Britons are much more positive.

Glossary

Acculturation: the process of changing so that you become more like people from a different culture, or of making someone change in this way.

Affiliation: a connection with a political party or religion, or with a larger organisation.

Alien: someone who lives in a country of which he/she is not a legal citizen.

Anthem: a song that has special importance for a particular group of people or country, often sung on special occasions.

Approach: a way of dealing with something.

Assimilation: the process of becoming similar to others by taking in and using their customs and culture.

Asylum: protection or safety, or a protected and safe place, given especially to someone who has left a country or place for political reasons.

Attitude: the way of thinking and feeling about somebody or something.

Behaviour: the way that somebody acts, especially towards other people.

Belief: something that you believe, especially as part of religion.

Brexit: an exit (= act of leaving) by the United Kingdom from the European Union (short for "British exit").

Britishness: the fact of being British, or qualities that are considered typical of British people.

Capitalism: an economic system in which a country’s businesses and industry are controlled and run for profit by private owners rather than by the government.

Citizenship: the state of having the rights of a person born in a particular country. It is also carrying out the duties and responsibilities of a member of a particular society.

Civilisation: is composed of many systems: political, economic, social, etc. related to human beings’ different aspects of life. It is a set of characteristics associated to intellectual, artistic, moral and materialistic way of life specific to mankind.

Cohesion: the situation when the members of a group or society are united.

Commonwealth: an organised group of independent self-governing countries.
**Communism:** a political movement that believes in an economic system in which the state controls the means of production on behalf of the people. It aims to create a society in which everyone is treated equally.

**Community:** a group of people who have the same interests, religion, etc.

**Constitution:** the system of laws and basic principles that a state, a country or an organisation is governed by.

**Consumerism:** a situation involving large amounts of goods being sold to individuals rather than businesses, especially when this is very important to an economy.

**Culture:** the customs and beliefs, art, way of life and social organisation of a particular country or group. It might be defined as the ideas, customs, skills, arts and tool which characterise a given group of people in a given period. It is a repertoire of socially transmitted and intra-generationally generated ideas about how to live, to think and to behave. Cultural models are thus inherited from the preceding generation through socialisation and they are learned intra-generationally and through imitation, teaching and from the media.

**Custom:** an accepted way of behaving or of doing things in a society or a community.

**Democracy:** the belief in freedom and equality between people, or a system of government based on this belief, in which power is held by elected representatives.

**Difference:** the fact of not being the same.

**Discrimination:** prejudice against people and a refusal to give them their rights.

**Diversity:** the mixture of races and religions that make up a group of people.

**Education:** the process of teaching or learning, especially in a school or college, or the knowledge that you get from this.

**Employment:** the number of people who have jobs.

**Englishness:** the quality of being English or of having characteristics regarded as typically English.

**Ethnology:** the scientific study and comparison of human races.

**Ethnicity:** relating to or characteristic of a large group of people who have the same national, racial, or cultural origins, and who usually speak the same language.
**Expectation:** a hope that something good will happen.

**Feudalism:** the social system that existed during the Middle Ages in Europe in which people were given land and protection by a nobleman and had to work and fight for him in return.

**Genocide:** the intentional killing of all of the people of a nation, religion, or racial group.

**Globalisation:** covering or affecting the whole world for example the globalisation of American way of life.

**Governance:** the way that organisations or countries are managed at the highest level, and the systems for doing this.

**Heterogeneous:** consisting of many different kinds of things or people.

**Holocaust:** the killing of Jews and others by the Nazis before and during the Second World War.

**Housing:** buildings for people to live in, this concept is used especially when talking about their price or condition.

**Hybridity:** a person whose background is a blend of two diverse cultures or traditions.

**Identity:** the characteristics, feelings or beliefs that distinguish people from others.

**Ideology:** a set of ideas that an economic or political system is based on.

**Immigration:** the process by which people come in to a foreign country to live there, or the number of people coming in.

**Integration:** to mix with and join society or a group of people, often changing to suit their way of life, habits, and customs.

**Intercultural Understanding:** going beyond your own culture, understanding others’ perspectives and points of view, assisting each other worldwide. A profound change in thoughts, perceptions and values can lead to changing how one views culture and one’s place in it.

**Interpretation:** the particular way in which something is understood or explained.

**Islamophobia:** unreasonable dislike or fear of, and prejudice against, Muslims or Islam.

**Labour:** workers, especially people who do practical work with their hands.

**Language:** the use by humans of a system of sounds and words to communicate.

**Legislation:** a law or set of laws suggested by a government and made official by a parliament.
**Liberalism:** the political belief that there should be free trade, that people should be allowed more personal freedom, and that changes in society should not be made in an extreme way.

**Migration:** to move from one country or region to another, often temporarily.

**Modernisation:** to make a system, methods, etc. more modern and more suitable for use at the present time using the latest technology, designs, materials, etc.

**Multiculturalism:** the belief that different cultures within a society should all be given importance.

**Nation:** a country considered as a group of people with the same language, culture and history, who live in a particular area under one government.

**Nationalism:** a feeling of love and pride in your country; a feeling that your country is better than any other.

**Nazi:** a member of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party that controlled Germany from 1933 to 1945 under Adolf Hitler, or someone who believes in fascism (state control of social and economic life and extreme pride in country and race, with no political disagreement allowed)

**Otherness:** being or feeling different in appearance or character from what is familiar, expected, or generally accepted.

**Patronage:** the financial support that is given to a person or an organisation by a patron.

**Personality:** the various aspects of a person’s character that combine to make them different from other people.

**Pluralism:** the existence of people of different races, religious beliefs, and cultures within the same society.

**Policy:** a set of ideas, or a plan of what to do in particular situations, that has been agreed officially by a government, or a political party.

**Populism:** political ideas and activities that are intended to get the support of ordinary people by giving them what they want.

**Practice:** used to describe what really happens as opposed to what you think will happen in a particular situation.

**Prejudice:** Someone or something that prejudices influences you unfairly so that you form an unreasonable opinion about something.

**Principle:** a belief that is accepted as a reason for acting or thinking in a particular way.
**Propaganda:** information or ideas that are spread by government to influence people’s opinions, especially by not giving all the facts or by secretly emphasising only one way of looking at the facts.

**Racism:** the belief that some races are better than others, or the unfair treatment of someone because of his or her race.

**Recognition:** official agreement that an organisation has authority to do things.

**Reflection:** careful thought about something, sometimes over a long period of time.

**Reform:** a change that is made to a social system, an organisation, etc. in order to improve or correct it.

**Refugee:** a person who has escaped from his/her own country for political, religious, or economic reasons or because of a war.

**Regulation:** to check that the activities of a business or organisation are legal and follow official laws.

**Ritual:** a series of actions that are always carried out in the same way, especially as part of a religious ceremony.

**Socialism:** a set of political and economic theories based on the belief that everyone has an equal right to a share of a country’s wealth and that the government should own and control the main industries.

**Societal:** connected with society and the way it is organised as an entity.

**Society:** a large group of people who live together in an organised way, making decisions about how to do things and sharing the work that needs to be done. All the people in a country, or in several similar countries, can be referred to as a society.

**Stereotype:** a fixed idea or image that many people have of particular type of person or thing, but which is often not true in reality. When one judges people one naturally generalises, simplifies and categorises them. The classification is called stereotyping. Such stereotyping limits one’s width of perception, while at the same time slowly killing one’s ability to inquire and learn about others. Stereotyping is very useful in perpetuating self-fulfilling myths about people. So everybody is an agent of change, the inner self should be allowed to modify and recreate.

**Structure:** the way in which the parts of something are connected together, arranged or organised; a particular arrangement of parts.

**Symbol:** a sign, shape, or object that is used to represent something else.

**System:** a way of doing things.

**Terror:** violent action or threats designed to cause fear among ordinary people, in order to achieve political aims.
**Terrorism:** (threats of) violent action for political purposes.

**War on Terror:** (also known as the Global War on Terrorism) is an international military campaign launched by the United States government after the September 11 attacks. The targets of the campaign are primarily Sunni Islamist fundamentalist armed groups located throughout the Muslim world, with the most prominent groups being Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and the various franchise groups of the two organisations.

**Theory:** a formal statement of the rules on which a subject of study is based or of ideas that are suggested to explain a fact or event or, more generally, an opinion or explanation.

**Third World:** a name for the poorer countries of the world, for example some of those in Africa, South America, and Asia, that have less developed industry than other countries, and in which many people are poor.

**Tradition:** a belief, custom or way of doing something that has existed for a long time among a particular group of people.

**Transnationalism:** refers to the diffusion and extension of social, political, economic processes in between and beyond the sovereign jurisdictional boundaries of nation-states.

**Understanding:** understanding oneself, one’s action, thought, behaviour, mind, feelings, surrounding, nature, is a process. The natural learning occurs when there is interest, curiosity and enthusiasm.

**Values:** beliefs about what is right and wrong and what is important in life.

**Xenophobia:** a strong feeling of dislike or fear of people from other countries.

**Note:** many of these concepts have controversial definitions.

**Sources:** <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/fr/dictionnaire/anglais>

Summary:
The thesis investigates the politics and practices of multiculturalism in Britain, with a particular emphasis on England. It aims to provide some possible answers to the controversial question "to what extent is multiculturalism in England successful?" through pointing out immigrants’ integration and the policies adopted to manage their assimilation within society. It also analyses multiculturalism in practice through education, employment and housing, explores the different challenges facing the policies of diversity and difference at both local and global level, and examines potential political alternatives.

Résumé: